India's federal structure is continually tested through disputes over policy implementation. A recent flashpoint is the language policy in schools, illustrated by Tamil Nadu’s pending legal challenge.
In May 2025, Tamil Nadu initiated legal proceedings in the Supreme Court against the Centre. Tamil Nadu has claimed that the Centre stopped funding a scheme requiring parallel contributions from both governments. This, it further alleged, is due to the Centre’s grouse about the State not implementing the National Education Policy’s (NEP) three-language formula. The Supreme Court’s direction in December 2025 directing both governments to hold consultations reflects a direct impasse over implementation authority.
More specifically, under a Centrally-sponsored scheme, the Union government sought to establish Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas (JNVs) across Tamil Nadu. The State refused to provide land for them. The core of this refusal is a legal claim: the JNVs teach three languages - including Hindi - while a State law mandates that schools in Tamil Nadu teach only two languages - Tamil and English. The Madras High Court examined this claim in 2017 and found that the JNVs’ syllabus actually aligned with the State law, as Tamil was the primary language of instruction. Despite this finding, Tamil Nadu continued its resistance. Objections to the formula have been echoed by some other non-Hindi-speaking states. Maharashtra and Karnataka had also rejected the policy’s formula, citing their cultural priorities and convenience in education of locals.
It is part of a wider trend in federal imbalance in implementation of policies: the Centre wants shared schemes to be branded solely in its name. Otherwise, it withholds approval for state-level projects or delays funding. This raises a deeper federal question, even if not raised expressly in Tamil Nadu’s case: who ultimately controls the implementation of laws and policies in our constitutional scheme? The Centre that enacts them or the states that operationalise them?
Article 73 of the Constitution vests executive power over concurrent subjects primarily in the states. The Centre may frame a policy, but how it comes to life within a state is for the state to decide. It follows that the Centre cannot use funding pressure to compel state implementation of a concurrent policy. Hence, the Tamil Nadu government is acting within its authority in its refusal to provide land for JNVs.
We must understand how the Constitution divides two key powers: legislation - the power to make laws - and execution - the power to execute laws. Execution also entails the power to create and execute policies. The document distributes legislative powers between the states and the Centre through three itemised lists: the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List. The Union List contains subjects only parliament can legislate on, while the State List contains those reserved for states.
The Concurrent List is meant for subjects that do not fit neatly into either national or state categories, or are concerned with shared interests. Hence, the Constitution allows flexibility for both to make laws on those. It recognises that the Centre may need to step in when a matter has an impact across state borders. Concurrency also lets states modify a Central law to suit their needs. This list includes subjects like education, forests and electricity. This arrangement creates room for layered responses, cooperation and avoids the need to change the Constitution every time a common concern arises.
However, when both want to make a law on the same concurrent subject, parliament’s law shall prevail. This ‘legislative dominance’ of the Centre prevents conflicting state laws from causing uncertainty in key areas. This is because such areas may require a cohesive national response - such as criminal law, environmental policies or control of epidemics. Alternatively, some areas like education may need to eliminate illogical state-to-state variations. This dominance is why the Centre can frame the NEP and the JNV-related scheme.
The Constitution then distributes executive powers based on this division of law-making powers. Through Articles 73 and 162, both the Centre and the states have executive power in areas where they can make laws. For items in the Concurrent List, then, both the Centre and states acquire equal executive power.
Article 73 governs situations where the Centre and the states both seek to implement policies on concurrent subjects. To solve any conflict, and unlike in a legislative-conflict, it provides that a state’s executive power shall predominate the Centre’s. Notably, executive power also includes the power to frame a policy on a legislative subject, even without making a law on it. Hence, even if parliament passes a law or the Centre frames a policy, it is the states which have the final say on how and whether it is implemented. This is the constitutional power Tamil Nadu is effectively asserting in refusing land for JNVs and in implementing the NEP, despite their legal validity.
The default rule in Article 73, however, carries one exception: parliament may pass a law and authorise the Centre to execute laws/policies in concurrent matters. The rationale behind this exception could be that this is a ‘consensual intrusion’: the concerned state gives indirect consent through its representatives in parliament. This also allows other states and the opposition to examine whether the consent is free from undue influence. However, this does not mean that parliament merely needs to enact a law. Instead, it means that the law’s text must specifically permit Central executive control. This makes it a narrow exception, and in doing so, affirms the broader rule: implementation is primarily the state’s domain. Notably, no such law currently exists that allows the Centre to implement the NEP in any state.
Some might argue that the Centre does gain executive control in these situations. That is because the Centre temporarily gains the ‘authority to make laws’ on a certain state-subject. On surface, this is the only requirement as per the text of Article 73(1)(a). However, this view would be incorrect. The Constitution requires an express, ongoing legislative power - not a situational licence - to justify central executive control. Hence, viewed in any manner, the compromise on executive control of the states is extremely limited.
Since the NEP is a Central policy on a concurrent subject, Article 73 allows states to decide how to implement it. It rests on the logic that implementation must follow local needs, not just Central intent.
Parliament may enact uniform legal frameworks, but implementation requires continuous interaction with local institutions. This means laws and policies must be implemented in the most effective manner on the ground, while also preventing unintended harm. State governments are always more suitable for this task. As B Pocker argued during the Constituent Assembly Debates, people hold state governments more accountable for day-to-day governance. States, thus, have to sensitise themselves to local needs and circumstances before implementing policies.
This local sensitivity is the very reason Tamil Nadu invokes its Tamil Learning Act, 2006 to enforce a two-language policy and avoid Hindi, a language not used by the State’s populace. Secondly, states maintain permanent, ground-level administrative machinery - down to district collectors and municipal bodies - that the Centre lacks. The other justification is that this position promotes decentralisation. In that light, this is prioritising administrative responsibilities in elected governments which are more local in nature.
Lastly, this position is aligned with the Constitution’s larger design. The document has imposed strict limits on when the Centre can take over a state’s executive power. It can do so only in exceptional cases under Articles 352 and 356 (Emergency provisions) or 324(6) (conduct of elections). Even on the rare occasions where the Constitution allows parliament to make laws on State List subjects - such as under Articles 249 and 250 in cases of national interest or Emergency - it notably stops short of handing over executive control to the Centre.
States’ executive power is supreme in its domain. It is because the Constitution foresaw that for areas like education, states are best placed to determine the most effective means of instruction. Hence, it specified very few means by which the Centre may usurp a state’s executive control. None of those exist in the context of the language row. The Centre’s coercive tactics in withholding funds over the NEP thus violates Article 73.
This discussion also makes the interim order of the Supreme Court constitutionally puzzling. If the State’s executive authority under Article 73 provides a clear, legitimate basis to refuse a Central scheme, the Court's role should logically be to affirm this autonomy. Instead, the judiciary has softened a definitive constitutional position into a mere bargaining chip. By doing so, it fails to enforce the clear bar that Article 73 places on using financial coercion to compel a state’s implementation of a concurrent policy. Tamil Nadu’s refusal is a constitutionally valid exercise of discretion. This is like telling a homeowner, who has every right to refuse a salesman at her door, that she must now sit down and negotiate with him.
Yash Sinha is an Advocate practicing before the Supreme Court of India.