While upholding a Madras High Court verdict, the Supreme Court found that conversion to Islam alone does not entitle a person to a seat in any of the seven Muslim communities declared as backward classes (BCs) by the Tamil Nadu government.
The case began when Paramasivam (Sameer Ahmed after conversion), a resident of Thoothukudi district in Tamil Nadu, converted from Hinduism to Islam in 2015 and sought to be recognised as a member of one of the Muslim communities listed as backward classes by the State government. Authorities rejected his application for a community certificate. Challenging this decision, Paramasivam approached the Madras High Court, which declared the Tamil Nadu government's government order, allowing a person who converted to Islam from BC, MBC, DC, or SC to be treated as BC (Muslim), unconstitutional. The Tamil Nadu government then appealed the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court.
A Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Sri Chandrasekhar formulated the precise question: whether a person belonging to a BC, MBC, DC, or SC prior to such conversion can, after embracing Islam, claim the status and consequential benefits of a BC Muslim.
In its reasoning, the Court emphasised that a person converting from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order cannot claim affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution merely because of the social backwardness associated with their pre-conversion status. A community certificate is issued based on established lineage and social status within the specified backward classes, not merely based on religious conversion. The judges also referred to previous Supreme Court decisions holding that determining social and educational backwardness under Article 16(4) of the Constitution must consider an individual's status within a recognised community, not just a change in religion. Thus, without proof of acceptance into the specific backward class Muslim community, a convert cannot automatically claim reservation benefits accorded to that group.
This verdict goes beyond a legal battle over a community certificate and raises several important debates in our society. Central among these are questions of identity. If a person leaves one religious community but is not automatically accepted into every social group associated with the new religion, where does that leave the person socially and legally? For example, if a person from SC who benefited from reservation converts and embraces Islam, but cannot claim community membership to any of the recognised communities within Islam that actually enjoy reservation, what will become of him? These questions no longer concern religious identity, but social identity and its legal recognition.
Does conversion immediately end one’s social backwardness? Conversion may not instantly remove the effects of historical discrimination, as social stigma and disadvantage can persist regardless of a change in religion.
In the Chinthada Anand case, the appellant was a Christian pastor who claimed he belonged to the Madiga community, a Scheduled Caste, and was abused by referring to his caste. It was argued that caste is a matter of birth and not of faith, and a change of religion does not wipe out the social identity and historical disadvantages attached to one’s caste. The Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal observing that "the appellant converted to Christianity, the caste status, which he earlier enjoyed as a member of the Madiga community, stood eclipsed in the eyes of law". The appellant thus could not invoke the protections of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (SC/ST) Act.
In CM Arumugam’s case, it was held that "once such a person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, the social and economic disabilities arising because of the Hindu religion cease, and hence it is no longer necessary to give him protection, and for this reason he is deemed not to belong to a scheduled caste".
Although in practice, both Islam and Christianity were prone to a hierarchical social structure similar to caste, theologically, they do not have any inherent superior and inferior social structure. This distinction is crucial. Indra Sawhney’s case rightly recognised this. The nine-judge bench in that case observed that "among non-Hindus, several occupational groups, sects, and denominations are, for historical reasons, socially backward. They too represent backward social collectivities for the purposes of Article 16(4)". Therefore, it seems logical that a person converting to such religions cannot carry past social disadvantages with them.
In the present case, the Court went a step further and acknowledged that at times, past social disadvantages follow a person when they convert to a different religion. Interestingly, the Court held that even if past social disadvantage follows, it still cannot be a ground for availing reservation benefits. It then explained the basis for this distinction. The reason is that social backwardness is treated as a condition arising from membership in a particular social structure whose foundational basis is caste. This is a crucial difference and a slight shift from previous decisions.
Earlier, the Supreme Court in Soosai v. Union of India, placed the responsibility on Christian converts to prove that they still face caste discrimination despite changing their religion. Similarly, in S Anbalagan’s case, the Court acknowledged that a person who belongs to a caste does not automatically lose their caste status upon conversion to Christianity. Since the petitioner has reconverted to Hinduism and was accepted as a member of the Scheduled Caste community throughout his life, he was fully qualified to contest elections from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Castes.
In G Michael’s case, the Madras High Court held that as a general rule, conversion operates as an expulsion from the caste; in other words, a convert ceases to have any caste.
In the present case, the Court concluded that a person's former caste position alone cannot establish membership in a backward class associated with the person's new religion that is not theologically based on caste. The Court recognised the petitioner's religious identity but declined to recognise the petitioner’s social identity and thus denied it legal recognition.
The Court’s observation above seems to miss a crucial point. When the Court acknowledges that social disadvantage follows a converted person, it becomes a social reality and that social reality need not necessarily emanate from caste or be backed by theological scriptures. Caste is, in essence, a socially constructed reality in its mechanism and a theologically backed social structure in its continuation and enforcement. Therefore, when caste becomes social reality, it has consequences in a non-Hindu social order. Even if a converted person wants to detach himself from this social reality, he cannot. And when he does, he faces consequences for that detachment.
In the book titled Karukku, the author Bama explores how caste penetrated Christianity. Nothing has changed, she concludes. Investigative reports such as the Hindu's video report on caste discrimination in Christianity highlight how caste hierarchies continue to manifest within church institutions and social practices in Tamil Nadu.
Another crucial difference appears in the present case. The petitioner sought to join one of the seven Muslim communities identified as backward by the Tamil Nadu government. This is why the Supreme Court distinguished between being a member of a religion and being a member of a particular community within that religion. If a person converts to Islam, he effectively steps out of the community in which he was born and enters into a religion that has different social communities that are categorised as backwards by the government. Therefore, one cannot seek membership in the different communities within that religion, nor can one claim reservation benefits by converting to it. Thus, even if a person converted to Islam suffers social and educational backwardness, he cannot claim reservation, because being a member of a particular community in the host religion is by established lineage.
Where does this person stand? Let’s assume that a person is converting to Islam for want of dignity, equal treatment and equal respect or any other religion for that matter. He may get them, but the conversion cannot ameliorate his social and educational backwardness because such social disadvantages prima facie arose on account of caste. It may continue to persist even after conversion. One cannot assume that his life has suddenly improved socially and educationally because he renounced the past caste-based social structure and joined the new one. He enjoyed constitutional benefits, which now stop upon conversion because the law does not permit him to claim them.
On the one hand, ignoring the social and educational impacts that persist after conversion runs counter to the purpose of social justice. On the other hand, continuing eligibility based on a previous social identity without examining the current situation creates practical problems. Thus, there is a strong friction between social reality and the legal framework of constitutional reservation. Surely, there must be a way to reconcile this.
However, the courts are not the appropriate place for such reconciliation. Merely identifying a social problem in court cannot guarantee a new reservation category or classification in the existing scheme. The courts can interpret constitutional provisions, examine the validity of classifications and evaluate state actions, but cannot create a new reservation category. That is a matter of state policy. In fact, Indra Sawhney’s case also emphasised that the authority appointed to identify backwardness must be left to do so.
A religious convert should not acquire reservation benefits based on previous social identity or by joining the new community, but on well-founded evidence that they still face social disadvantage. Reservation should never protect one’s past identity; rather, it should lift those disadvantaged in education and employment because of societal inequalities. But if past social disadvantage continues even after conversion, then reservation benefits should be extended to lift those in deprived status. That would be an emphatic way to implement social justice schemes.
Mohamed Sajid Nadwi is a practising Advocate at the High Court of Madras.