The Supreme Court has ruled that the 24-hour constitutional deadline for producing an arrested person before a magistrate for remand begins from the moment the person's liberty is curtailed through detention, and not from the time a formal arrest is recorded by the investigating agency [Sujit Das v. Union of India].
A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S Chandurkar also held that if a person is detained beyond 24 hours without production before magistrate, the person will have to be release from custody immediately.
Ruling in a nutshell
1. The 24-hour clock begins from actual detention, not formal arrest.
2. Detention beyond 24 hours without production before a magistrate requires immediate release.
3. Only necessary travel time to the magistrate's court can be excluded.
4. No artificial distinction between detention and arrest is constitutionally permissible.
5. No investigative buffer period outside Article 22(2) can be created.
6. Detention must also be reasonable under Section 58 BNSS, even within 24 hours.
7. Magistrates must record the actual date and time of detention and verify compliance with Article 22(2).
8. Magistrates may refuse remand where detention exceeds a reasonable period, even if within 24 hours.
9. Orissa High Court ruling in Ariyaman Pattnayak case, Madras High Court ruling in Kannan case and Kerala High Court ruling in Arun K Thomas case disapproved as incorrect in law.
10. Court expresses reservations over the observations in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora concerning Article 21 and Section 37 NDPS, but stops short of ruling on the coordinate Bench decision.
The Court passed the ruling in a case where a person accused in a drug smuggling case was detained on the afternoon of September 29, 2025, but was shown as formally arrested only on September 30, 2025.
The accused man argued that this was done by the investigating agency to circumvent the 24-hour deadline prescribed under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India to produce an arrested person before a magistrate. The investigation agency, on the other hand, maintained that the 24-hour deadline only began from September 30, the time when the arrest was formally recorded.
The Court today held that such an approach is illegal and that the 24-hour clock begins to run the moment a person is placed under detention, regardless of whether a formal arrest is recorded only later.
"Clause (2) of Article 22 does not sanction creation of a zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigative purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such a buffer zone is unconstitutional," the Court held.
The Court has made it clear that no artificial distinction can be drawn between detention before a formal arrest is recorded, and the period thereafter.
"Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between arrest and detention would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective," it explained.
Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between arrest and detention would dilute the fundamental protection guaranteed by the ConstitutionSupreme Court
The Court further termed any attempt to suspend a detained accused's constitutional safeguards by drawing such a distinction unsustainable and wholly unconstitutonal.
"The Constitution does not recognise any detention divorced from arrest ... The prescription of the 24-hour time period would commence the moment a person is detained by the arresting authority, suspecting him to have committed an offence, when his liberty is effectively curtailed. To that extent, the words appearing in clause (2) of Article 22, i.e., arrested and detained, are synonymous," the Court added.
The Constitution does not recognise any detention divorced from arrest. The prescription of the 24-hour time period would commence the moment a person is detainedSupreme Court
The Court further pointed out that such safeguards are put in place to prevent custodial torture, which is an unfortunate reality in India.
"Custodial violence is an unfortunate reality of our country and is judicially acknowledged.... the worst violations of human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police, with a view to extracting information or confession, resort to third-degree methods by adopting techniques of screening arrest, by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation," it said.
In this context, the Court observed that its endeavour has always been to ensure that no custodial violence takes place during interrogation, from the time when a person is intercepted and detained by the investigating agency.
Applying these principles, the Court ruled that the accused in the present case were entitled to be released immediately since the procedural safeguards that should have been followed during their arrest were flouted.
"The arrest of the appellants for the purpose of Article 22(2) would be construed to have taken place at 2 PM on September 29, 2025, when they were under the control and custody of the search team. Therefore, they were required to be produced before the Judicial Magistrate before 2 PM on September 30, 2025. But the appellants were produced before the Judicial Magistrate at 4:45 PM on September 30, 2025. There is thus a clear breach of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution, vitiating the arrest of the appellants and rendering their continued detention beyond 2 PM on September 30, 2025, illegal and unconstitutional," the Court held.
It also pointed out that there were provisions in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) which laid down that no person can be detained for an unreasonable period of time within the 24 hours before their production before the magistrate. This safeguard was flouted as well in the present case, the Court found.
"There is a gap of 18 hours from the conclusion of the search and seizure procedure and the formal arrest of the appellants. No explanation has been given for this delay of 18 hours. Eighteen hours in custody without judicial oversight is a long period, with misuse and abuse of authority a clear possibility. Such a period certainly cannot be construed to be a reasonable period within the meaning of Section 58 BNSS. That being the position, the appellants are entitled to be released from custody forthwith." the Court held.
The Court proceeded to overturn the Tripura High Court's April 29 order denying bail to the accused in the case, which involved an alleged recovery of 11.03 kilograms of methamphetamine tablets, commonly known as yaba.
In its ruling today, the Court also reiterated that the stringent tests for the grant of bail under Section 37 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) cannot override the safeguards laid down in the Constitution of India.
"The rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution are not only constitutional rights; these are fundamental rights. The right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 is at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under a special statute. When there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under a special statute would have to give way ... A statute, special or otherwise, cannot be a guide to interpret the Constitution. Rather, it should be the other way around. To reiterate, a fundamental right must be interpreted in such a manner that it upholds and furthers the objective of such a fundamental right," the Court held.
When there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under a special statute would have to give waySupreme Court
[Live Coverage]