Equality and denominational autonomy: The constitutional questions before the nine-judge Bench

A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court will start hearing the Sabarimala review petition in April. The Court will re-engage with the fundamental questions of the extent of the guarantee of religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

What began as a dispute over women’s access to the Sabarimala Temple has evolved into a constitutional question: whether denominational autonomy is to be considered beyond the reach of equality analysis or whether religious practice must, in any event, submit to the general guarantees under Part III. The reference before the Court is to pose an unanswered question about the balance between the collective authority of religions and individual rights, particularly in the context of gender equality claims within religious contexts.

The seven questions referred to the Bench reveal the extent of the uncertainty on this question. These questions are intended to circumscribe the extent of the guarantee of religious freedom and, more fundamentally, to inquire into the meaning of “morality” in constitutional discourse and the extent of judicial inquiry into the determination of religious essentials.

At the center of this debate is the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine. This doctrine emerged in the early years of constitutional adjudication; it was intended to secure the guarantee of religious freedom by circumscribing State action to those practices that are not essential to the religion. The courts were thus charged with the determination of whether a particular practice was essential to a religion, on the assumption that only such practices were worthy of constitutional protection.

However, this approach has led to a number of difficulties over the years. Thus, in order to determine whether a particular practice is essential, the courts are required to interpret religious texts, assess their significance and determine authenticity. The judiciary is thus placed in the position of making theological assessments, which is clearly incongruous with a secular constitutional framework.

The question goes beyond theoretical debate. When equality challenges arise in the context of religious practices, the ERP doctrine often puts the Court in a dilemma. Should an essential practice go beyond the reach of constitutional review? Or should the equality, dignity and non-discrimination guarantees operate as separate benchmarks to which even essential practices are subject? The earlier decision in Sabarimala indicated that the Court’s understanding of constitutional morality, as the normative order of rights embedded in Part III, might override religious or customary practices in the event of a conflict. However, the subsequent reference to the larger Bench indicated that the Court itself was not sure about the viability of this approach within its own institutional setting.

Among the most important questions, the meaning of “morality” would be crucial. If morality in Articles 25 and 26 is equated with constitutional morality, then religious practices discriminating or excluding persons on the ground of sex would be amenable to equality analysis. On the other hand, if morality is given a narrower construction to include religious or community standards, then denominational autonomy would widen and judicial intervention would be less likely.

It is no coincidence that most of the disputes raising these questions before the Court involve women’s rights of entry and participation in religious institutions. These include women’s rights to enter temples and mosques, to participate in religious institutions after inter-religious marriages and to declare the validity of practices touching upon bodily autonomy. Though the factual matrix would be different in each case, the constitutional question would remain structurally similar. Women would be in a double role: they would be members of religious communities whose collective autonomy would be guaranteed, as well as individual citizens with claims to equality, dignity and freedom under the Constitution. When religious practices limit their participation, the Court would have to determine which of the two constitutional roles would take precedence.

One argument is that denominational autonomy permits communities to regulate their internal religious affairs, including questions of access and participation. Excessive judicial intervention, it is said, risks eroding pluralism and imposing uniform norms on diverse traditions. Yet, the countervailing concern is that religious communities do not exist outside the constitutional order. If collective rights under Article 26 are interpreted as insulated from the rest of Part III, they may create spaces where individual rights are diminished. The Constitution does not clearly indicate that association with a religious denomination entails surrendering the protections of equality or dignity. The difficulty, therefore, is not choosing between religious freedom and equality, but determining how both can coexist without one being rendered subordinate.

This tension escalates in situations related to the right to bodily integrity. In contrast to access-based restrictions, the practice that has irreversible physical effects, particularly when carried out on children, raises fundamental constitutional rights related to the right to life and liberty. The applicable framework for analysis in these situations may differ from that used in access and participation cases. It may be necessary to draw a fine line between access-based claims and claims related to bodily autonomy to prevent the reduction of essentially different constitutional issues to a single issue of “religious practice.”

The reference also points to a major structural problem related to Article 26 itself. Are the rights of religious denominations limited only by the express restrictions specified in the provision, or are they still circumscribed by the general provisions of Part III? If the first view gains ascendance, religious denominations may enjoy a degree of constitutional shelter that is not available to other associations. If the second view is accepted, the constitutional autonomy of religious denominations will continue, but within the general framework of equality and dignity. The answer to this question will determine the meaning of collective rights in Indian constitutional law.

The need for a clear doctrine is further accentuated by the fact that similar questions arise in other communities. If the Constitution specifies a certain balance between the right to religious freedom and the right to equality, such a balance must be applied uniformly, irrespective of the religious community. Differences in theology and practice exist, but the underlying constitutional principles cannot be different for different communities. The credibility of secular adjudication requires such uniformity.

Ultimately, the significance lies not in the resolution of a single controversy, but in the articulation of a coherent constitutional approach. The Constitution protects religious freedom robustly, yet it also affirms the equal status of all citizens. The challenge has always been to reconcile these commitments without reducing one to an exception to the other. Now the Court is being asked to bring greater clarity to this balance to define how denominational autonomy and individual dignity coexist within a secular constitutional framework.

In doing so, it will address a question that has remained unresolved for years: whether religious spaces function as insulated spheres of collective authority, or as institutions that, while protected, remain accountable to the Constitution’s promise of equal citizenship. The answer will not end these debates. But it will shape the terms on which they are conducted for decades to come.

Akhil Yadav and Shivam Rajpurohit are students at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar.