The Supreme Court has recently held that the limitation period for filing an appeal under provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be extended beyond what is provided for in the statute..Section 421(3) of the Companies Act provides that appeals may be filed to the NCLAT within a period of 45 days from the date of the NCLT order. The proviso to this sub-section, however, allows an extended period of 45 days for sufficient cause..An appeal was preferred by Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association to the NCLAT against an order passed by the NCLT. This appeal, however, was filed 9 days after the period of limitation of 45 days had expired and further period of another 45 days had also expired..The appellants relied on Section 433 of the Companies Act, which enables the application of Limitation Act, 1963 to all appeals. Section 5 of the Limitation Act essentially allows the Court to condone any delay if sufficient cause is shown..The appellants further relied on Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which is a para materia provision. This sub-section also provides for a three-month timeline for setting aside an arbitral award with a proviso which allows an extended period of 30 days. However, it contains the words “but not thereafter” after providing the extended timeline for filing an application..The appellants, therefore, argued that in the absence of similar wordings in Section 421(3), Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to condone the delay..Justice Rohinton Nariman of the Supreme Court, however, read period of limitation provided for under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act as different from that provided in the Limitation Act. He also held that ,.“Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply “as far as may be”. In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.”.He further held that the mandatory or peremptory negative language used in Section 421(3) would have same effect as the expression “but not thereafter” used in Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996..The appeal was dismissed accordingly..(Read the judgment)
The Supreme Court has recently held that the limitation period for filing an appeal under provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be extended beyond what is provided for in the statute..Section 421(3) of the Companies Act provides that appeals may be filed to the NCLAT within a period of 45 days from the date of the NCLT order. The proviso to this sub-section, however, allows an extended period of 45 days for sufficient cause..An appeal was preferred by Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association to the NCLAT against an order passed by the NCLT. This appeal, however, was filed 9 days after the period of limitation of 45 days had expired and further period of another 45 days had also expired..The appellants relied on Section 433 of the Companies Act, which enables the application of Limitation Act, 1963 to all appeals. Section 5 of the Limitation Act essentially allows the Court to condone any delay if sufficient cause is shown..The appellants further relied on Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which is a para materia provision. This sub-section also provides for a three-month timeline for setting aside an arbitral award with a proviso which allows an extended period of 30 days. However, it contains the words “but not thereafter” after providing the extended timeline for filing an application..The appellants, therefore, argued that in the absence of similar wordings in Section 421(3), Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to condone the delay..Justice Rohinton Nariman of the Supreme Court, however, read period of limitation provided for under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act as different from that provided in the Limitation Act. He also held that ,.“Section 433 obviously cannot come to the aid of the appellant because the provisions of the Limitation Act only apply “as far as may be”. In a case like the present, where there is a special provision contained in Section 421(3) proviso, Section 5 of the Limitation Act obviously cannot apply.”.He further held that the mandatory or peremptory negative language used in Section 421(3) would have same effect as the expression “but not thereafter” used in Section 34(3) proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1996..The appeal was dismissed accordingly..(Read the judgment)