The Delhi High Court in Review: October, 2019 [Part I]

The Delhi High Court in Review: October, 2019 [Part I]

With its vast and varied case-docket, the High Court of Delhi has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief overview of the important pronouncements of the High Court of Delhi over the period of the relevant month in review. While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.

Below are the judgments from the Delhi High Court for the month of October, segregated as per practice areas.


In Rail Land Development Authorities v. Bhagwati Rail Infra Pvt. Ltd.,[1] the Court observed that though Section 34(2)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) does provide a window for the Court to set aside an Award upon arriving at a finding of patent illegality, however, the proviso to the same clearly proscribes interference on the ground of erroneous application of law or re-appreciation of evidence.

In National Highways Authority of India v. M/s. PCL-SUNCON JV[2], the Court held that the question as to whether the work executed by the contractor fell within the scope of a particular Bill of Quantities (‘BOQ’) item or not, was a matter which pertained to the construction of the terms of the contract and, therefore, falls within the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal.

In Neeru Jain v. Jasmine Buildmart[3], while examining the normative underpinnings of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court held that the ultimate aim of the provision is to mitigate the chance of risk or injustice during the period when the arbitration proceedings are pending and the ultimate test that the Court would adopt would be the one encapsulated by Lord Hoffman in Films rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd.[4] viz. the path which has a lower risk of injustice. Applying the aforesaid test, the Court in the said case injuncted execution of title deeds by a real-estate developer which had abruptly cancelled the allotment of apartments in favor of the Petitioners without sufficient notice and the record indicated that the said properties were immediately thereafter sought to be sold at a much higher price to certain third parties.

In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of M/s Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Limited,[5] the Court reiterated that a completely non-est filing would not amount to a properly instituted petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for the purpose of stopping limitation, and listed out a minimum threshold in this regard viz. requisite signatures on the petition, proper execution of a Vakalatnama and a properly signed and attested accompanying affidavit/statement of truth.

In Ramacivil India Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.,[6] the Court noted that though a pre-arbitration reference to a dispute resolution committee was contractually mandatory before arbitration could be validly invoked, when it was evident from the record that the said committee had never been constituted, despite express requests to this effect by the party seeking arbitration, then the opposite party could not seek to resist the maintainability of a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act on account of the non-reference to the dispute resolution committee.

In UBV Infrastructures Limited v. National Highways Authority of India, [7] the Court held that even though it is impermissible for the arbitrators to rely on material which was unilaterally sought and received from a party after the matter had been reserved for pronouncement of the Award, however, when it was established from the record that the said information had not resulted in grant of any relief to the concerned party which had supplied the said information, then there could not be said to be any ultimate illegality in the Award.

In United India Insurance v. Sreedhar Malik Foods Ltd.,[8] the Court noted that though the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was indeed limited, an Award passed in ignorance of squarely applicable circulars issued by a statutory entity like the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (‘IRDA’) which would have a direct bearing on the subject matter of the dispute, would render the Award liable to be set aside.

In Ms. G. Kapoor v. Reacon Engineers Pvt. Ltd.,[9] the Court held that even a notice invoking arbitration would amount to a pleading within the meaning of Section 7(4)(c) of the Arbitration Act inasmuch as the same is in the nature of request under Section 11(4)(a) of the Arbitration Act and if the existence of an arbitration agreement is not controverted, and is rather obliquely acceded to, in response to the aforesaid notice, then it could be said that an arbitration agreement indeed existed between the parties, in terms of Section 7(4)(c) of the Arbitration Act.

In Chopra Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Drishticon Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,[10] the Court upheld the power of an arbitrator to probe into and try and ascertain the underlying intention of the parties while entering into the agreement in question, when there were two diametrically contrary conditions in the agreement which could not be reconciled.

In Theme Engineering Services v. Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd.,[11] the Court observed that in the appropriate contractual and factual context, the usage of the phrase ‘final and binding’ would convey the same meaning as ‘excepted matter’. However, in Union of India v. Chenab Construction Company,[12] the Court noted that merely stating that a claim fell within the rubric of an ‘excepted matter’ would not be sufficient, and it was incumbent on the party stating so to demonstrate that a particular claim was contractually required to be determined by a particular authority alone and whose decision was final to the exclusion of all others.

In Shivaai Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. DTC,[13] the Court noted that the filing of a formal application offering cogent reasons for the delay in filing the petition within the thirty-day window beyond the three-month period as permitted under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was essential, and it was not the scheme of the Arbitration Act that the period of delay within said thirty-day window should be mechanically condoned by the Court at the mere asking.

