The second part moves from institutional dynamics to the arena where Constitutional elasticity is most visibly tested: electoral politics.
Part I traced how institutional structures gradually step over constitutional boundaries. Part II examines how electoral incentives accelerate this process. The pressures of winning and retaining power often produce policies that strain the Constitution’s discipline. We look at three such arenas: welfare-driven public spending, political defections and the push for simultaneous elections.
Article 282 of the Constitution authorises both the Union and the States to make "any grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may make laws." Drafted as a fiscal safety valve, the provision was intended to promote cooperative flexibility in a newly independent nation. Yet, its open-ended phrasing "any public purpose" has proven to be both its strength and its vulnerability. It allows governments to respond quickly to socio-economic needs, but it also covers for fiscally reckless populism.
In S Subramaniam Balaji v. The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors, the Supreme Court dismissed challenges to welfare schemes involving free distribution of colour televisions, laptops and grinders announced in election manifestos. It was contended that such schemes violated Articles 14, 162, 266(3) and 282 of the Constitution and also amounted to electoral bribery under Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court refused to interfere, while holding that election promises in manifestos do not constitute corrupt practices under Section 123, as it applies only to candidates and their agents, not political parties. It further ruled that judicial review cannot extend to welfare schemes as they constitute ‘public purpose’ and are subject to legislative approval.
While dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the Election Commission to frame guidelines on election manifestos. In 2013, the Election Commission of India (ECI) issued ‘Guidelines on Election Manifestos’. These guidelines require political parties and candidates to ensure that their manifesto promises align with Constitutional and legal provisions. They must avoid putting undue pressure on voters and clearly show the reasoning and financial impact of the proposed welfare measures. This approach effectively transformed Article 282 into a constitutional justification for expansive welfare expenditure, leaving fiscal prudence to the political domain.
The only check on fiscal populism that remained was electoral accountability. Competitive populism, such as loan waivers, cash transfers and free utilities, has become structurally embedded in electoral politics. These policies are usually funded by unsustainable public borrowing, which increases fiscal deficits and reduces the amount of money available for investments in the social sector and necessary capital. Recognising these concerns, a bench led by then Chief Justice of India NV Ramana in the case of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, referred the issue to a larger bench, observing that unrestrained freebies may distort electoral choice and undermine fiscal stability. The matter is yet to be heard.
At what point does welfare become electoral bribery? The central issue is not charity, but choice - who decides and with what accountability. Article 282 was meant to empower States and the Union to address developmental priorities. It was not designed to underwrite competitive populism that compromises long-term economic governance. A more principled jurisprudence from the courts is needed. It may not require courts to police every welfare scheme, but it could demand transparency, fiscal disclosure and objective criteria linking expenditure to a measurable public purpose. Without such norms, the line between distributive justice and electoral inducement blurs dangerously.
The Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act of 1985 introduced the Tenth Schedule, which disqualified lawmakers who voluntarily left their parties. Interestingly, such questions relating to disqualification are not decided by courts, but by the Speaker of the House. Precedents of Speakers acting in a non-partisan manner outnumber those where they tend to act in favour of the ruling party that appoints him or her. This ‘anti-defection’ law was intended to bring stability in elected governments. However, it has now been weakened by political manipulation, selective enforcement and prolonged procedural delays.
The Supreme Court dealt with the Speaker’s prolonged inaction on disqualification petitions in KM Singh v. Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. The petitions were pending before the speaker against a Congress MLA who joined the BJP-led government after elections. The Court acknowledged the Speaker’s role under the Tenth Schedule as a competent authority, but ruled that inaction should not frustrate Constitutional objectives. Affirming the scope of judicial review to ensure timely decision-making, it directed the Speaker to decide the petitions within four weeks.
Five years later, the Court built upon KM Singh, marking a shift from case-specific relief to a broader constitutional standard. In Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc v. The State of Telangana and Ors, it held that disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months, setting aside the Telangana High Court’s ruling.
There are many reasons for a politician to defect. Being part of the ruling government, being given a larger political role or seeking to avoid prosecution in serious crimes remain the most common ones. The framework of disqualification, even though originally intended to deter opportunism, has become a tool of negotiation.
The Hindu’s 2024 analysis found that 70% of lawmakers who switched parties were re-elected and 89% were re-nominated by their new party, suggesting that defection is politically advantageous.
