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How cryptocurrency is reshaping money laundering and terrorist financing

An effective response to crypto-enabled financial covertness requires more than taxation and sectoral regulations.

Anmol Ratan

The rise of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) such as crypto-exchanges, digital wallets and decentralised finance platforms (DeFi) has fundamentally reshaped the global financial regulatory landscape.

By offering quicker, cheaper and pseudonymous transactions beyond the realm of regulated banking infrastructures, VASPs are appealing not just to legitimate transactors but also to organised criminals seeking to launder illicit funds.

Since 2014, when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first published a cautionary note on it, cryptocurrency has become instrumental in the operations of terrorist groups, drug dealers, child sexual abuse material (CSAM) distributors, weapon cartels and sanction evaders. Followed by the FATF, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had also warned on the notoriety of cryptocurrency and digital assets for being conduits of money laundering, terror financing, drug and human trafficking.

Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis estimated that on-chain cryptocurrency-linked money laundering reached at least USD 82 billion in 2025. Emerging during the pandemic, Chinese money laundering syndicates are arguably the most rapidly expanding networks in the world today which had processed about USD 44 million per day in 2025. Platforms such as Huione and Xinbi have emerged as important facilitators connecting illicit service providers with customers. An August 2025 advisory from the U.S. Treasury's FinCEN highlighted the deep penetration of such Chinese networks, identifying them as a critical, systemic threat to domestic and global financial security.

Centralised exchanges and decentralised finance

Centralised exchanges generally operate through identifiable intermediaries that facilitate transactions while keeping checks on compliance, KYCs and suspicious activity monitoring. For instance, SEBI mandates its registered intermediaries to monitor and report suspicious transactions. DeFi protocols, in contrast, facilitate transactions through smart contracts - self-executive programs that automatically implement predefined conditions on a blockchain. Most of these protocols operate without human oversight, due diligence, KYCs or centralised kill switch. Simply put, smart contracts swap a Token A for a Token B without checking its source or trail further undermining anti-money laundering (AML) and even counter-terror financing (CFT) obligations.

The recent development of ‘laundering-as-a-service’ networks that offer a range of services tailored to launder dirty money has complicated matters further. Prominent among these services are ‘money mule motorcades’, which establish complex webs of networks between different accounts and wallets with an intention to obscure its origins and the track. Another methodology is ‘Black U Services’ in which the platforms specialise in selling illicit crypto-tokens at discounted rates. Buyers usually purchase such assets at lower rates in return for assuming the potential risk and legal exposure attached to such tainted tokens.

Such arrangements effectively outsource the money laundering process as their core business, allowing for easier placement, layering and integration of illegally obtained funds in regulated financial systems. This is as much a predicament for financial regulators as it is a systemic national security concern that aggravates the global institutionalisation of terrorism and crime.

Crypto terror financing: Global and domestic realities

Organisations such as Hamas have been leveraging cryptocurrencies and DeFIs since 2019. Initially relying on standard crypto-wallets, Hamas progressively shifted towards non-custodial wallets in order to evade sanctions. By 2021, it launched a fundraising campaign via social media asking for donations and funds solely through cryptocurrencies. This shift towards decentralised financial tools and platforms highlights the potency of digital assets in efficient terror fundraising.

The reliance on crypto extends beyond non-state actors to targeted state-backed plots, as was noted in 2022 Department of Justice of the United States of America indictment in which the US claimed that an operative of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) utilised cryptocurrency to arrange an assassination of former National Security Advisor John Bolton. Such threats are neither distant nor purely foreign.

India too is acutely exposed to the mechanics of crypto-financed terrorism. A crypto-hawala racket was reportedly unearthed by the IT Department in Kerala involving illicit transactions amounting to ₹330 crore. In this case, crypto money was received from Indonesia and the money trail was concealed by mixing and creating multiple fake accounts and wallets. Back in 2024, cryptocurrencies were used to fund the Bengaluru Rameshwaram Cafe ​​attack. Lastly, several crypto fundraising links have been found in India tracing back to the Islamic State Khorasan Province.

On the global stage, multilateral organisations have repeatedly warned us of the reinforcing nexus between cryptocurrencies and terrorism. Reports from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have revealed that ISIS’s Al-Karrar has funnelled upwards of $25,000 in the form of stablecoins. The UNSC has also found that illicit trade in cultural heritage, antiques and other stolen treasures are frequently used to finance terror. This makes it clear that digital assets have created a niche, multilayered financial architecture that covertly facilitate–fundraising, cross-border movement as well as concealment and conversion of illicit funds.

A fragmented policy response

Given the facts, crypto-governance, or the lack thereof, is a concern that is rather urgent. As of now, different jurisdictions follow distinct governance and regulatory frameworks leaving little to no scope for global regulatory alignment. Jurisdictions may be broadly categorised into three groups depending on their overall treatment of cryptocurrencies. Category A is composed of countries like China, that have heavily restricted the operations of cryptocurrencies. Recently in 2025, Algeria outlawed all kinds of crypto-activities including owning, trading and mining. Category B includes countries such as the UAE and El Salvador that have openly embraced the rise of crypto in their respective jurisdictions. Category C is of countries like Japan and the EU that allow for crypto-activities under a very close regulatory oversight. Japan was in fact one of the first countries to set up crypto-laws (Payment Services Act and the Financial Instruments Exchange Act). EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulations or MiCA came into effect in 2024.

In order to bridge this regulatory schism, the FATF extended the application of Recommendation 16 (travel rule) to VASPs. As per the travel rule, VASPs must obtain, verify and transmit information of their senders and receivers of a transaction that is valued at USD/EUR 1,000 or above. By doing this, the FATF, to an extent, stripped away the blanket anonymity enjoyed by the entities on such platforms.

It is, however, important to note that the FATF rule only applies to regulated and registered platforms and that it thereby does not obligate unhosted wallets, P2P networks and unregulated platforms. Additionally, the FATF recommendations are only applicable to signatory states, which again creates a challenge ensuring a unified and comprehensive response to such developments.

Call for a unified defense

Navigating this fragmented landscape requires India and other countries to move beyond piecemeal measures toward an integrated enforceable regulatory overhaul. A significant step in this direction was taken in March 2023, when the Indian government designated crypto-exchanges and other VASPs as reporting entities under the Section 2 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and thereby subjecting them to the supervision of the FIU-IND.

However, extending the PMLA framework to specific service providers does not, by itself, resolve the problems posed by non-custodial wallets, peer-to–peer arrangements. Strengthening Indian anti-money laundering along with counter-terror financing mechanisms remains paramount in this regard. The FIU-IND’s actions against 25 offshore virtual service providers in October 2025 illustrates both the scale of the challenge as well as the need for it. India needs to invest in specialised institutional capacity. This would require specialised capacity building and institutional access to advanced blockchain forensic tools.

Equally important would be to put in place protocols for information-sharing, digital evidence sharing, recovery among nations, states and strategic partners. Section 56 of the PMLA provides for a similar framework of international cooperation between countries for the purposes of prevention of money laundering. At a global level, the implementation of FATF standards remains necessary and urgent. Common baseline standards must be put up for deliberation and dialogue at fora such as the G20 as well as World Economic Forum to reduce regulatory arbitrage that allows illicit actors to exploit our systems.

An effective response to crypto-enabled financial covertness requires more than taxation and sectoral regulations. It demands clear legal responsibility, capable institutional enforcement as well as coordinated international actions.

Anmol Ratan is an advocate practicing before the Patna High Court.

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