In New Delhi Municipal Council v. V3S Infratech Ltd.,[14] while construing a clause in an agreement which proscribed payment of interest on amounts which were withheld pursuant to an audit/technical examination of the work, the Court upheld the view of the arbitrator that initiation of a vigilance enquiry against certain officials, considering the scope thereof, would be entirely different from an audit / technical examination of the work and would not fall within the scope of the said clause so as to prohibit payment of interest.

In Gaurav Enterprises v. Commissioner (Transport Department)[15], the Court noted that when the designated authority under the contract for appointment of the arbitrator was the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, then the arbitration invocation notice was correctly addressed to him and the mere non-service of the said notice upon the contesting Respondent would not impugn upon the maintainability of a Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.

In Global Transnational Trading FZE v. Union of India & Anr.,[16] the Court in the background of an admitted arbitration agreement existing between the parties, noted that when there was a factual dispute obtaining between them, then the said dispute is to be adjudicated in an arbitration proceeding, and not in writ proceedings, even if the said adjudication would involve examination of a fertilizer control order issued by the Department of Fertilizers, Government of India.

Banking and Finance

In M/s. Faqir chand dalip kumar & Ors. v. HDFC Bank Ltd.,[17] the Court observed that merely because the bank had not been prompt in initiating proceedings under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI’) subsequent to the requisite action under Section 13(4) of the Act having been taken, the said delay would not relieve the borrowers from the rigor of law.

In Fortune Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. United Bank of India & Anr.,[18]  the Court held that once it was established that the demand drafts in question were prepared on stolen draft leafs, then even if the bank had acted upon the same in a bona-fide manner and given credit for the same, it could not be argued that the said credit would continue even after the fraud had been discovered. The Court held that in such a case of apparent fraud, the general principles of equity or the principle enshrined in Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 could not be pressed into service to the detriment of the bank, and that the burden of proof would remain that of the person who was the holder of the said instrument in light of Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Court disagreed in this regard with the earlier judgment of a Single Judge of the Court in Rajesh Gupta v. Central Bank of India.[19]

In Global Heritage Venture Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.,[20] the Court held that inasmuch as the steps taken under Section 13(7) of the SARFAESI Act are in continuation of the steps taken under Section 13(4) and that the sub-sections together form a complete scheme, therefore an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act would lie before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (‘DRT’) if a person was aggrieved by the measures taken under Section 13(7) read with Section 13(4).

In Sushma Raina v. Canara Bank & Ors.,[21] the Court held that the amendment to Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 which was brought into effect from 01.09.2016, would not have retrospective effect.

Civil Procedure

In Neelam & Ors. v. Pradeep Birman & Ors.,[22] the Court disallowed a plea in the replication which was completely inconsistent with the case set up in the plaint. The Court further observed that what could not be permitted to be done by way of an amendment to a plaint, could not be permitted to be done by way of a replication.

In Suresh Kapoor v. Shashi KrishanLal Khanna & Ors.,[23] the Court noted that the issue of whether the market value of a property is higher or lower than the circle rate of the property is a mixed question of fact and law which would require trial, in the absence of any clinching documentary evidence before the Court at the preliminary stage.

In HarBhagwan Sachdeva & Ors. v. Marwari Charitable Trust (regd) & Ors.,[24] the Court held that a plaintiff could not seek to utilize the framing of an additional issue by the Court out of abundant caution, and at the plaintiff’s own request, at the stage of final arguments, as a license to seek to lead further evidence in order to plug loopholes which existed in his/her evidence.

In Itihad Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Paras Dass Jain Charitable Trust,[25] the Court held that an application under Order IX Rule XIII of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’) could not be entertained without an accompanying application for condonation of delay if the said application was otherwise required.

In Krishan Kumar Saini (since deceased and now represented by his LRs) v. Rajinder Kumar Saini (since deceased and now represented by his LRs) & Ors.,[26] the Court directed the trial court to consider the possibility of conducting a DNA test, if so permissible in law, and after hearing all the concerned parties, in relation to the adjudication of a civil suit for partition in which the lineage of certain of the parties was in serious contestation.

