The Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 creates a statutory right in favour of citizens and corresponding statutory duties for public authorities and public information officers (PIOs).
A PIO is not merely processing an administrative request. The officer is required to adhere to duties prescribed by the Act, including the obligation under Section 7 to deal with an application within the prescribed period and communicate the decision in accordance with law.
The question becomes legally significant when an official response is not merely delayed or erroneous, but knowingly false. If a PIO knows that a record exists and nevertheless states that it does not, the issue may move beyond ordinary administrative lapse and into the field of statutory and, in an appropriate case, criminal accountability.
A criminal analysis must begin by separating three situations. A record may genuinely be unavailable to the PIO despite a reasonable search. There may be negligence or defective record management. Or an officer may know that the record exists and deliberately deny its existence. These situations cannot be treated alike. Section 20 of the RTI Act itself recognises the significance of mala fide denial and knowingly giving incorrect, incomplete or misleading information. It also covers destruction of information and obstruction in furnishing it. Thus, the Act itself draws a distinction between an ordinary failure and conduct involving knowledge or mala fides.
Section 198 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 provides a possible criminal law framework in a narrow class of cases. It applies where a public servant knowingly disobeys a direction of law concerning the manner in which he is required to conduct himself as a public servant, with the intention of causing injury to a person or with knowledge that such injury is likely to result. Four elements therefore require attention: the accused must be a public servant; there must be a legal direction governing the conduct; the disobedience must be knowing; and the required intention or knowledge concerning injury must be established. The provision does not criminalise every breach of official duty.
The important question is whether the relevant RTI obligation amounts to a "direction of law" for the purposes of Section 198. In a case involving a PIO, the statutory duties under Sections 5 and 7 provide the starting point. Section 7 requires the PIO to deal with the request and communicate the decision in the manner prescribed by law. Where information is denied, the statutory scheme requires the response to identify the reasons for rejection and the appellate remedy. A deliberate false statement that a known record does not exist cannot be equated with a lawful refusal under Sections 8 or 9. Whether the particular conduct satisfies Section 198, however, remains a question for the competent court on the evidence.
The most important limitation is the requirement of injury. Section 198 does not punish knowing disobedience by itself. The prosecution must establish the additional mental element relating to injury. The BNS defines injury broadly to include harm illegally caused to the body, mind, reputation or property. But broad statutory language does not mean that every inconvenience caused by an RTI violation amounts to criminal injury. A complaint should identify the injury relied upon and explain how the accused's conduct caused, or was known to be likely to cause, that injury.
It would, therefore, be unsafe to convert every unsuccessful RTI application into an allegation of criminal mental injury. Repeated proceedings, unnecessary expenditure, loss of a legal opportunity, reputational consequences or other concrete harm may become relevant depending upon the facts. But the complainant must establish the factual basis and causal connection. A bare assertion that the applicant was harassed or frustrated should not substitute for the statutory requirement under Section 198.
In a case based on a statement such as “record not found”, the central evidentiary question will often be what the PIO knew when the reply was issued. A later discovery of the record, by itself, does not prove criminal intention. Stronger evidence may include earlier correspondence before the PIO, file movement entries, internal communications, previous orders referring to the record, acknowledgements, or subsequent departmental records showing that the officer had access to information establishing its existence. The issue is not simply whether the reply was wrong. It is whether the officer knew it was wrong and nevertheless gave it in circumstances satisfying the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence.
The BNS also contains provisions dealing with public servants who knowingly prepare incorrect documents or records with the requisite intention concerning injury or loss. Sections 201 and 256, however, contain their own specific ingredients and should not be mechanically applied to every false RTI response. If the allegation concerns preparation of an incorrect document, the prosecution must identify the document, the statutory duty attached to its preparation, the accused's knowledge that it was incorrect and the required intention or knowledge concerning injury or loss. The mere existence of an inaccurate RTI reply is not enough.
Section 20 of the RTI Act provides a specific statutory mechanism for penalty and disciplinary recommendation. That mechanism remains the ordinary route for establishing an RTI violation. A criminal proceeding is different. The existence of a Section 20 penalty does not, by itself, establish a BNS offence, nor does a BNS allegation eliminate the need to satisfy the RTI Act. The two regimes operate on different legal questions. A criminal complaint must, therefore, stand on its own statutory ingredients and evidence.
The RTI Act itself protects acts done in good faith under Section 21. This reinforces the need for caution before invoking criminal law against a PIO. An honest inability to trace an old record, a bona fide misunderstanding of the scope of a request, or a reasonable but ultimately incorrect administrative decision cannot simply be converted into criminality because an appellate authority later takes a different view. The decisive distinction is between bona fide error and knowing, deliberate conduct accompanied by the mental element required by the penal provision.
Even where the facts appear to disclose a possible offence, criminal process must follow the applicable procedure. Depending upon the status of the public servant and the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed, the requirement of previous sanction under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita may arise. This is a procedural question that must be examined at the stage of cognizance and cannot be assumed either way.
The proposition, therefore, should not be stated as “a false RTI reply is a crime”. That would be legally excessive. The more precise proposition is that where a PIO, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys a statutory direction governing the handling of an RTI request, and does so with the intention of causing injury or knowledge that such injury is likely to result, the conduct may potentially attract Section 198 of the BNS, subject to proof of every statutory ingredient. Depending on the facts, another specific BNS provision may also be relevant.
The significance of the issue lies in the integrity of the information system itself. An RTI regime cannot function effectively if an official can knowingly defeat a statutory right simply by stating that an existing record cannot be found. At the same time, criminal law should not become a substitute for the appellate and penalty mechanisms of the RTI Act. Where the evidence shows only error or negligence, the matter may remain within the RTI and service law framework. Where it demonstrates knowing disobedience, deliberate falsehood and the legally required injury, criminal scrutiny may legitimately arise. The decisive question is, therefore, not whether the reply was inconvenient or even wrong, but whether the evidence establishes the state of knowledge and intention required by the penal law.
Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India.