Karnataka High Court declines to quash criminal proceedings against MLA CS Puttaraju

The Karnataka High Court recently declined to quash the chargesheet filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) CS Puttaraju, for allegedly securing a site from the Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA) by abusing his position as a MUDA member and MLA. .Justice S Sunil Dutt Yadav dismissed the criminal petition filed by Puttaraju and upheld the order of the trial court, noting that the conclusion of trial court was correct, even though the reasoning was partially faulty. Defects in reasoning in arriving at the conclusion can be ignored to secure the ends of justice, under Section 482 (inherent power of High Court) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the Court said. .The chargesheet against the petitioner had been filed before the Special Judge for CBI cases for offences under Sections 120-B (criminal conspiracy), 406 (criminal breach of trust) 409 (Criminal breach of trust by public servant), 420 (cheating) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 13(2) (public servant who commits criminal misconduct) read with Section 13(1)(c) (public servant fraudulently misappropriating property) and (d) (abusing position as public servant for pecuniary advantage) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act)..Puttaraju, who belongs to Janata Dal (Secular) party, was an MLA from Melukote constituency from 2008 to 2013 and served as a member of MUDA. As per the allegations by the CBI, Puttaraju illegally got himself allotted a site, even though he was ineligible, as his wife was already an allottee from the same Authority. In 2009, he applied to MUDA seeking allotment of a site declaring that neither he nor his family had been allotted any site by any Urban Development Authority. Moreover, the application was predated. In 2011, he executed a sale deed in favour of one Khalak Sharief for the allotted site, after which he made an application to MUDA seeking cancellation of the allotment. Subsequently in 2012 he repurchased the same property from Sharief. .The Court examined whether sanction under Section 197 (prosecution of Judges and public servants) of CrPC is required for proceedings relating to offences under the IPC. Sanction is required where the person "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty", the Court noted. The Court referred to the judgement of the apex court in Rajib Ranjan and Others v. R.Vijaykumar, to state that whether or not the offence was committed in the course of the petitioner's official duty would to have to be evaluated by the material and evidence in support of the chargesheet. "Such exercise involving appreciation of quality of evidence is a matter best left to the trial Court at the appropriate stage in the trial," the Court said. .Further, the Court considered whether sanction under Section 19 (previous sanction necessary for prosecution) was required under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In 2018, Section 19 of the Act was amended to read that sanction is needed when the offence is allegedly committed by a person "who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed". Prior to the amendment, sanction was required only if the person was currently employed at the time when cognisance of the offence is taken. In the present case, the chargesheet was filed in the year 2016, after his period of office from 2008 to 2013, and prior to the 2018 amendment, therefore of sanction for prosecution would not be required, the Court held. .The Court then considered the issue that cognisance was taken by order of the special judge only on March 29, 2021, even though the charge sheet dated December 12, 2015 was filed on February 03, 2016. The investigating agencies completed their investigation when they filed the chargesheet in 2016, the Court noted. Referring to the judgement of the apex court in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director K.M.Cherian and Ors, the Court said that delay or deferment of taking cognisance by a special judge, when there is no legal impediment to do so, does not prejudice the investigation.."Keeping in mind the principle that the 'act of the court shall prejudice no man', it could be concluded that the final report filed prior to amendment in 2018 of the Act ought to have been considered and is deemed to have been considered and cognizance taken as per the law prevailing when the charge sheet was ripe for consideration," the order said. .With regard to the applicability of the amendment made in 2018 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Court referred to the judgement of the Karnataka High Court in Govardhan M v. State of Karnataka, which noted that every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is made to have a retrospective effect. In case of an amendment, the amended provision is substituted in the place of earlier provision, "as if the substituted provision is there in the earlier act from the inception." However, if the amendment Act expressly states that the substituted provision shall come into force from the date the amendment comes into force, the said provision is prospective in nature, the Court said."Then it is not open to the Court by way of interpretation to give retrospective effect to such provision," the order stated..The amendment in the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force on July 26, 2018, and therefore the substitution would be effective prospectively, the Court held. .Referencing the decision of the Telangana High Court in Katti Nagaseshanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr, the Court noted that the 2018 amendment imposes a new obligation and duty on the prosecution to obtain sanction even after retirement of the public servant, and that, "it is not the intention of the legislation to defeat all prosecutions pending against retired Government Servants." .In this regard, Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act was referred to, which lays down that repeal of an enactment will not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy, unless a different intention is apparent. .While upholding the order of the trial court in continuing the prosecution against the petitioner, the Court noted that their reasoning was partially faulty, even though the conclusion of the trial court was in accordance with the law. To support this, the Court utilised the Tipsy Coachman Doctrine, which states that a correct conclusion in a higher Court can be upheld, even if the reasoning of the lower Court was flawed. The doctrine was evolved by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Lee v. Porter in the year 1879 and it stated:"The human mind is so constituted that in many instances it finds the truth when wholly unable to find the way that leads to it."The Court also quoted a poem by Oliver Goldsmith, named Retaliation: A Poem, which was penned in 1774: ."The pupil of impulse, it forc’d him along,His conduct still right, with his argument wrong;Still aiming' at honor, yet fearing to roam, The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home.”.With this poetic reference, the Court observed that defects in reasoning can be ignored to secure the ends of justice, in consistency with the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 (inherent power of the High Court) of the CrPC. .[Read Order]