In Raghubir Singh Arora & Anr. v. Rajesh Khanna[27], the Court held that Order XVA of the CPC permitted the Court to fix the amount of deposit after taking into consideration the market rent of the property in question and it was not limited only to the amount admitted by the defendant. The Court further noted that a bald plea that the defendant was a protected tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRCA’), in the absence of any material particulars, would not exclude the applicability of the said provision. Further, in Vijay Kumar Suri v. Surinder Pal Singh (Deceased) through LRs,[28] the Court observed that merely because an objection as to the maintainability of the suit on account of it being purportedly barred by Section 50 of the DRCA was pending consideration, would not mean that the admitted rent could not be directed to be deposited before the Trial Court.

In Rajeev Gupta v. L.R. Gupta HUF & Ors.[29] on an interpretation of the mandate of Order IX Rule XIII of the CPC, the Court reiterated that the fundamental issue was not just whether service of summons had been duly affected but as to whether the defendant had sufficient knowledge of filing of the suit and sufficient time to appear and contest the same.

In Rakesh Kumar Verma & Ors. v. Radha Krishan Verma & Ors.,[30] the Court noted that even after a final decree had been passed directing partition of the property through metes and bounds, when subsequent developments would reveal that it was impossible to give effect to the said manner of partition, then the Court was not powerless to modify a decree and direct outright sale of the property. It was further observed that the principle of functus-officio would not apply in such a case.

Commercial Courts

While interpreting Order 11 Rule 1 of the CPC as introduced by the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (‘Commercial Courts Act’), in particular sub-rule 5 thereof, the Court in Hassad Food Company Q.S.C. & Anr. v. Bank of India & Ors.,[31] noted that the said provision employed the phrase ‘reasonable cause’ as opposed to ‘good cause’ and opined that the former required a lower degree of proof. The Court noted that when certain documents are inadvertently missed out while undertaking a voluminous original filing and the said additional documents do not set out an entirely new case, and when the suit is also not at an advanced stage and when the pleadings were not completed as the replication was yet to be taken on record, then the application should ordinarily be allowed. The Court further opined that it would be a relevant fact that the documents pertaining to the defendant which were sought to be placed on record by the plaintiff should, in fact, by their very nature have been placed on record by the defendant itself and which it failed to do.

In Satish Kumar v. Khushboo Singh & Ors.,[32] the Court noted that even if no case for rejection of a suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was made out, Order XIII A of the CPC, as applicable to Commercial Courts, vests an independent power in the Court to summarily dismiss a suit if it finds no real prospect for the plaintiff to succeed in the suit. In a similar vein, in Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev & Anr.,[33] the Court noted that in view of the various amended provisions in the CPC, introduced for the trial of commercial disputes under the Commercial Courts Act, a long-winded trial was no longer the default norm and the Court was empowered to straight away decree a suit, even if there were certain disputed questions of fact, if the Court were to come to the conclusion that the defendant lacked any prospect of successfully defending against the claim in the suit.

In Union of India v. M/s Associated Construction Co.,[34] and in M/s Ambuj Hotel & Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. Indian Railway Catering & Tourism Corp. Ltd.,[35] the Court held that applications for condonation of delay in filing appeals under the Commercial Courts Act are to be strictly construed. 

Company Law and Insolvency

In Action Ispat and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shyam Metalics and Energy Ltd. & Ors.,[36]  the Court exhaustively dealt with the spirit behind the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) and noted inter alia that the scope of proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) is much wider than the scheme of liquidation provided under the Companies Act, 2013 inasmuch as the former aims for resolution by way of revival and attempts to preserve the company and its commercial functioning for the benefit of all stakeholders, as opposed to the latter, which has a more unidirectional mandate of liquidating the assets of the company in order to satisfy the claims of the creditors. The Court further held that the IBC being a special legislation would override the Companies Act, 2013 by virtue of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 238 of the IBC.

In Swastik Hand Made Paper Pcis Ltd. & Anr. v. Toyin Woodcraft (India) Pvt. Ltd.[37] and in Natraj Sales v. Telco Water Technology Pvt. Ltd.[38], the Court reiterated that when there were no further recoverable assets of the company in liquidation, and the amount available as part of the corpus of the company was far below the claims of the creditors, then the appropriate course of action would be to pass an order dissolving the company.

Competition Law

In Shri Saurabh Tripathy v. Competition Commission of India & Anr.,[39]the Court on a conjoint reading of Sections 26 and 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 opined that as per the scheme of the Act, it was always open for the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’)  to disagree with the Director General’s (‘DG’) recommendation if there was a  cogent rationale for the same and it cannot be argued that the recommendation of the DG is binding on the CCI. The Court further pertinently noted that when an allegation regarding the unfairness of any contractual term is made, then it must be established that the same must be patently unfair and commercially unconscionable and implanted through dominant position of one of the parties. The Court noted that commonly used clauses which are found in various contracts would not fall within the mischief of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act. 

Constitutional Law

In Laxmi College of Education v. National Council for Teacher Education & Anr.,[40] the requirement in a public notice requiring interested education institutions to submit with the National Council for Teacher Education (‘NCTE’), a formal recommendation from the concerned State Governments/UT Administration in support of their applications for grant of recognition/permission for certain Integrated Teacher Education Programmes, was quashed and set aside by the Court. The Court noted that inasmuch as the concerned regulations formulated under the NCTE Act, 1993 did not contemplate involvement of the State governments at the time of inviting applications or prior thereto, the introduction of such a requirement in the public notice was impermissible. The Court held that though the introduction of the said requirement may have had a bona-fide and cogent basis behind it, even laudable underlying motives cannot justify a departure from the strict letter of the law.

In Vestige Marketing Private Ltd. v. Flipkart Internet Private Ltd. & Ors.,[41] the Court prima facie observed that in as much as Article 19(1) G of the Constitution of India confers the right to occupation, trade or business, any restriction on such a right sought to be imposed under Article 19(6) of the Constitution would have to, by law, be enacted by parliament or a state legislature. The Court further noted that the Direct Selling Guidelines, 2016, which are in the nature of executive guidelines, have not been issued in exercise of power under any particular statute.

In Samarendra Beura v. Principal Secretary to his Excellency the Governor of Odisha & Ors.,[42] the Court noted that the general rule in relation to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India extending only to territories within its jurisdiction, would not be detracted from merely because it was alleged that the competent High Court could not be approached on account of an on-going advocate’s strike.

In Neeraj Sharma v. The Union of India & Ors.,[43] the Court rejected a challenge to the vesting of vast powers with the municipal commissioner under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 as being contrary to Article 243W of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it was held that under the scheme of the Act the Municipal commissioner was answerable to the Corporation and also had to discharge specified duties and functions, and the delegation of power could not be said to be excessive in nature.

In Atraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,[44] the Court reiterated that disputed questions of title and ownership could not be gone into in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In R.L. Makhija v. SDMC & Ors.,[45] the Court held that allegations of alleged breach of contract by a private entity in its dealings with the State could not form the subject-matter of a public interest litigation, particularly when independent legal proceedings in relation to the said alleged breach between the said private entity and the Government agency concerned were already pending adjudication.

In Sarva Chintan Foundation & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,[46] the Court refused to interfere with a change in policy whereby local co-operative societies were no longer given preference in the installation of milk booths inasmuch as it was observed that the said changed policy did not create a monopoly in favor of any particular vendor or class of persons, and therefore it was ultimately a matter of discretion of the authority concerned and which would not be lightly interfered with.

In Kiran Jain v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.,[47] the Court reiterated that while administrative autonomy is a fundamental right of minority educational institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, however the same does not extend to the right to mal-administer and therefore the regulations which are reasonable and do not detract from the basic nature of the minority institution and are geared to achieve overall excellence, would be permissible in law.

In Rekha Jain v. Secretary of Ministry of Human Resources Development & Anr.,[48] the Court noted that though the bye-laws of the Central Board of Secondary Education would proscribe it’s powers to correct names after a certain period is over, the said bye-laws would, however, not curtail the power of the Court to do complete justice in individual cases brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In Legal Forum for Women Empowerment v. Government of National Capital Territory Delhi,[49] the court held that inasmuch as charges imposed by private nursing homes and hospitals depend upon a variety of factors, such as kind of treatment offered, it is not feasible to prescribe a uniform rate to be charged from patients hailing from the general category.

In Yugansh Mittal v. Union of India and Anr.,[50] in the context of technical aspects of aircraft safety, the Court observed that such technical matters, particularly those requiring extensive leading of evidence, cannot be gone into in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.


In Inox Air Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Rathi Ispat Ltd.,[51] the Court while finding a person guilty of disobedience of orders passed by it in proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, under which certain plant and machinery was required to be preserved, held a case of contempt as having been made out and directed that the value of the machinery and equipment which had gone missing be paid back as a condition for purging the contempt.

In Union of India & Ors. v. Shishir Dutt,[52] the Court noted that a writ challenging an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (‘CAT’) asking certain parties to show-cause as to why proceedings for contempt be not initiated against them, was pre-mature and the appropriate remedy would be to render an explanation to the CAT, and thereafter pursue appropriate remedies once the CAT renders a final decision on the issue.

