On October 27, 2026, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the matter of ECL Finance Ltd. v. Abhinav Mukherjee (Civil Appeal No. 6268 of 2022) held that an institutional lender (also being a debenture holder) was a "related party" of the corporate debtor under Section 5(24)(m)(i) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). Both the lender as well its debenture trustee by implication, were therefore barred from the Committee of Creditors (CoC). The lender was not a promoter or a promoter's proxy. It was excluded because of the covenants mentioned in the debenture trust deed and other loan documents to protect the interest of the lender and secure repayment of its money.
The IBC is not a recovery statute. Swiss Ribbons described it as "a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors." But IBC chose a specific means of achieving revival: a CoC of financial creditors. They were chosen because, in Swiss Ribbons' words, they are "from the very beginning, involved with assessing the viability of the corporate debtor."
The related-party exclusion protects that body. Phoenix ARC v. Spade Financial explained that its purpose is "to obviate conflicts of interest" and to stop promoters regaining control through loans made by them. Accordingly, it is meant to be a shield for financial creditors against the promoter, not a sword against creditors who protected themselves by negotiating and inserting protective covenants in the transaction documents.
The results are visible on bank balance sheets. The gross NPA ratio of scheduled commercial banks fell from 11.2% in March 2018 to 1.8% in March 2026. The IBC accounted for 52.4% of banks' recoveries in 2024-25. Creditors have realised over ₹4.35 lakh crore under resolution plans. Over 30,000 cases, with defaults of about ₹14 lakh crore, settled before admission. The real achievement was behavioural: defaulting promoters finally feared losing their companies.
The Court accepted that Section 5(24)(m)(i) does not require the "positive control" applied under Section 29A of the IBC. It held that "a role of navigation would suffice." It then examined certain rights reserved by the lender/ debenture holder under the transaction documents including right to appoint a nominee director on default, deadlock referral, quarterly construction-budget approval, inspection rights, escrow of project proceeds, key-personnel covenants, the appointment of sales agents and a security power of attorney. That the rights were never actually exercised was held irrelevant. This is critical as practically, while the lenders reserve all such rights in transaction documents, the exercise of these rights is limited to certain critical eventualities. The promoters are at the helm of affairs and the lenders intervene in company management only if there is a glaring anomaly. Lenders are not in the business of running real estate companies and would rely on the expertise of the promoters to efficaciously run the business to ensure timely repayment of monies.
Lenders do not run businesses. But no lender can finance a plan it has not examined and agreed. Before disbursement, it must discuss and settle the project cost, schedule, cash waterfall, management team and milestones. That is underwriting, not policymaking. The borrower proposes, the lender evaluates, both agree the yardsticks, and the borrower then runs the business while the lender measures performance.
Each impugned clause mentioned in the judgment serves that purpose. Budget approval and escrow ensure that project money is spent on the project. Parliament imposes the same discipline on every developer through Section 4(2)(l)(D) of RERA. Key-personnel covenants protect the team the lender underwrote and do not direct any decision. Inspection rights provide information, not power. Nominee directors, step-in rights and powers of attorney arise on default and are security, not governance. Discussions and participation needed to finalise a business plan and lay down yardsticks should not fall within the mischief of Section 5(24)(m)(i).
First, the Court never asked the question Phoenix ARC made decisive: would the lender's presence create a conflict of interest? Every right relied upon was a right against the promoter.
Second, the four limbs of Section 5(24)(m) mirror the "significant influence" indicators in Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 28, which describe an investor's relationship with its associate. Ind AS 110 likewise treats a lender's covenant and default rights as protective rights.
Third, the legislative intent of Section 5(24)(m) should have been taken into consideration. The various restrictions on related party of a corporate debtor show that the scheme of IBC was to prevent related parties of the corporate debtor itself from sitting on decision making positions vis-à-vis the revival of the entity. The idea was to have an independent decision-making body to ascertain whether the corporate debtor could be revived and what would be in the best interest of the various stakeholders. By reserving contractual rights, a financial creditor is simply protecting the repayment of its monies. Such an entity could not be treated as a related party to the corporate debtor. Otherwise, almost every financial creditor would be treated as a related party and disqualified from the CoC.
Fourth, the debenture trustee is required by SEBI regulations to monitor covenants and the use of funds. Similarly, where alternative investment funds are extending funds, it is the duty of a prudent investment manager to ensure that the interests of the investors are adequately protected, and suitable contractual protections are built into the transaction documents. One arm of the State demands vigilance, while this ruling penalises it.
Fifth, while collectively reading the provisions of the transaction documents to state that ECL had an ‘all-pervasive’ control over the projects of the corporate debtor, the Court failed to consider the ramifications on all lending transactions where a prudent lender would be penalized for protecting its interests.
The ECL judgment has sent lenders scrambling to modify their transaction documents to ensure they don’t fall within the mischief of ‘related party’ under Section 5(24)(m) of the IBC.
Promoters are the winners. They will resist covenants by citing ECL. Lenders will monitor less and intervene later. In insolvency, related-party challenges will be used to remove the most informed creditor and delay the process. ECL's own CIRP began in January 2020 and CoC composition was settled only in October 2026. The passive lender becomes safer than the diligent one.
Courts should confine ECL to its facts and apply a clause-by-clause functional test. The Legislature should add an Explanation to Section 5(24)(m) to clarify that lender protection rights such as business-plan appraisal, monitoring, use-of-funds covenants, escrow, and default-triggered remedies negotiated at arm's length do not by themselves make a lender a related party. The second proviso to Section 21(2) which excludes financial creditors who have substituted their debt for equity should be expanded to also exclude financial creditors who have lender protection covenants but could not be seen as having significant influence over the management of the corporate debtor.
The IBC succeeded because promoters feared informed, independent creditors. If the watchman is instructed to lower its guard, that fear fades, and a sense of complacency would again creep in, which defeats the purpose of being a prudent lender and a cautious borrower.
About the Authors: Amit Aggarwal is the Managing Partner (Corporate & Non-Contentious Practice) and Devyani Dhawan is Counsel at SNG & Partners.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s). The opinions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of Bar & Bench.