Reports also indicate that investigative pressure and political incentives sometimes operate together. Since 2014, cases by the Enforcement Directorate against politicians have quadrupled, with 95 per cent targeting opposition leaders. Between 2014 and 2024, 25 opposition politicians facing probes defected to the ruling party and 23 received reprieve, with cases stalled or closed.
Reform, therefore, must move beyond procedural timelines and address the incentive structure itself. A temporary bar on contesting future elections, holding office and transferring adjudicatory powers from the Speaker are necessary to restore neutrality. Without structural changes to prevent opportunistic floor-crossing and preserve legislative stability, the anti-defection law risks remaining symbolic.
The idea behind One Nation, One Election (ONOE) intends to align federal, state and local body elections. Advertised as cost-cutting exercise, its implementation poses a challenge to India’s federal structure. It is more than just a scheduling reform; it signifies a transition from intended federalism to practical unitary operation.
In March 2024, a committee headed by former President Ram Nath Kovind came out with a report in favour of ONOE. However, this suggestion raises a constitutional concern. Federalism is an essential part of the Basic Structure, as acknowledged in Kesavananda Bharati. Subordinating state elections to a national schedule jeopardises the significance of state electorates’ mandates, possibly transforming the fundamental Constitutional identity of India.
Implementation is contingent upon the suggested Article 82(A) in The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024, which permits early dissolution of state assemblies to align elections with the Lok Sabha. This directly contradicts Article 172, which ensures a set five-year duration. In the context of ONOE, states experiencing mid-term failure would hold elections solely for the "remainder of the term," resulting in a consistently shortened governance cycle. This impermanence can diminish voter involvement, hinder long-term policy development and redirect responsibility away from state administrations.
India previously held simultaneous elections from 1952 to 1967. It was a period of federal overreach, President’s rule and premature dissolution of state assemblies. This strained the federal balance and it eventually led to the ONOE concept being lost in the Indian polity. Revisiting it without addressing past mistakes could further centralise powers.
ONOE also endangers the diverse nature of Indian democracy. It amplifies national narratives at the risk of neglecting local linguistic, cultural and economic concerns. Policies would be more central, which would further weaken the idea of decentralised governance. Organising elections for almost a billion voters, while simultaneously deploying personnel, security and EVMs, is a monumental challenge, where mistakes could undermine both effectiveness and credibility.
ONOE promises convenience for administration but carries risk of undermining the structural ethos of Indian polity. Resultantly, a quasi-unitary electoral regime would replace pluralistic diversity.
Every strong government, regardless of ideology, had sought to bend constitutional structures to its own advantage. This is the pattern that is revealed if one reads all the six themes across both parts together. The stretching could be as simple as an amendment to the Constitution or a legislation or it could be more sly through institutional practice, fiscal design or electoral strategy. The Constitution, in its resilience, allows a degree of flexibility. But as DR BR Ambedkar warned, it cannot preserve itself if Constitutional morality is absent in those who wield power.
History shows that governments repeatedly try to subordinate them. From Indira Gandhi’s supersession of Justice HR Khanna to the Modi government’s idea of control over judicial appointments shows how this tug-of-war endures. The recent ECI amendments, which altered the appointment process of Election Commissioners, similarly raise fears of executive dominance over a body that is meant to be independent. Such episodes are not aberrations, but part of a consistent weaning of institutions - an attempt by governments, regardless of ideology, to seize levers of power even where the Constitution intended independence. Left unchecked, this institutional erosion is fatal to democracy. An elastic stretched too far eventually loses its capacity to return to shape.
The only true check lies in electoral accountability.
Unconstrained majorities stretch the elastic to its limit. Coalitions, though messy and imperfect, can act as a safety valve. Although they might not be a panacea, coalitions are a reminder that divided power may not be a weakness, but a saving grace of our constitutional democracy.
Finally, the responsibility lies with each one of us as citizens. Voting should not be reduced to personality cults. If we remain vigilant, the Constitution can continue to bend without breaking. If not, it risks snapping; and with it, the democratic promise itself.
Nakashvir Singh Aulakh is an advocate practicing before the Supreme Court of India, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) and the High Courts of Delhi and Punjab & Haryana.
Bhoomika Nim is a fourth-year student at University School of Law and Legal Studies, New Delhi.