The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Hindware Ltd. v. Grohe India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3913 is an important milestone in India’s evolving jurisprudence on trademarks and keyword advertising. The dispute relates to the use of a registered mark “Hindware” as a keyword in Google’s AdWords programme, wherein competitors’ sponsored links were appearing when users searched for Hindware-related terms.
Hindware Ltd. has used the registered trademark 'HINDWARE' exclusively and continuously since 1991 in relation to sanitaryware and bathroom accessories.
Google India Private Limited and Google LLC operate the Google AdWords Program, a paid keyword advertising service on www.google.com. The programme allows advertisers to bid on keywords that serve as backend triggers. So, when a user types a keyword into the Google search bar, the advertiser's sponsored link appears prominently at the top of the Search Results. To assist advertisers, Google provides a Keyword Planner Tool that actively suggests high-traffic keywords, including third-party trademarked terms.
The plaintiff discovered that Grohe India Pvt. Ltd., a direct competitor in the sanitaryware segment, had purchased 'HINDWARE', 'HINDWARE SANITARYWARE', 'HINDWARE SANITARY', and related combinations as keywords on Google's AdWords Programme. As a result, when users searched for these coined terms, Grohe's website appeared as the top sponsored result, above the plaintiff's own website. In another dispute, the plaintiff discovered that Cera Sanitaryware Ltd. and Omkara Infoweb Pvt. Ltd. had also used 'HINDWARE' as a keyword, causing Cera's website to appear as the first result when users searched for 'HINDWARE'. In both suits, Google India Private Limited and Google LLC were the other Defendants. As a result of the dispute, Grohe settled with the plaintiff in November 2015, Cera in March 2019, and Omkara Infoweb in November 2017. The suits were thereafter contested solely against Google, bidding Google India Private Limited and Google LLC.
1. That the use of 'HINDWARE' as a keyword constituted 'use' of the mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 ('TMA'). The plaintiff argued that Section 2(2)(c)(i) TMA expressly defines use 'in relation to goods' to include use 'in any other relation whatsoever' to such goods — language wide enough to capture invisible or non-visual use.
2. Section 29(6)(d) TMA provides that a person uses a registered mark when he 'uses the registered trade mark on business papers or in advertising'; the word 'advertising' here is a process (verb), not a noun, and therefore encompasses using a mark as a keyword to trigger an advertisement, even if the mark itself does not visibly appear in the advertisement's text.
3. Google is the active user of the mark as it operates a Keyword Planner Tool that actively suggests trademarked terms to advertisers. It conducts real-time auctions for keywords, including third-party trademarks, and earns CPC revenue when a user, diverted by a trademark-triggered advertisement, clicks it. Google offered the mark 'HINDWARE' for bidding without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent and without sharing any revenue with the trademark owner.
4. Google's conduct constituted infringement of the trademark, as the role it played is not confined to the role of an intermediary. In present case Google has actively participated in the commercial activity and has gained profit from it. Thus, no exemption from liability under section 79 of IT Act, 2000.
1. Keywords are invisible backend triggers, imperceptible to the consumer, and therefore cannot constitute 'use' of a trademark in any meaningful sense, so it does not violate section 29 of TMA.
2. Section 2(2)(b) TMA requires use in a 'printed or other visual representation', and Section 2(2)(c) requires use in a form perceivable by the consumer. Since no consumer ever sees the keyword, there is no trademark use, and accordingly no infringement.
3. The word 'advertising' in Section 29(6)(d) TMA must be read as a noun and construed as visible use of the trademark. It must appear in the visible AdText. The use of a word as a backend trigger is categorically different and does not amount to infringement as it is not visible to the public.
4. No likelihood of confusion and loss was proved, sponsored results are clearly labelled 'Ad', and confusion must be attributable to a visible advertisement, not to an imperceptible keyword.
5. Section 29(2) TMA, which requires likelihood of confusion, was in any event inapplicable as Google does not provide services similar to the plaintiff's sanitaryware products.
