The Punjab State Assembly recently enacted the Jaagat Jot Sri Guru Granth Sahib Satkar (Amendment) Act, 2026, which has been notified in the Official Gazette. The Amendment Act introduces a statutory definition of "sacrilege" and prescribes enhanced punishment for the offence, providing for imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 7 years but which may extend to 20 years, and a fine which shall not be less than 2 lakh rupees but which may extend to 10 lakh rupees.
Before the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act was challenged before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Simranjeet Singh v. State of Punjab, retired Justice RS Sodhi’s piece in The Tribune, titled “The Guru's Word is Beyond Law”, has given an interesting early response to the legislation.
In his article, Justice Sodhi opines that the living embodiment of the Guru ought not to be subjected to juridical regulation and that the existing legal framework is sufficient to address such offences. While rooted in a religious perspective, the critique raises legitimate concerns regarding the Amendment Act's constitutional validity, which are examined in greater detail in this article, especially keeping in mind the historical developments on the exact same issue in Punjab.
Additionally, in light of the provisions of the Constitution of India, this article aims to answer the following questions: first, whether the Amendment Act is repugnant to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); second whether the definition of the term “sacrilege” as provided in the Amendment Act is vague and arbitrary; and third whether the punishment prescribed under the Amendment Act is proportionate.
In 2016, the Shiromani Akali Dal and Bharatiya Janata Party (SAD-BJP) government in Punjab introduced an Amendment Bill proposing the insertion of Section 295AA in the IPC, to prescribe life imprisonment for sacrilege of the Guru Granth Sahib Ji, along with an enhancement of punishment under Section 295 of the IPC from 2 to 10 years. The Bill was returned on the ground that singling out one religion for special protection was constitutionally impermissible.
In 2018, the Congress-led government expanded the proposal to include the Bhagavad Gita, the Holy Quran and the Bible. That Bill too was eventually returned, as per media reports, following the coming into force of the BNS in 2023. In 2025, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government introduced the Punjab Prevention of Crimes Against Holy Scriptures Bill, 2025, which was referred to a Select Committee.
The present Amendment Act was thereafter introduced and passed unanimously by the State Assembly.
Article 245 read with Article 246 of the Constitution distributes legislative powers between the Union and the States through the three lists in the Seventh Schedule. List I enumerates subjects on which parliament may legislate; List II contain those reserved for state legislatures and List III has subjects on which both may legislate concurrently. For present purposes, the relevant entries are Entry 1 of List II, relating to public order, and Entries 1 and 2 of List III, relating to criminal law and criminal procedure respectively.
The question of legislative competence must be determined by applying the doctrine of pith and substance, which requires an examination of the true nature, object and effect of the legislation to ascertain the legislative field to which it properly belongs. This doctrine has been explained by the Supreme Court in AS Krishna v. State of Madras (1956) and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994). From the scheme of the Amendment Act and its statement of objects and reasons, it is evident that the legislation seeks to create and punish a specific criminal offence of sacrilege.
The original enactment was confined to regulating the supply and handling of Birs of the Guru Granth Sahib Ji, a subject traceable to public order under Entry 1 of List II. The Amendment Act, however, by introducing and prescribing punishment for the offence of sacrilege, falls squarely under the field of criminal law, a subject on which parliament has already legislated through the BNS and which falls within the domain of Entries 1 and 2 of List III.
The use of a public order statute as a vehicle to introduce a distinct criminal offence suggests that the amendment is colourable in nature, seeking to achieve indirectly what the previous legislative attempts could not achieve directly.
Article 254 of the Constitution provides that in the event of repugnancy between a State law and a parliamentary enactment on a Concurrent List subject, the latter shall prevail, rendering the State law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency, unless the State law has received Presidential assent. This position was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018), wherein the Maharashtra Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 was held to be repugnant to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
In the present case, the definition of "sacrilege" under Section 3(bb), read with the punishment prescribed under Section 5 of the Amendment Act, is in direct conflict with provisions of the BNS - including Sections 298, 299 and 302 - which already criminalise acts injuring or defiling places of worship and outraging religious feelings. This overlap indicates that the field is already occupied by central legislation, thereby giving rise to repugnancy under Article 254. In such a situation, the provisions of the BNS would prevail and the Amendment Act would be rendered inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.
The definition may be divided into two parts: first, a willful and deliberate act of damaging, tearing, burning, or defacing the Saroops of Guru Granth Sahib Ji; and second, conduct by visible representation, spoken or written words, or through electronic means of such a nature as to hurt religious feelings.
The second limb bears a close resemblance to Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which punishes the sending of information of an offensive or grossly menacing character.
The Supreme Court, in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), struck down that provision, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court held that such language is vague and fails to provide any reasonable standard of application. It was further observed that in criminal law, the action sought to be criminalised must be certain and clearly defined.
Similarly, the Amendment Act contains no definition of the term "hurt to religious feelings". Without such a definition, even far-fetched or scholarly expression that bears no proximate connection to the mischief sought to be addressed could fall within the sweep of the provision. The Supreme Court in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) upheld the constitutional validity of Section 295A of the IPC, but did so on the specific ground that the provision did not punish every act, restricting its operation to those performed with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging religious feelings, conduct calculated to have a direct tendency to disturb public order. Therefore, the definition of "sacrilege" in the Amendment Act is vague and arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution.
The question is whether the punishment prescribed under the Amendment Act is proportionate. In Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2014), the constitutionality of Section 364A of the IPC - which punishes the offence of kidnapping with death or life imprisonment with fine - was challenged on the ground of being unreasonable. The Supreme Court upheld the provision on the ground that the provision was brought into force due to the increasing incidence of ransom and kidnapping. The Section is meant to curb not only kidnapping and abduction by ordinary criminals for monetary gains, but also by terrorist organisations which have the potential of destabilising the country. The Court further held that the prescription of punishment is a function of the legislature, which is best suited to assess the needs of the people, and that courts cannot interfere merely because the punishment is perceived to be excessive.
Applying the same principle to the State of Punjab and considering its history, there may be instances where the incidents of sacrilege have been funded or conspired by persons with the intent to disrupt the sovereignty and security of the nation. Moreover, the legislature has prescribed the punishment with respect to the increased incidence of sacrilege over the past few years. Furthermore, in the present scenario too, the courts have the discretion to award imprisonment subject to the gravity of the crime.
Amarpal Singh Dua is an advocate practicing before the Supreme Court of India.