Academic excellence and the agenda of centralisation of NLUs

Recently, on May 17, 2026, the National Judicial Academy at Bhopal hosted a conference for deliberating on excellence in legal education. The conference was first of its own kind in terms of both participatory scale and coordinated judicial intervention into the future institutional architecture of National Law Universities (NLUs) in India.

The conference was presided over by Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant. The CJI was accompanied by approximately a dozen sitting judges of the Supreme Court of India, Vice-Chancellors (VCs) representing all 25 NLUs through the Consortium of NLUs, in addition to the Chief Justices of all the High Courts as Chancellors and Visitors.

The stated agenda of the conference mainly was to have a legislative and institutional groundwork, taking up the question of Central government recognition, a uniform governing legislation and a dedicated central regulatory body for NLUs drawing on the structural model of the National Medical Commission (NMC) constituted under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019. The conference, however, was focused mainly on inadequate finance/funding to NLUs by the state governments as the major impediment in achieving ‘excellence’ in the legal academics. Centralisation of governance of NLUs was presented as the only possible solution. 

While introducing and contextualising the agenda of the conference, CJI Kant began with the observation that notwithstanding the fact that NLUs are statutory creations of state governments established through state-specific legislations, they employ the nomenclature “National,” which operates as a conceptual misnomer and hence creates ambiguity regarding their actual status and the institutional character.

The CJI observed that the state governments usually provide only one-time capital assistance at the stage of establishment of these institution, while largely abstaining from assuming responsibility for recurring and operational expenditures necessary for their long-term functioning. Consequently, most of the NLUs operate under chronic revenue deficits and are compelled to rely substantially upon student fees as the primary mechanism for meeting their recurrent financial obligations.

A large number of NLUs were functioning predominantly through contractual, ad hoc, or temporary teaching appointments. Only a handful of these institutions possess regular faculty members necessary for sustained academic development, research continuity and institutional stability.

Under such a state of affairs, the CJI observed that the aspiration of achieving “excellence” in legal education would remain largely unattainable. He, therefore, suggested pressing need not only of centralisation of NLUs but also a central regulatory body as a way forward to excellence. 

In favour of the centralisation of NLUs, the CJI made a two-fold argument. First, that centralisation through a comprehensive Union law would enable the transfer of regulatory and financial responsibility from the states to the Union. The second argument was that the proposed Union law would create a statutory obligation and a statutory commitment on the Union government to provide these institutions with regular and adequate funding. The proposed centralisation through a comprehensive Union law coupled with a central regulatory authority would also confer upon NLUs a genuinely “national” institutional character which would eventually facilitate transformation of NLUs into adequately funded and academically robust institutions capable of attaining the status of “Institutions of Excellence.”

Although the agenda advanced by the CJI was evidently framed in the language of institutional reform and academic excellence, the agenda nonetheless carried deeper constitutional, political and epistemic implications concerning federalism, institutional autonomy, academic freedom, future Centre-State relations and the future of legal education in India.

With the exception of Justice BV Nagarathna, who emerged as the lone judicial dissenter, the judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of High Courts largely aligned with the position articulated by the CJI.

The deliberative atmosphere was thus marked by a pronounced institutional ‘consensus’ within the judiciary, arguably reflecting a hierarchical culture of conformism. On the academic side as well - except Prof R Venkata Rao, the VC (in-charge) of India International University of Legal Education and Research (IIULER), Goa and Prof GS Bajpai, the VC of NLU Delhi - the overwhelming majority of VCs expressed not only their willingness but also eagerness to the proposed centralisation project, even at the cost of surrendering institutional autonomy and academic independence in exchange for the “assured” financial support.

Justice Nagarathna articulated a series of serious and constitutionally grounded objections to the agenda, particularly emphasising its implications for the federal structure of the Indian Constitution and the autonomy of States within the constitutional distribution of legislative and administrative powers. 

However, before discussing Justice Nagarathna’s dissent, let us deal with the CJI’s preliminary objection concerning the use of the nomenclature “National” by State-established National Law Universities which allegedly operates as a conceptual misnomer creating ambiguity regarding their actual status and character.

In this regard, an alternative constitutional and institutional perspective may be advanced. The issue transcends the semantics of institutional nomenclature and enters the broader constitutional terrain concerning the legitimacy of centralisation and the permissible boundaries of Union power within a federal polity. The nomenclature “National” does not necessarily signify an assertion of Union ownership or central legislative competence. Rather, it may more appropriately be understood as reflecting the academic ambition and institutional aspirations of the State governments to create centres of higher legal education capable of competing with premier institutions established by the Union government and recognised as institutions of national importance.

A State invests public money in creating infrastructure; establishing these institutions gives rise to a legitimate expectation to serve not only regional interests but also broader national intellectual and professional needs. Such efforts are consistent with the constitutional vision of cooperative federalism, wherein States are not merely subordinate administrative appendages of the Union but active participants in nation-building through social, educational and institutional development.

From this standpoint, use of the word “National” is neither a conceptual misnomer, nor is its use constitutionally impermissible. The nomenclatural symbolism can not be invoked as a juridical justification for expanding Union authority into a sphere constitutionally shared with and substantially occupied by the States.

Justice Nagarathna argued that since education falls within the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, both the Union and the States possess legislative competence. Establishment, administration, regulation and developmental orientation of state-created institutions are intrinsically connected to the constitutional principle of cooperative federalism and hence, both can legitimately participate in educational governance. In Justice Nagarathna’s assessment, the proposed agenda of bringing NLUs under a Union law and a central regulatory authority would substantially dilute the constitutional role of states in governing their own institutions. As long as federalism remains part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution - as consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court of India -neither the Union nor the States can legitimately seek to annihilate or substantially erode the constitutional domain of the other through unilateral institutional expansion.

