Extension of limitation period ordered due to COVID-19 does not apply to statutory period for condoning delay: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on Friday said that the order passed by it in March this year extending the period of limitation on account of the COVID-19 pandemic would not be applicable to the time period up to which delay can be condoned under discretion provided for by a statute..In its judgment rendered on Friday, the Bench headed by CJI SA Bobde and comprising Justices AS Bopanna and V Ramasubramanian held,."What was extended by the above order of this Court was only “the period of limitation” and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute".The Court further said that the phrase "prescribed period" which appears throughout in the Limitatrion Act cannot be construed to mean anything other than limitation period..This ruling came from the Court in an appeal against the decision of the NCLAT where an application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the appeal before NCLAT was dismissed as being barred by limitation. The appellant in the instant case had moved the NCLAT in appeal in July this year while the period of limitation stood lapsed on March 18 this year..The sole point of contention before the Supreme Court was that the NCLAT did not take into account the order passed by the Supreme Court on March 23 through which the period of limitation stood extended with effect from March 15, on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown and the ensuing restrictions and difficulties..Unimpressed by this argument and rejecting the same, the Supreme Court's judgment ruled that,."The order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them.".Moreover, the Court delved into the meaning of the term "prescribed period" to say that while it is not defined anywhere specifically under the Limitation Act, it has been used in the Act to denote a period of limitation.Therefore, the appellants could not have claimed the benefit of the March order for enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be condoned, the Court said..Advocate Gunjan Singh represented the appellants while Senior Advocate Sajan Poovayya represented the first respondent in the case..Read Judgment: