Nvidia ex-CEO Jensen Huang 
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Private life, public disclosure: Nvidia’s CEO crisis in Indian securities law

Had Nvidia been listed in India, its board would have had less time, its CEO less room and investors would not have as much power.

Sumit Agrawal, Kavish Garach

On November 12, 2026, Nvidia Corporation announced that its co-founder Jensen Huang had resigned as President, CEO and director with immediate effect. Its Form 8-K, the “current report” a US-listed company must file with the SEC to announce major events, shows that the board had accepted the resignation a day earlier. Neither document gives a reason.

Four days earlier, the board had opened an independent investigation “in light of recent reporting” that Huang had been “the target of a foreign intelligence effort”. The same day, Nvidia published his email to employees admitting that he had been unfaithful to his wife.

A denial, an admission, an inquiry and a resignation. The question for an Indian securities lawyer is: what if this had been a company listed on the Indian stock exchanges?

The short answer is that Indian law would have demanded faster and fuller disclosure. It would have done little for the investor. Throughout, the test is not what the CEO did in private, but what the market was told about it and when.

US law: The class action comes first

Nvidia’s spokesman had described Huang’s interactions with an executive of Megaspeed, a Singapore-based customer, as “not unusual or unexpected”. On November 8, the board said that a committee of independent directors, assisted by outside counsel, would oversee its investigation. On November 11, the board accepted Huang's resignation. The next day, it announced that the CFO would serve as interim CEO while remaining CFO.

On November 9, a shareholder filed Kistenmacher v. NVIDIA Corporation in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint does not treat the affair as the fraud. It alleges that the Megaspeed statements were misleading because the relationship was not disclosed and pleads a 4.27% fall in the share price on November 9. These are untested allegations.

Where Indian law reaches the CEO

Take a top-250 listed company whose founder-CEO is also a promoter. Indian law does not leave that CEO to the company. The Listing Regulations and the Insider Trading Regulations name him repeatedly.

He is key managerial personnel (KMP) under Section 2(51) of the Companies Act, 2013 and a vacancy in his post must be filled within three months under Regulation 26A. He and the CFO certify the financial results under Regulations 17(8) and 33(2)(a). Regulation 9A of the Insider Trading Regulations makes him responsible for internal controls against insider trading. And Regulation 30(11A) requires promoters, directors, KMP and senior management to give “adequate, accurate and timely” responses to the company’s queries so that it can verify market rumours. The company must pass those responses on to the stock exchanges.

He is also the subject of disclosure. Under Para A of Part A of Schedule III, his fraud or arrest “whether occurred within India or abroad”, his resignation and his being unavailable for more than 45 days in any rolling period of 90 days are all deemed material. Under the Insider Trading Regulations, as amended in 2025, a change in KMP other than on superannuation or end of term is ordinarily unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI).

Replaying the episode in India

Start with the denial. A report about a CEO’s private life is probably not the rumour of an “impending specific event or information” that a top-250 company must confirm, deny or clarify within 24 hours of a material price movement under the proviso to Regulation 30(11). The real exposure lies in what was said. A CEO’s own words to the press are not private either: under para A(18) of Schedule III, the company must disclose any material information that its KMP announces through mainstream media before the company has made it public. Under Regulation 2(1)(c) of the PFUTP Regulations, fraud includes “a representation made in a reckless and careless manner whether it be true or false”, and an issuer “giving out misinformation that affects the market price” of its securities. Regulation 4(2)(k) separately catches dissemination through any media of information that the disseminator knows to be false or misleading, in a reckless or careless manner, and that is likely to influence investors. A CEO who made or approved a “normal and not unusual” statement could be a noticee in his own right.

Then the admission. An affair is not, by itself, a material event. An undisclosed relationship with an executive of a major customer under official scrutiny may well be, if its omission would likely provoke a significant market reaction under Regulation 30(4). A board that voices confidence before its inquiry begins is also making a disclosure and that disclosure must be accurate. Nvidia’s board expressed confidence on November 8 and accepted the resignation three days later.

Next, the CEO’s own duties. Section 166(4) of the Companies Act bars a director from situations in which he has a direct or “indirect interest” that conflicts, or may conflict, with the company’s. Whether an intimate relationship with a customer’s executive is such an interest is arguable; no Indian authority settles it. Section 184 and Regulation 26(5) reach financial and commercial interests, not personal ones.

The related-party question is sharper. The Companies Act’s definition of “relative” does not reach a girlfriend. But the Listing Regulations also adopt the accounting standards and Ind AS 24 treats a KMP’s “domestic partner” as a close member of the family. Whether an unmarried partner is a “domestic partner” is undefined. Even if she is, Ind AS 24 reaches only an entity she controls or jointly controls, not one where she is merely an executive. Where it applies, sales to her company would need audit committee approval and, above the materiality threshold, shareholder approval under Regulation 23.

The investigation itself falls in a gap. Schedule III requires disclosure of a forensic audit and of specified actions by authorities. A board inquiry into a CEO’s conduct is neither. Para A(17) confines “forensic audit” to audits aimed at detecting misstatement, misappropriation, siphoning or diversion of funds. Paras A(19) and A(20) cover only specified actions by authorities. Disclosure of the inquiry would, therefore, rest on general materiality, which these facts would very likely meet.

The leak would be treated more strictly. Once the board began deliberating the CEO’s removal, that information was price-sensitive. In India, the trading window for those in the know would be expected to close. Any leak would trigger the inquiry required by Regulation 9A(5) of the Insider Trading Regulations, under a board-approved policy, with SEBI to be informed promptly of the leak and its outcome.

