The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently ruled that not every case under Section 498A (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) can be branded as an offence involving moral turpitude [Brahmjeet Kaushal v. Union of India & Ors].

Justice Sandeep Moudgil expressed a disagreement with High Courts that have ruled that Section 498-A IPC constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude to remove a public employee from work.

“With all humility at my command, a careful distinction becomes necessary, on the one hand, between the genuine cases of egregious dowry-related cruelty which shock the collective conscience of the society as a whole, and, on the other hand, prosecutions arising out of essentially personal disputes within the precincts of the matrimonial home, which may culminate in compromise, acquittal, or even conviction based on findings of only technical or marginal cruelty,” the Bench said.

In 1996, the Supreme Court observed that moral turpitude implies conduct which is "inherently base, depraved or contrary to accepted standards of morality". Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude are frequently barred from public employment in India.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court had recently upheld the dismissal of an employee convicted under Section 498A of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, ruling that dowry demands amount to 'moral turpitude' as it is associated with greed. The High Courts of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh earlier passed similar verdicts.

Justice Moudgil acknowledged that at present, no uniform judicial consensus exists on whether every conviction under Section 498-A IPC constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude.

The judge said that reasonable people may differ on the question of whether a particular case under Section 498-A IPC may involve moral turpitude.

“What cannot be accepted, however, is any general rule that every offence under Section 498-A IPC, by its very nature, must automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment, promotion or higher education,” the Court added.

The Court further said that since matrimonial relationships and husbands or in-laws' conduct within that intimate sphere happens to be the axis of a Section 498A case, every prosecution under it may not be a societal problem.

“To elevate every prosecution under Section 498-A, irrespective of its factual substratum, into an ‘offence against society’ and, on that abstract footing, to brand it in all cases as an offence involving moral turpitude, is a proposition which cannot withstand legal scrutiny. If that idea is accepted, then almost every offence in the Indian Penal Code or Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita could easily be described as dealing with a ‘societal’ problem, and almost every conviction would have to be treated as involving moral turpitude. This would wipe out the important difference between ordinary criminal offences and only those acts which are so base, vile, depraved or so shocking to the public conscience, that they deserve to be characterised against involving ‘moral turpitude’.”

It further said that the label of an offence involving moral turpitude can legitimately be imposed only where those facts disclose genuine moral depravity, rather than merely a strained matrimonial relationship.

The Court made the observations while granting relief to a branch manager of the State Bank of India (SBI) who was discharged from service in 2018 following his conviction in a case under Section 498-A of the IPC. He had been acquitted of the charge of dowry death of his wife.

While setting aside the discharge order, the High Court reasoned that disciplinary authority cannot simply reproduce the phrase “conviction involving moral turpitude” and proceed to terminate service. 

The authority is obligated to evaluate the nature of the offence, its nexus with official duties, the surrounding circumstances, the employee’s service record and the proportionality of the proposed punishment, it said.

“The impugned order dated 27.06.2019 (Annexure P5) whereby the services of the respondents have been discharged from 14.12.2018 is hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner from 15.12.2018 along with interest @ 6% p.a. within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order,” the Court ordered.

Advocate Karnail Singh represented the petitioner.

Senior Advocate Dheeraj Jain with Advocate Sahil Garg appeared for the Union of India

Advocate Madhu Dayal represented other respondents.

[Read Judgment]