Modification of arbitral awards: Not the need of the hour

Why the proposal to allow courts to modify arbitral awards in domestic arbitration is untimely and unwise.
Arbitration
Arbitration
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A recent column here made the case for a legislative amendment in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to provide courts with the power to modify awards in domestic arbitration.

The column, in its conclusion, suggests that the scope of this amendment will be “restricted to domestic India-seated awards falling foul of public policy”. This essay is a response to the column and argues that India’s arbitration ecosystem requires a return to the basics, rather than reforms to appease the naysayers.

Gayatri Balaswamy and its aftermath

In the original column, the author covers the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gayatri Balaswamy and how its unruly categories for when the power to modify is appropriate have led to more chaos than calm. Interestingly, the column makes the case for why the Supreme Court’s ability to modify the award under Article 142 will have "terrible consequences as a party will ultimately never be certain as to what the ultimate outcome will be (and whether an award will be modified eventually) (…) Businesses rely on certainty and predictability, and are loathe the use of unbridled discretion...”

I agree with this wholeheartedly. One of the bedrock principles of arbitration is finality: parties consciously choose to resolve their disputes through arbitration instead of traditional court-based litigation for its bespoke advantages of autonomy, efficiency and finality. Justice Viswanathan’s dissent focused on these principles when he explained how modification would cut against the core idea of minimal judicial interference in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. He also explained why the majority’s decision would disturb the legislative scheme for setting aside of arbitral awards – which made no mention of a power to modify or vary the award.

Specifically, in the context of Article 142, it is even more troubling. If the Supreme Court wields the power to modify awards at a discretionary last stage of judicial proceedings (an SLP, after all, is a discretionary power sparingly exercised), parties lose one of arbitration’s core advantages and uncertainty looms. But if it is understood that modification takes away the advantage of finality and diminishes predictability for parties, why propose entrenching it through legislation instead?

Re-arbitration and the inevitability of an appeal

The column makes two central arguments for why modification should be allowed through a legislative amendment in the Arbitration Act:

First, forcing parties to re-arbitrate their dispute after years of protracted litigation over an award that was set aside on grounds of public policy is an “inappropriate and undesirable” outcome and it would be better if the Section 34 court were allowed to modify the award, nipping this problem in the bud. The column speaks of awards that are set aside on the ground of public policy, although it is not immediately evident why the argument would not follow for other grounds under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Second, it says that allowing Section 34 courts to modify the award will assuage the naysayers of arbitration, predominantly PSUs and the government, and help inspire confidence.

I will address these in turn.

As the author himself notes, the threshold for interference with arbitral awards must not be whittled down – keeping in tune with the principle of minimal judicial interference under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. And it is also accepted that at no stage of judicial review over an arbitral award should there be a review of the merits of the case, which remains the exclusive territory of the arbitral tribunal. If both principles are accepted, a power to modify the award will destroy the boundaries of the court’s limited jurisdiction and invariably lead to an evaluation of the merits of the case.

Let me take the very example the original column used. If an arbitral tribunal has, in a violation of its mandate, effectively re-written the contract between the parties in its award, the column suggests that the ideal solution in that case would be “for the Section 34 court to apply the terms of the contract instead and modify the portion of the award that rewrote the terms”. The exercise of modifying the portion of the award will inevitably require the court to consider the pleadings and evidence led by the parties in the arbitration, for applying the terms of the contract does not happen in a factual vacuum but depends on the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. In other words, the court will be conducting a merits-based review to modify the award – which, in my eyes, is two sins in one go.

There is a theoretical justification for this as well. As Justice Viswanathan took great pains to explain in his dissenting judgment in Gayatri Balaswamy, an arbitration agreement does not lose its validity after an award is rendered and subsequently set aside, except in those cases where it was found that no arbitration agreement existed. As a result, the parties’ consent to arbitrate disputes arising out of their contract (and, resultantly, not have courts decide them) continues to remain valid and should detract a Section 34 court from modifying the award while considering (and deciding) an application to set aside.

What, then, about the argument that it is more efficient to allow modification given the time parties end up spending in pursuing their statutory remedies under the Arbitration Act and exhausting their remedy of an SLP before the Supreme Court? Allowing a modification for this reason would be akin to breaking a walnut with a sledgehammer.

Awards that are re-writing contracts or overlooking vital pieces of evidence deserve to be set aside at the Section 34 stage itself – and the Section 34 court’s judgment will say as much. Instead of asking whether parties should go through “the same rigmarole” of re-arbitrating their dispute, my advice is for parties to carefully and consciously evaluate the actual likelihood of succeeding in a Section 37 appeal and in a subsequent SLP before the Supreme Court – both of which provide very little room to parties to overturn the Section 34 court’s decision. These appeals should not be filed as a matter of right when the Section 34 court’s decision is sound and the award suffers from fatal deficiencies; doing so is a waste of everyone’s time and resources.

Arbitration offers plenty of advantages, but extracting those advantages needs active participation. Choosing the right tribunal and a strategic choice of seat, building a robust case through pleadings and evidence, fixing avoidable errors through Section 33 applications are all steps that parties can take to ensure that the final award is one that parties don’t even feel the need to challenge in the first place.

But the naysayers are seemingly losing faith in arbitration and modification may be a way to assuage them. Not quite.

Nay to the naysayers

In a recent column here, the fallacy of the naysayers’ position was revealed: arbitration’s loudest critics (the government, its instrumentalities and its undertakings) were less than impressed that its recent arbitration cases had resulted in huge financial liabilities and had failed to deliver the cost and time efficiencies it promised. What they failed to recognise was that arbitration is merely a dispute resolution process that puts the parties in control of the proceedings. It does not (and cannot) magically turn a bad case on merits into a good one, or provide cost and time efficiencies despite multiple requests for adjournments and a consistent failure to abide with agreed timelines.

Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision in NHAI v. Hakeem came at a time when it was the NHAI that had called for adhering to the principle of finality and argued against any modifications to arbitral awards that had made an initial grant of compensation to landowners.

Allowing Section 34 courts to modify arbitral awards will not assuage the naysayers or inspire confidence. It will only provide them with one more aspect about the arbitration ecosystem in India to complain about.

Why the UK and Singapore example is inapposite

The column mentions that other jurisdictions, including premier arbitration seats such as the United Kingdom and Singapore, contain legislation that include the power to vary arbitral awards. It asks how a provision allowing modification will adversely affect India’s reputation as a seat of arbitration, if it didn’t do so for these jurisdictions.

Framing the question in these terms, in my view, is unappealing. The power to vary awards is one that is invoked extremely rarely and requires a leave of the court in most instances – which is refused in most cases. A jurisdiction builds its reputation as an arbitration seat by providing an environment that encourages and supports arbitration proceedings, both domestic and foreign. An amendment in the Arbitration Act to allow modification of awards at the Section 34 stage needs to earn its place on its own merit and provide a change that improves the present legislative framework or fixed an existing flaw, not because it is a feature also seen in leading jurisdictions.

The amendment that is needed in the Arbitration Act, post Gayatri Balaswamy, is a provision similar to Section 71(2) of the UK Arbitration Act, which recognises the modifications made by a court as part of the tribunal’s award – to overcome any preventable hurdles in the enforcement of India-seated awards, that have been subsequently modified by courts. Modification, otherwise, should respectfully be off the table in the next round of amendments to the Arbitration Act.

Sumit Chatterjee is a commercial litigation and arbitration lawyer.

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