In a high-level closed-door interaction with the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the One Nation One Election Bill, former Chief Justice of India (CJI) DY Chandrachud cautioned lawmakers about significant constitutional gaps in the proposed legislation.

Sources present during the meeting told Bar & Bench that the former CJI made it clear that while the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024 does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution, it contains serious flaws that need correction before it can move forward.

The meeting was attended by 38 Members of Parliament and officials from the Parliament Secretariat. Former CJI JS Khehar was also invited to present his views before the committee.

Synchronised polls not unconstitutional

Chandrachud began by addressing the central premise of the Bill. He pointed out that simultaneous elections are not in conflict with constitutional principles. In fact, from 1950 to 1960, elections to the parliament and State assemblies were held together. He cited the example of 1957, when several assemblies were dissolved early to align with national elections.

He stressed that democracy and federalism, though part of the basic structure, do not require that elections be held separately. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates asynchronous elections, he said.

According to him, legislatures elected before the notified date (defined as the first sitting of the newly elected Lok Sabha) will continue their full five-year terms. Legislatures elected after the Lok Sabha is constituted would, only once, have their terms aligned to parliament’s tenure as part of a transitional provision.

After this one-time adjustment, he said, both parliament and State assemblies would run independently and parallelly, each for their own five-year tenure unless dissolved earlier under regular democratic circumstances.

Concerns raised over excessive powers granted to EC

Chandrachud’s sharpest objection came in relation to the powers conferred on the Election Commission of India (ECI) by the proposed Bill. According to sources, he flagged two provisions as constitutionally unacceptable:

• One allows the ECI to modify provisions of Part XV of the Constitution to implement the Bill.

• The other empowers the ECI to postpone elections to any State assembly if simultaneous conduct with the Lok Sabha is deemed infeasible.

He reportedly stated that giving the ECI the power to alter substantive constitutional provisions or to shorten the tenure of elected assemblies through a unilateral report to the President cannot pass constitutional muster.

He referred to Article 356(5) as a comparative framework, noting that the Constitution provides specific mechanisms for State intervention. Any power to defer elections, he said, must be clearly defined and limited.

To resolve the flaws, Chandrachud is said to have suggested a three-point safeguard:

1. The ECI should be allowed to delay elections only in situations involving national security or public order.

2. Any such recommendation must be ratified by both Houses of Parliament.

3. Postponements should be permitted only for a fixed, limited period.

Without these guardrails, he reportedly warned, the proposal could result in an unaccountable and open-ended concentration of power in the hands of the Commission.

Unaddressed constitutional scenarios

Sources said that Chandrachud flagged two major constitutional silences that the Bill currently ignores.

The first concerns a National Emergency under Article 352, which allows Parliament and state assembly tenures to be extended by one year. The Bill does not explain how such extensions would impact the synchronised cycle.

He explained that once an Emergency ends, the government would need to choose between cutting short parliament’s next term or extending the assemblies’ terms to restore synchronicity.

The second silence involves a more everyday situation:

What happens if a State assembly is dissolved six or seven months before its tenure ends, due to a loss of majority? The Bill provides no clarity on whether elections can be deferred in such cases to align with the parliament.

He said this situation is not covered by Article 356, and unless addressed directly in the Bill, could lead to confusion or even misuse.

According to those present, Chandrachud summarised his submission in three broad points:

1. The idea of simultaneous elections does not violate the Constitution’s basic structure.

2. However, the powers conferred on the Election Commission must be revised and limited.

3. The Bill must deal with constitutional silences, particularly in cases of emergency and premature dissolutions.

In December 2024, the government introduced the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, aiming to bring in a framework for holding simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha, state assemblies and local bodies. Soon after, a Joint Parliamentary Committee was formed to examine the Bill in detail.

The committee has 39 members drawn from both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. It is chaired by BJP MP PP Chaudhary. Among those on the panel are Anurag Thakur, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, Manish Tewari, Supriya Sule and Sambit Patra. The committee has been tasked with looking into the legal, constitutional and administrative issues that would arise if all elections across the country were to be held at the same time.

It has held several rounds of consultations with experts, including former Chief Justices of India, to assess how the Bill would work in practice and what gaps may need to be addressed before any changes are made to the Constitution.