Finally, the exit. A board decision accepting the resignation must reach the exchanges within 30 minutes of the meeting closing, or within three hours if it ends after market hours but more than three hours before the next trading session. The resignation letter, with detailed reasons as given by the CEO, must follow within seven days of the resignation taking effect. An Indian CEO would have to put his explanation on recor, and SEBI could test it. Any interim CEO must be appointed in accordance with the law applicable to a fresh appointment. An interim CEO who remains CFO would sign the Regulation 17(8) certificate in both capacities. That is lawful, but it raises the question of who checks whom.

SEBI and the CEO

SEBI would come for the CEO, but not for the affair. Its jurisdiction attaches to what was said and what was traded. Under Section 11(4)(b) of the SEBI Act, it can, pending or after an investigation, restrain a person from accessing the securities market, giving a hearing “either before or after” the order. Section 11B lets it issue such directions as are appropriate in the interests of investors and the securities market.

SEBI has used these powers against the head of a market institution. In its order of February 11, 2022, it imposed a penalty of ₹3 crore on Chitra Ramkrishna, former MD and CEO of the National Stock Exchange (NSE), restrained her for three years from associating with any market infrastructure institution or registered intermediary. It also directed NSE to forfeit her excess leave encashment of ₹1.54 crore and deferred bonus of ₹2.83 crore. Further, it faulted NSE for permitting her “to merely resign” without taking any action against her. Her appeal against the order was heard by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) and reserved for orders on October 30, 2026. Pending the appeal, the tribunal directed that the leave encashment and bonus be held in escrow. SEBI’s concern was what the CEO did in office and how the board let her go.

The investor is left behind

Indian law protects the market better than it compensates the investor. The SEBI Act gives no private right to damages for misstatements. Disgorged sums go to the Investor Protection and Education Fund (IPEF) under Section 11(5) of the SEBI Act and restitution from it to “eligible and identifiable investors” is made only where SEBI “deems fit”.

Recovering pay from a CEO is harder still. In National Stock Exchange of India Ltd v. SEBI, the SAT set aside SEBI’s direction that two former NSE chiefs disgorge 25% of their salaries. Salary, it held, is not an unfair gain and recovering it under Sections 11 and 11B “amounts to penal recovery”.

A class action under Section 245 of the Companies Act exists on paper. It can claim damages from the company or its directors for any “fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or omission” and for a listed company it needs 100 members or 5% of members, whichever is less, or holders of 2% of the issued capital. It has rarely been used. In the US, an investor sued the day after the board’s statement. In India, the investor still largely waits for SEBI.

What boards should take away

Boards need not wait for SEBI. Five steps follow from the Nvidia episode:

First, let the independent directors own the inquiry, the choice of investigator and every public statement about the CEO from day one, as Nvidia’s did.

Second, disclose that an inquiry is under way and what it covers, but do not express confidence in its subject before it reports.

Third, treat the CEO’s future as price-sensitive from the first conversation and leave no gap between a board decision and its disclosure.

Fourth, extend the code of conduct under Regulation 17(5) to require the CEO and senior management to disclose, in confidence, any close personal relationship with an executive of a customer, supplier or competitor, or with a direct report.

Fifth, build misconduct clawbacks into CEO contracts and decide “cause” only after the facts are in.

Where the rulebook runs out

Indian law asks more of the CEO than US law does, but only about the events it anticipates. The Nvidia episode tests it at four points that it does not yet answer.

First, the board’s own inquiry. Schedule III captures a forensic audit and specified actions by authorities, but not a board’s inquiry into its CEO. Whether, when and with what content such an inquiry must be disclosed is left to each company’s view of materiality.

Second, personal relationships. Section 184 and Regulation 26(5) reach financial and commercial interests. Whether a close relationship with a counterparty’s executive, or with a direct report, must be disclosed depends on each company’s code of conduct, and whether Section 166(4) reaches it at all is unsettled.

Third, the partner’s company. Ind AS 24 uses the term “domestic partner” without defining it. Whether dealings with a company controlled by a CEO’s unmarried partner need approval under Regulation 23, therefore, turns on how the company chooses to read the term.

Fourth, the investor. Restitution from the IPEF is at SEBI’s discretion and the one shareholder class action to get through ended in arbitration. An investor who bought on a misleading statement has no assured route to compensation.

These are questions for SEBI, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the ICAI where the Companies Act and the accounting standards are concerned. Settling them would give boards certainty before the CEO becomes the story, rather than leaving the answer to an enforcement order after it.

Had Nvidia been listed in India, its board would have had less time and its CEO less room. The board’s decision would have reached the market within 30 minutes, the CEO’s own reasons would have been on record within a week and his words to the press would have triggered disclosure by the company. That is the strength of the Indian rulebook: it asks more, and asks it sooner. Its weakness lies at the edges, where private life meets corporate risk, and, at the end, where the investor who lost money looks for a remedy.

The affair was never the offence, in California or in Mumbai. What was said about it is. India has answered that question for the CEO and the board. It has yet to answer it for the investor.

Sumit Agrawal is the Managing Partner of Regstreet Law Advisors, a former SEBI Officer and the author of a book on the SEBI Act. Kavish Garach is a Senior Associate at Regstreet Law Advisors. The views expressed are personal.

Sumit Agrawal, Kavish Garach

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