Justice A Badharudeen made the observation on November 13 while considering a petition concerning the failure of authorities to prevent the sale and supply of liquor to persons below 23 years of age.

"That apart, it is high time for the legislatures to consider appropriate amendments in the statutes which deal with the ‘juveniles and child in conflict’ with law to reduce age to 16 years, taking note of the present trend showing sufficient maturity by children when they reach the age of 16," the Court observed.

The petition was filed by journalist Vinod Vikraman Pillai, who alleged that licensed establishments were serving liquor to underage persons in violation of Sections 15A and 15B of the Kerala Abkari Act.

Section 15A prohibits persons below the age of 23 from consuming liquor, while Section 15B restricts licensed establishments from selling or supplying liquor to them.

He contended that the authorities had a statutory duty to enforce these restrictions and that the continued supply of alcohol to underage persons amounted to a failure in discharging their duty.

The petitioner referred to recent incidents in which persons below the age of 18 had caused fatal road accidents and other motor vehicle mishaps after consuming alcohol.

He highlighted the fatal accident at Nedumbassery involving a Mini Cooper, which was driven by a 19-year-old, under the influence of alcohol.

The plea stated that the easy availability of liquor for minors despite existing restrictions posed a serious threat to public safety.

Pillai further added that he had submitted a representation on October 15, to the Excise Commissioner and the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (VACB) Director seeking mandatory electronic age verification systems at bars, action against establishments violating the law and even investigation into excise officials suspected of taking bribes from bar establishments.

When no effective action was taken on his representation, he approached the Court seeking directions to enforce the statutory restrictions and investigate the alleged lapses.

Considering these concerns, the Court observed that the matter required a detailed hearing and posted it to November 24.

In the mean time, it directed the Excise Commissioner to file a statement detailing the directions already issued to implement Sections 15A and 15B of the Kerala Abkari Act.

The Court also sought suggestions on further measures that could be adopted to ensure effective enforcement of these restrictions in order to protect the public from danger.

Advocate U Jayakrishnan appeared for the petitioner.

[Read Order]

The distinction between these two expressions came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division) in Zaha Hadid Limited v. The Zaha Hadid Foundation, [2026]. The facts of this case are interesting. Dame Zaha Hadid was a world-famous Iraqi-born British architect who developed an international architecture practice in the name of Zaha Hadid Limited and had registered trademarks for her name. By a license dated May 1, 2013, she licensed the marks to the company in which she was then the sole shareholder. On her death on March 31, 2016, the trademark passed to the Zaha Hadid foundation - which she had set up to preserve her work and legacy - and the Foundation became the licensor.

Under an agreement, the company (licensee) had to pay a royalty of 6% of its ‘Net Income’ from Licensed Services’. That term was defined to cover all services provided by the licensee whether or not they used the trade mark. After some time, the licensee company contended that the licence fee was too high and claimed that it had the right to terminate the contract after giving reasonable notice. The Zaha Hadid Foundation did not agree and contended that the licensee had no right to terminate at all, because the agreement was for an indefinite period and would continue unless the licensor chose to end it. The matter went to court and the most important issue was the scope of clause 12, which dealt with duration and termination. Clauses 12.1 and 12.2 are reproduced below:

12.1. This agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and shall continue indefinitely, unless terminated earlier in accordance with this clause 12.

12.2. This Licensor shall have the right to terminate this agreement on giving the Licensee not less than 3 months’ written notice of termination.

Clause 12.3 is lengthy, but it specified that the licensor could terminate the agreement with immediate effect if there were specified acts of default on the part of the licensee. The trial judge held that the contract contained no term entitling the company to terminate on reasonable notice. He also held that the agreement would not amount to restraint of trade and rejected the claim of the licensee company on grounds of public policy and reasonableness as well.

Before the Court of Appeal, the company contended that clauses 12.1 and 12.2 did not mean that the contract was “perpetual” and that it had the right to terminate the contract on giving reasonable notice. After considering the submissions of the licensee company and the licensor foundation, the Court of Appeal reversed the view of the single judge and allowed the appeal. Paras 43, 44, and 45 contain the key conclusions of the Court of Appeal.