6. Google further argued that its conduct amounted to fair use under Sections 30(1) and 30(2)(a) TMA (identifying goods, comparative advertising, nominative use) and Section 35 TMA (bona fide descriptive use), and that keyword advertising promotes fair competition and consumer choice, a position which had been endorsed by the Competition Commission of India.
The Court held both suits in favour of the plaintiff and against Google LLC and Google India. A permanent injunction was granted restraining both Google entities from using or permitting the use of 'HINDWARE', 'HINDWARE SANITARYWARE', 'HINDWARE SANITARY', 'HINDWARE SANITARYWARE INDIA', or any combination thereof, as advertising keywords, AdWords, or in any other manner amounting to infringement. Nominal damages of ₹30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) were awarded, payable jointly and severally by Google LLC and Google India. Actual costs of litigation were also awarded.
Distinctiveness of the Trademark
The Court emphasised that 'HINDWARE' is a coined word and has acquired distinctiveness, having been in exclusive, continuous, and extensive use since 1991. It was confirmed as a well-known mark in 2017. Given the distinctive nature of the mark, it should be afforded greater protection against infringement.
Keyword use as trademark infringement under the TMA
Section 2(2)(c) uses the words “any relation whatsoever”, which puts even the invisible use of a trademark in the same domain, Google's invisibility argument is rejected. Section 29(6)(d) expressly provides that using a registered trademark 'in advertising' amounts to use of the mark – therefore, use of a trademark as a keyword constitutes 'use' of the trademark under the TMA, and 'in advertising' (verb form) is not synonymous with 'in an advertisement, can be understood by simple reading of the act.
The Court rejected Google's invisibility argument and held that use of a trademark as a keyword constitutes 'use' of the trademark under the TMA. The Court also found keyword use analogous to the use of meta-tags in website source code, which had consistently been held to amount to trademark infringement by Courts in India.
Google is an active user of the mark
Google's claim that it is a neutral platform and that only the advertiser 'uses' the keyword is rejected, as Google is the keyword planner actively involved in the commercial avenue. Google earns through the diversion when a consumer clicks on the advertisement. The Court found that Google actively encourages and suggests the use of trademarked terms as keywords through its Keyword Planner Tool; determines, through its proprietary algorithms, which advertisements appear on the SERP; conducts real-time auctions of trademarked keywords; and earns CPC revenue that is triggered precisely at the moment of consumer diversion caused by a trademark keyword. Thus, the use of a trademark as a keyword amounts to use by Google.
Infringement under Section 29(8): Unfair advantage and dishonest practice
The use of a trademark as a keyword is a use in the process of advertising; thus, it falls within the ambit of section 29(8). The Court held that Google's conduct constituted infringement under Section 29(8) TMA on two independently sufficient grounds. First, it amounted to an unfair advantage contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. A trademark has an advertising function: it attracts and retains consumers, and its goodwill is an asset built by the proprietor's sustained investment. When Google auctions the plaintiff's coined mark to direct competitors, it sells the advertising power of the mark, a form of property, without the owner's consent and without sharing the resulting profits. The proprietor is, compelled to bid on its own coined trademark merely to maintain top visibility on Google's own platform, paying the very company that is auctioning its property to rivals. This is textbook free-riding. Second, the practice is contrary to honest commercial practices. Honesty in trade requires competitors to build their own reputation and market presence. Selling a trademark one does not own to the owner's rivals, without consent or compensation, is commercially dishonest, irrespective of whether consumers are confused.
No defence under Section 79, IT, Act, 2000
The Court held that the safe harbour under Section 79(1) IT Act was not available to Google. The exemption under Section 79(1) applies only to an intermediary's liability for third-party information that it hosts or makes available; it does not extend to Google's own conduct of auctioning, suggesting, and selling the plaintiff's trademark.
About the authors: Zeeshan A Khan is a Partner and Keshav Yadav is an Associate at Luthra and Luthra Law Offices India.
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