

Earlier this month, the Maharashtra government revised its Rules of Business, expressly empowering the Chief Minister to override a decision taken by any minister in the Cabinet, except quasi-judicial cases, on grounds of ‘public interest’ (Rule 13, sub-rule 5, Maharashtra Government Rules of Business, 2026). The response to the change has been predictably polemical, with some describing the incumbent as a ‘Super Chief Minister’ and others terming the provision as constitutionally suspect.
However, such criticism overlooks the constitutional position occupied by a Chief Minister (CM) within the Council of Ministers. While the CM is often described as primus inter pares, or first among equals, the Constitution vests greater powers and responsibilities in the office that extend beyond those of individual ministers in the cabinet. Seen in this context, the revised Rules do not represent a radical departure from the constitutional scheme as the initial reactions might suggest. Rather, they expressly recognise a supervisory authority that is inherent in the office of the CM.
Article 154 of the Constitution formally vests the executive power of the State in the Governor. However, under the constitutional scheme, this power is ordinarily exercised on the aid and advice of the council of ministers. This is evident from Article 163, which provides for a council of ministers “with the Chief Minister at the head” to aid and advise the Governor. The provision also highlights that the CM is not merely another member of the council, but its constitutional head.
For the day-to-day affairs of the government, Article 166(3) obligates the Governor to make rules for the “more convenient transaction of the business” and its allocation among different ministers. However, any decision taken by a minister in accordance with the Rules of Business is not their personal decision, but a decision of the state government, for which the council of ministers is collectively responsible.
In this context, the Supreme Court has time and again reaffirmed the special position occupied by the CM. For instance, in Gulabrao Keshavrao Patil v. State of Gujarat (1996), the Court observed that the CM “holds the ultimate responsibility to the Governor” and is accountable to the people for the good governance of the State, with the assistance of the Council of Ministers.
Gulabrao is also factually relevant to the recent developments in Maharashtra. In that case, the Minister for Revenue had taken a particular decision on a matter falling within his department. However, the decision was subsequently placed before the CM, who arrived at a different conclusion. The Court was called upon to adjudicate whether the CM was bound by the Minister’s decision or could overrule it.
The Court held that a minister’s decision under the Rules of Business is not necessarily final merely because the subject stands allocated to that minister. Until the decision has become final and been communicated in the name of the Governor in accordance with Article 166 and the applicable Rules, it remains open to the CM to call for the file, examine it and take a different view. The Court described this as an “implied power” flowing from the CM's responsibility to the Governor and accountability to the people.
Importantly, the Court also linked this authority to the principle of collective responsibility. A decision taken by the CM, even on a subject allocated to another minister, does not constitute the exercise of an independent authority external to the Council. Rather, it is treated as a decision of the Council itself, for which they are collectively responsible. Ultimately, the judgment established that the allocation of business among ministers does not displace the CM’s constitutional position as head of the Council or reduce the office to that of merely being first among equals.
However, it must be clarified that the dictum in Gulabrao applies only to a ministerial decision that has not yet been communicated in accordance with Article 166. It does not establish an unrestricted inherent authority in the CM to reopen every decision taken by another Minister.
Maharashtra is not the first State to expressly empower the CM to intervene in matters allocated to another Minister. Similar provisions exist in the Rules of Business of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, to name a few. For instance, both Rajasthan and Gujarat vest a similarly worded residuary power in the CM, exercisable suo motu, to call for papers and pass orders in any case involving a question of policy or a matter of urgent public importance.
The relevant rule in Gujarat reads (Rule 15, sub-rule 5):
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules or anywhere in these Instructions, it shall be competent for the Chief Minister to pass orders in any case involving a question of policy or a matter of urgent public importance, relating to any department when he considers it necessary or expedient so to do, or when the case is referred to him by the Minister‐in‐charge of the department.”
The revised Rules are arguably in response to the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Chandrapur District Central Cooperative Bank v. State of Maharashtra (2023). In that case, the petitioner bank had sought permission to conduct recruitment to address a staff shortage, which was ultimately allowed by the Minister of Co-operation. However, 6 days later, then CM Eknath Shinde stayed the minister’s decision.
The bank argued that the CM had no jurisdiction to stay the minister's order. The State government, on the other hand, argued that the CM, as head of the Council of Ministers, was entitled to intervene in a matter allocated to another minister. It also relied upon Instruction 11 of the Business Rules, which permitted the CM to call for and see papers relating to any case in any department.
The High Court adopted a strict reading of the Rules and drew a distinction between the power to call for and examine a file and the power to take a decision on it. In its view, once business had been distributed among different ministers, it fell within their prerogative and the CM could not intervene unless there was an express provision authorising such intervention. Since the Rules contained no such provision, the Court held that the CM had no power to review or modify the decision taken by the Minister concerned and consequently quashed the stay. The Court held:
“We are unable to see any Rule amongst Rule Nos. 1 to 15 which empowers the Chief Minister to intermeddle with the business of a department assigned/allocated to another Minister. Neither do the Instructions confer supervisory or appellate powers on the Chief Minister to review or to reverse the decision or business, transacted by the Minister-in-charge.”
Importantly, this should not be read as the Court holding that the CM could never be vested with such a power. Its conclusion was narrower: the Rules as they then stood did not confer such a power. This is evident from the following observation:
“Once the powers are distributed by the Rules of Business and Instructions, there must be an express provision authorizing the Chief Minister to indulge in the matter assigned to the particular Ministry.”
However, the judgment itself merits closer consideration, as it does not appear to adequately account for the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, including Gulabrao, where the Court had located the CM’s power to call for a file and take a different decision in their constitutional position as head of the Council of Ministers and their ultimate responsibility for the functioning of the state government. On the other hand, the High Court located this power in the applicable Rules of Business and insisted on an express provision conferring such a power, a conclusion that sits somewhat uneasily with the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
In any event, the revised Rules render much of this debate academic. They expressly empower the CM to override a decision taken by a minister in public interest, subject to reasons being recorded in writing and an exception for quasi-judicial matters. In doing so, the Maharashtra government has effectively filled the precise gap identified by the Bombay High Court - an express legal basis for the CM's intervention.
Swapnil Tripathi leads Charkha, the Constitutional Law Centre at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.
Views are personal.