It was held that a contract which is intended to be perpetual is different from the one in which the duration is indefinite. It held that the contract had to be interpreted on the basis of a two-stage reasoning process. The first was to determine whether, as a matter of construction, it was the common intention of the parties that the agreement to pay royalty was to be in perpetuity. If the contract was not intended to be perpetual, then, even though the duration was indefinite, it could be terminated on giving a reasonable notice. The Court held that the question is not decided by presumptions either way, though commercial parties are not normally expected to bind each other in perpetuity. In this case, the licensor had the right to terminate the agreement by giving not less than 3 months' notice under clause 12.2, but that did not mean that the licensee had no such right. The fact that the contract was to continue indefinitely did not necessarily mean that the parties intended it to be perpetual.

Most importantly, the court held that to describe a contract as being “perpetual” is something fundamentally different from a contract where the duration is indefinite. Accordingly, the court concluded that the company had the right to terminate the agreement by giving a reasonable period of notice. It further pointed out that what is reasonable would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

In India, there is no decision that analyses this distinction between an agreement which is “perpetual” and “indefinite” in the manner the judgment in Zaha Hadid does.

In Classic Motors Limited v. Maruti Udyog, (1997), the Delhi High Court held that unless an agreement expressly states so, it cannot be perpetual. On the facts, it held that both parties to the contract were entitled to terminate it without assigning any reason and by giving 90 days' notice. It must be noted that the dealership agreement had an express termination clause which provided for a 90-day notice period.  

While the words used in the UK are 'indefinite and perpetual', in India, Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 permits a lease of immovable property to be either made for a certain time or to be in perpetuity. These are leases of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes. In the case of leases for any other purpose, the lease is deemed to be from month to month and liable for termination by a 15-day notice. Indian law thus recognises the concept of a perpetual lease. Section 106 provides that the duration of a lease, if not specified in the contract, would be deemed to be a lease from year to year and liable for termination either by the lessor or the lessee by giving six months' notice.

In India, there are a number of cases dealing with immovable property. Most of the cases deal with whether a lease is for an indefinite period or for a permanent period. In Sivayogeswara Cotton Press v. M. Panchaksharappa (1962), the Supreme Court held that if there was a lease of an agricultural land to set up a factory and no period was mentioned in the lease, the presumption is that it was intended to create a permanent tenancy. The fact that the lessee had the right to give up possession did not make a difference on the issue of permanency. If the landlord also had the right to serve notice of ejectment, then it could be treated as a tenancy at will. The High Court had held that the lease, being for an indefinite period, lasted only for the lessee’s lifetime, applying the Privy Council’s rule in Baboo Lekhraj Roy v. Kunhya Singh (1876-77). The Supreme Court reversed this view and held that the lease, read as a whole, to be a permanent tenancy.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Zaha Hadid underscores the importance of carefully drafting contractual clauses, particularly when the contractual period is expected to be for a larger period of time. The UK court rightly pointed out that, generally, commercial parties do not bind themselves forever. Similarly, in India as well, a contract will not be treated as perpetual unless there are clear words to indicate the intention of perpetuity. In the absence of such words, even a contract for an indefinite period can be terminated by either party on reasonable notice.

Arvind Datar is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India.

The initiative, conceived in 2022 by IIMA Professor of Strategy MP Ram Mohan and Tata Sons Group General Counsel Sidharth Sharma, seeks to address the changing expectations from in-house lawyers, whose responsibilities increasingly extend beyond legal advice to strategic business decisions.

Explaining the rationale behind the programme, Professor Ram Mohan said that the competencies required of corporate lawyers differed significantly from those expected in private practice.

"The capabilities required to navigate the demands from in-house lawyers including persuasion, conflict management; long-term strategic thinking; understanding how critical management decisions are made; and the ability to build and motivate teams etc differ in nature and degree from those ordinarily required of a lawyer in private practice," he said.

Sharma said that economic liberalisation had substantially transformed the legal profession, particularly the role of in-house counsel.

"This is particularly visible in the growing role of in-house lawyers, who are expected to take ownership of issues that are both legal and strategic or business-related," he said.

He added that corporate lawyers must understand business imperatives, collaborate across organisations and provide stakeholders with actionable guidance.