Further, Justice Nagarathna asked a simple but a nuanced question - can the Union government not give funding without taking over these institution (NLUs)? What stops the Union government from funding these institutions without taking away their academic independence and institutional autonomy? In other words, why must financial support from the Union necessarily be conditioned upon the dilution of academic independence, institutional autonomy and the constitutional role of the States in educational governance?

But the question was not addressed by the floor. Instead, Justice Kant reacted swiftly by reaffirming the central agenda of the conference. The CJI emphasised the overwhelming legislative power of the Union government on the subject matter. The assertive reiteration of the agenda by the CJI, coupled with the absence of any engagement with the question raised by Justice Nagarathna, created the impression that the decision had already been taken prior to the conference itself. The conference appeared less as an open-ended deliberative forum intended to a meaningful deliberative engagement on governance of legal education and more as an exercise aimed at securing endorsement and formal validation for a pre-determined policy direction. Such a perception, if accurate, raises broader concerns regarding democratic decision-making within the governance architecture of higher education. Genuine consultation within a constitutional democracy ordinarily presupposes openness to dissent, reciprocal engagement with competing viewpoints and the possibility of revising institutional proposals in light of reasoned objections.

Further, the proposed Union legislation and a central regulatory authority for NLUs may also have far-reaching implications. One of the most serious doubt arising from the proposed framework concerns the possibility that it would intensify the already existing politicisation of higher education in India by substantially centralising academic, regulatory and pedagogical authority in the hands of the Union government. In this context, the controversy raises two interconnected pedagogical and constitutional questions: not merely how law should be taught, but more fundamentally what should be taught in institutions of legal education. 

The question of curriculum is never ideologically neutral because legal education plays a central role in shaping constitutional consciousness, democratic values and the normative orientation of future lawyers, judges, academics and public administrators. Excessive centralisation may create conditions conducive to ideological intervention in legal education, particularly if academic autonomy is weakened through statutory and regulatory mechanisms. More specifically, a centrally controlled legal education regime under a politically dominant Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Central government may gradually alter the normative foundations of constitutional pedagogy by privileging particular cultural, religious, or ideological frameworks over the pluralistic and secular ethos embodied in the Constitution.

For example, the constitutional jurisprudence traditionally grounded in rights-based discourse - centred upon liberty, equality, justice, fraternity, secularism, human dignity and inclusive constitutional morality - may increasingly be displaced by pedagogical frameworks drawing legitimacy from majoritarian or religiously inflected conceptions of social order. In this apprehension, legal education may gradually shift from teaching constitutionalism as a project of democratic inclusion and social heterogeneity towards frameworks emphasising civilisational homogeneity, cultural nationalism, or duty-centric normative orders associated with selective interpretations of “dharma” justifying graded social inequalities.

The concern is particularly significant because legal education does not merely transmit technical knowledge of law; it also shapes the interpretive imagination through which future legal actors understand constitutional values, minority rights, secularism, social justice and the nature of democratic citizenship. Accordingly, any perceived attempt to ideologically restructure legal pedagogy acquires profound constitutional implications.

These serious concerns cannot be dismissed as entirely speculative because similar ideological tendencies are already visible in certain educational institutions governed by the BJP-ruled states. Reference can be made to the programmes such as the Centre for Vedic Jurisprudence at NLU Tripura and the Vedic Vigyan Kendra within the Department of Law at Banaras Hindu University (BHU), where courses relating to Vedic jurisprudence or traditional knowledge systems have been introduced in the name of integrating indigenous intellectual traditions with contemporary legal studies. Similarly, concerns have been raised regarding programmes conducted within departments associated with AYUSH studies at BHU, including courses such as “Bhoot Vidya Vigyan,” blurring the boundaries between traditional knowledge, spirituality, paranormal concepts and scientific education of medical science.

In the absence of strong institutional safeguards protecting academic autonomy and scientific temper as mandated in Article 51A (h) of the Constitution, centrally controlled educational frameworks may permit the incorporation of pedagogical content that blurs the distinction between evidence-based rational, scientific scholarship and ideologically motivated knowledge systems. 

The arbitrary assumption of regulatory control and institutional authority by the Union government over State-established NLUs would rather prove counterproductive to the long-term institutional interest and the broader aspiration of achieving academic “excellence.” It is possible that states, particularly the non-BJP ruled ones, in response to perceived attempts at central takeover, may reconsider existing land allocations, infrastructural arrangements, or statutory relationships governing these institutions. Any such escalation would inevitably jeopardise institutional stability and adversely affect the academic future of thousands of students presently enrolled in these institutions. 

The appropriate constitutional response to the challenges confronting NLUs, therefore, may not lie in unilateral centralisation or regulatory absorption, but in evolving a consensual and collaborative framework between the Union and the States regarding questions of funding, infrastructure development, academic governance, institutional accountability and educational standards. Such a cooperative model would enable the Union government to provide substantial financial and policy support to NLUs while simultaneously preserving the institutional autonomy of the NLUs and the constitutional role of the States in educational governance. Such a framework would also reduce the risk of politicisation and institutional conflict by ensuring that reforms emerge through deliberative consensus rather than through assertions of superior legislative authority.

The aspiration of achieving genuine excellence in legal education cannot be realised through centralisation alone. Excellence in higher education depends equally upon constitutional trust, academic freedom, institutional pluralism, democratic governance and cooperative public investment. Any reform process that undermines these foundational principles may inadvertently weaken the very institutions it seeks to strengthen. 

Prof Vinod Kumar is a Professor of Law at National Law University (NLU) Delhi and is also presently serving as the Additional Director at the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal.

This article has been written in his personal capacity as a Professor of Law and has nothing to do with National Judicial Academy.