The Supreme Court has held that merely abusing in filthy language does not constitute criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal Code (IPC)..The judgment was delivered by the Bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan and KM Joseph in an appeal challenging a judgment of the Allahabad High Court..The appellant is the Director of a surveying company which undertakes survey of insurance claims for insurance companies. The appellant’s company had given an adverse report about the insurance claim made by the respondent’s company. The appellant claims that a complaint of criminal intimidation was filed by the complainant..The respondent filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC alleging offences under Sections 383, 384, 471, 504 and 506 of IPC. The allegation by the respondent was that the appellant came to the respondent’s house with two-three other people. The appellant was holding a revolver and he hurled abuses in filthy language at the complainant. The appellant and his associates fled the spot when the complainant’s neighbours arrived..The Investigating Officer conducted investigation into the complaints, not once but twice. The second investigation was pursuant to a protest petition filed by the respondent in which the Judicial Magistrate ordered a probe. On both occasions, the IO filed a closure report saying no case has been made out. A second protest petition was filed by the respondent in which the Judicial Magistrate summoned the appellant for offences under Section 503 and 506 of the IPC. A discharge application filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and a Criminal Revision against the same was rejected by the Allahabad High Court..The Allahabad High Court came to be challenged in Supreme Court. The question before the court was whether the acts of the appellant constituted criminal intimidation under Section 506 of IPC..The Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2013) 14 SCC 44] wherein the ingredients of the offence under Section 504. As per the said judgment, Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence..The Court then placed reliance on the judgment in Manik Taneja and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Another [(2015) 7 SCC 423] in which the Supreme Court had examined the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In that judgment, the Court had held that the mere fact that the allegation that accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506..“It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant.”.In the above case, allegation was that appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506. .Applying the ratio laid down in the above two judgments to the instant case, the Court held that the ingredients for the offences Section 504 and 506 are not satisfied. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients, the Court held. The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court..Read the Judgment:
The Supreme Court has held that merely abusing in filthy language does not constitute criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal Code (IPC)..The judgment was delivered by the Bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan and KM Joseph in an appeal challenging a judgment of the Allahabad High Court..The appellant is the Director of a surveying company which undertakes survey of insurance claims for insurance companies. The appellant’s company had given an adverse report about the insurance claim made by the respondent’s company. The appellant claims that a complaint of criminal intimidation was filed by the complainant..The respondent filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC alleging offences under Sections 383, 384, 471, 504 and 506 of IPC. The allegation by the respondent was that the appellant came to the respondent’s house with two-three other people. The appellant was holding a revolver and he hurled abuses in filthy language at the complainant. The appellant and his associates fled the spot when the complainant’s neighbours arrived..The Investigating Officer conducted investigation into the complaints, not once but twice. The second investigation was pursuant to a protest petition filed by the respondent in which the Judicial Magistrate ordered a probe. On both occasions, the IO filed a closure report saying no case has been made out. A second protest petition was filed by the respondent in which the Judicial Magistrate summoned the appellant for offences under Section 503 and 506 of the IPC. A discharge application filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and a Criminal Revision against the same was rejected by the Allahabad High Court..The Allahabad High Court came to be challenged in Supreme Court. The question before the court was whether the acts of the appellant constituted criminal intimidation under Section 506 of IPC..The Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2013) 14 SCC 44] wherein the ingredients of the offence under Section 504. As per the said judgment, Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence..The Court then placed reliance on the judgment in Manik Taneja and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Another [(2015) 7 SCC 423] in which the Supreme Court had examined the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In that judgment, the Court had held that the mere fact that the allegation that accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506..“It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant.”.In the above case, allegation was that appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506. .Applying the ratio laid down in the above two judgments to the instant case, the Court held that the ingredients for the offences Section 504 and 506 are not satisfied. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients, the Court held. The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court..Read the Judgment:
