Ilaiyaraaja v. Saregama: Judicial adventurism?

The recent judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ilaiyaraaja v. Saregama raises an important question: can the rights of a music composer continue to subsist after the composer has parted with those rights in favour of the producer?

Although the judgment may, at first glance, appear to favour the producer, certain observations made by the Division Bench could potentially have consequences detrimental to the producer's interests. This raises a further question: does the judgment amount to judicial adventurism in departing from the settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court in IPRS v. Eastern India Motion Picture Association & Ors (1977)?

It is an established principle under the Copyright Act, 1957 that copyright in a cinematograph film and a sound recording vests in the producer, subject to the statutory framework. However, instead of applying this statutory principle, the Delhi High Court appears to have recognised a continuing and independent right of the authors of the underlying musical work. In our considered view, this interpretation appears to depart from both (a) the statutory scheme of the Copyright Act, 1957, and (b) the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in IPRS. It is germane to refer to the 1977 judgment, wherein the Supreme Court observed:

“...the rights of music composer or lyricist can be defeated by the producer in a cinematograph film in the manner laid down in proviso (b) and (c) of Section 17 of the Act. Both are the cases falling under clause (b) and (c) of Section 17, a cinematograph film producer becomes the first owner of the copyright and no copyrights subsists in the composer of the lyrics or music so composed unless there is a contract to the contrary between the composer of the lyrics and music on one hand and the producer of cinematograph film on the other hand.”

The principle emerging from the aforesaid judgment is significant. Where the circumstances contemplated under Section 17(b) and (c) are attracted, the producer becomes the first owner of copyright in the cinematograph film, unless there is a contract to the contrary.

In relation to the musical compositions, the Division Bench appears to have taken the view that the rights vest with Ilaiyaraaja and, therefore, the musical work contained in the song continues to remain protected. Consequently his right to exploit the musical work under Section 14(a)(iv) and 14(a)(v) r/w 14(a)(vi) remains inviolate and sacrosanct. This view has impinged upon the sacrosanct right granted by the Act and 1977 judgement to the producer.

The Division Bench has relied on Section 13(4) of the Act to aid this interpretation. It was further stated that Section 17 would not affect his right under 13(4). This is incorrect, as by no stretch of opinion can a music composer claim rights once he has parted with his copyright in favour of a producer. It is difficult to reconcile the proposition that the same rights nevertheless continue to remain with the composer in an unfettered manner.

The answer assumes particular significance where the composer's work has been validly subsumed in a sound recording or a cinematograph film. The rights in such records shall be validly owned by the producer, being the first owner of the copyright as per the provisions of Section 17(b).

Another important issue concerns the 2012 amendment to the Copyright Act.

The Division Bench's interpretation has given a retrospective effect to the 2012 amendment, whereas the original song in question was released only in 1980. At that time, the statutory framework and judicial interpretation governing the ownership of copyright were materially different from the position subsequently introduced by the 2012 amendment. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the 2012 amendment can be interpreted in a manner that affects rights which had already vested in the producer decades earlier.

The situation prevailing at the time of the IPRS judgment passed by Supreme Court in 1977 ought to have been regarded in respect of the situation prevailing at the time of publishing of the record in 1980. It is inferred that the 1977 judgment will hold the ground to the facts transpired in 1980. Therefore, if rights in the cinematograph film and the sound recording had vested in the producer in 1980 under the statutory framework then prevailing, they cannot be disturbed. Any interpretation that substantially alters or diminishes those vested rights by relying upon a subsequent amendment would require compelling statutory justification. To support this argument, we rely on the presumption of prospectivity.

It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. A new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past and this presumption operates unless shown to the contrary by express provision in the statute or is otherwise discernible by necessary implication. [Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India (2012)]

The question is not merely whether authors' rights were strengthened by the 2012 amendment. The more fundamental question is whether that legislative change can retrospectively unsettle rights that had already vested and had been commercially exploited on the basis of the law applicable at the time.

The issue assumes even greater significance when viewed through Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India. In view of the principle of stare decisis, the principle laid down in IPRS cannot be disregarded.

However, the Division Bench has failed to consider both the binding character of the 1977 judgment and the law made by the legislature under Section 17(b) and (c) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Such judicial adventurism strikes at the root of this judgment and would amount to judicial impropriety.

It is also interesting to note the linguistic distinction highlighted by Neel Mason in relation to the use of the word “the” instead of “a” in the 1977 judgment. The distinction assumes significance because the use of “the” may indicate a reference to the particular cinematograph film in question, whereas the use of “a” could potentially carry a more generic connotation.

In our considered view, this distinction raises an important question concerning the scope of the 1977 judgment.

The implications of the Division Bench's interpretation may extend beyond the immediate dispute between Ilaiyaraaja and Saregama. If the principle adopted by the Division Bench is applied consistently, particularly in relation to the right of adaptation, it could mean that the right to authorise an adaptation of a musical work remains with the music composer notwithstanding the producer's ownership of the cinematograph film and the sound recording. Consequently, licences for exploiting a new work, creating a new sound recording or otherwise adapting the underlying musical work could potentially have to be obtained from the composer or the relevant copyright society, such as IPRS.

The same reasoning, if extended to cinematograph films, could lead to an equally significant consequence. If a producer acquired rights in a film released in 1980, could the author of the underlying literary work subsequently claim an independent right to authorise a remake of that film? If so, would the producer's right to exploit or remake the film be subject to the independent consent of the author of the underlying script?

Such an interpretation could have far-reaching consequences for the film industry. It could introduce uncertainty into licensing arrangements, remake rights, adaptations and subsequent exploitation of films, particularly where rights were acquired several decades ago. More importantly, it could unsettle commercial arrangements entered into on the legitimate assumption that the producer had acquired and controlled the relevant rights under the law prevailing at the time.

The issue, therefore, should not be viewed merely through the lens of a conflict between the producer and the author, or as a question of whose rights should prevail, but whether the uncertainty that prevails pre and post 2012 need to be harmoniously reconciled without retrospectively disturbing rights that had already vested. It is this tension between law holding the ground, binding precedent, authorship rights and commercial certainty that deserves closer scrutiny. Whether this amounts to judicial adventurism remains a question ultimately reserved for authoritative determination by the Supreme Court.

Rajesh Kumar is Head of Legal and Akanksha Badika is Legal Manager at Bhansali Productions. 

Manoj Sawant assisted in preparing this article.