Launched in 2023, the programme was designed as a three-to-five-day on-campus certificate course at IIMA. Its curriculum includes leadership, strategic thinking, finance, marketing, team building, persuasion, conflict management, crisis management, legal risk management and Gandhian philosophy.

The programme has entered its fourth edition, with participation from over 100 senior and mid-level lawyers across Tata group companies.

Madhav Uppuluri, General Counsel of Tata Consultancy Services, said executive thinking, leadership and influence had become essential qualities for in-house lawyers.

"The Leadership and Management Development Programme, a unique collaboration between IIM Ahmedabad and Tata Sons Legal, is designed to build exactly these capabilities and transform in-house counsel to next generation legal leaders," he said.

Anjali Balagopal, General Counsel of Tata Technologies, said the programme helped lawyers appreciate the importance of multidisciplinary knowledge.

"It broadens one’s perspective beyond law, reinforcing my belief that in-house lawyers need a multidisciplinary understanding of business, strategy and leadership to be effective strategic partners to the organisation and contribute to better decision making," she said.

Simrata Gujral, General Counsel of Tata Digital, said the programme encouraged experienced lawyers to reassess established approaches to leadership and decision-making.

"It helped me look beyond my legal training, rethink how I approach leadership and decision-making, and return to my role with a broader perspective and renewed intentionality," she said.

Building on the Tata initiative, IIMA began conducting similar programmes for the wider community of Chief Legal Officers and General Counsel in 2024.

Speaking at the Dubai Arbitration Week 2026, Justice Bhat said legal principles have evolved through robust judicial enquiry and the limited scope for reviewing arbitral awards raises a broader question about how new legal concepts would develop.

“So if you leave everything to arbitration, as we all believe that all disputes should be arbitrable, I think there will be a time when the growth of law will be static,” he said.

Justice Bhat was speaking at “Four Courts, One Award: Judicial Perspectives, Cross-Border Advocacy & the Great Common Law Debate”, organised by the Indian Institute of Arbitration and Mediation in association with Balfaqeeh Advocates & Legal Consultants and Providence Law Asia.

The panel also featured former Abu Dhabi Courts judge Ahmed Bakry, Providence Law Asia Managing Director Abraham Vergis SC and JSA Partner Sidharth Sethi. DSK Legal Partner Dinesh Pardasani moderated the discussion.

Justice Bhat clarified that he was not advocating a radical change. However, advances in technology and emerging questions concerning damages and other legal doctrines required reflection on how courts should respond.

He said judicial scrutiny helped develop legal principles. He questioned how new doctrines, including those concerning damages and technology, would evolve if disputes were increasingly resolved through arbitration with limited court review.

He explained that an award could survive judicial scrutiny so long as it met the internationally accepted public policy threshold. This prompted the question of how the law would grow when disputes were increasingly resolved through arbitration.

On judicial intervention in India, Justice Bhat said the position has changed over the past decade, with the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasising that interference must be minimal, and public policy could not accommodate every objection to an award.

“But the courts are more constrained now in the sense that unless something is egregious and it appears on the face of the award, the enquiry doesn't proceed further,” he said.

He also cautioned against straightforward comparisons between India and Singapore. India’s extensive court system, differing judicial understandings of public policy and growing congestion in commercial courts presented distinct challenges. Nevertheless, he said there has been greater stability in the understanding of public policy over the past decade.

Bakry said arbitration-friendly courts should exercise both restraint and meaningful supervision. Courts must establish that parties had agreed to arbitrate, while judicial specialisation requires practical understanding.

“Specialisation is not a sign on the door. It is the judge behind it,” he said.

Vergis said Singapore’s pro-arbitration approach did not shield awards from scrutiny. Courts intervened over jurisdictional defects, breaches of natural justice, decisions exceeding the reference and failure to address fundamental issues.

Sethi said common law systems largely relied on party-driven fact-finding, while civil law systems gave tribunals a more active role. Counsel should adapt to the procedural framework and tribunal’s preferences, without assuming extensive cross-examination would be useful or permitted.

“Ultimately, international arbitration is not about importing your traditions or systems into the proceeding. It is about learning the traditions in the room and then adapting your advocacy accordingly,” he said.

Pardasani highlighted the tension between party autonomy, finality and judicial oversight when multiple courts became involved.