In Corruption against Society (Regd.) v. Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Ors.,[53] the Court reiterated that for enforcement of an order passed in an earlier writ petition which had been finally disposed of, the appropriate remedy was to file a contempt petition and not a fresh writ petition.

Contract Law

While construing the scope and purport of Section 70 of the Contract Act, in Apco-Titan (JV) v. National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.,[54] the Court held that the same would be applicable only in a scenario where the work had been done directly by one party for the other and without a contractual agreement obtaining between themselves. The Court noted that Section 70 of the Act would not come to the aid of a sub-contractor who had executed work for the main contractor under a written contract, and pursuant to the insolvency of the main contractor, sought payment of certain sums from the main employer with which it had no privity of contract.

Criminal Law and Procedure

In Vijay v. State,[55] the Court held that a Forensic Science Laboratory (‘FSL’) report is merely a corroborative piece of evidence and a negative report by itself would not negate the otherwise reliable testimony of the victim in this regard.

In Amit Sahni v. GNCTD & Anr.,[56] the Court directed the convening of periodical meetings of the Sentence Review Board under the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018 for the purpose of reviewing sentences awarded to convicts.

In Sachin v. State,[57] the Court held that mere absence of the name of the accused in the first information report (‘FIR’) would be inconsequential when material recoveries, including that of the body of the deceased, were subsequently effected at the instance of the said accused.

In Akash v. State,[58] the Court held that a major contradiction in the testimony of police witnesses with regard to the time of recovery of the weapon of offence is a major defect that cannot be overlooked.

In Abhijeet Ghosh v. State of NCT Delhi,[59] the Court, while considering an application for grant of bail, held that even if the accused had voluntarily consented to undergo a lie detector/polygraph test, the results of the said test, even if seemingly favoring the stand of the accused, couldn’t be read into evidence inasmuch as the accused did not have any conscious control over the responses during administration of the test. The Court further held that just as the statement made while undergoing such a test could not form the basis of a conviction, it could not form the basis of an acquittal either.

In M/s Goutam Shoe Store & Anr. v. Relaxo Footwear Ltd.,[60] the Court refused to quash a summoning order emanating from proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’) and noted that the aspect of whether the bank account of the accused persons had been closed prior to the date of issuance of cheque is a matter of trial.

In Pawan Kumar v. State & Anr.,[61]the Court reiterated that the suggestion given by an advocate appearing on behalf of the accused during the course of trail cannot be read as an admission against the accused.

In Aarti v. State,[62] the Court held that inasmuch as it is the quality of the evidence which is paramount, and not the quantity, there was no infirmity in the prosecution’s decision to not produce all the witnesses available with it, and to restrict itself to only a few relevant ones. The Court further noted that in the context of a charge of criminal conspiracy, mere agreement to participate in the illegal act is sufficient to attract the offence, and active participation at all stages is not required to be proved.

In Kamal Kishore v. The State of Delhi,[63] the Court reiterated the bar against detailed scrutiny of the merits of a case and the associated evidence while deciding an application for grant of regular bail.

In Mahua Moitra v. State & Anr.,[64]  the Court noted that an order merely adjourning the consideration of application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’) in a pending complaint case would amount to an interlocutory order and therefore no revision would lie against the same under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C.

In Pawan Kamra v. State,[65] the Court upheld the issuance of process of attachment of properties under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C. inasmuch as it noted that despite the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application filed by the accused, he had consistently refused to surrender before the investigating officer or the court.

In Ritika v. State,[66] the Court turned down the application for grant of anticipatory bail in a case where a teacher has been charged with abetment of suicide of her student inasmuch as the Court found that the deceased had clearly ascribed the usage of demeaning and bitter words against her, and which fact was prima-facie suggestive of the teacher’s role.

In Pradeep v. State,[67] the Court enlarged on bail accused persons charged inter-alia under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘the SC/ST Act’), inasmuch as it was found that at the stage when the complainant had made the initial complaint by dialing the police helpline, there was no allegation of usage of casteist remarks by the accused.

In Runa Rajput v. State,[68] while reiterating the parameters of granting anticipatory bail, it was held that refusal to join the investigation and production of the electronic gadgets which were allegedly used in the commission of crime and which admittedly belonged to the accused, would be a valid ground for refusing anticipatory bail. In a similar vein, in Shyam Sunder v. The State of NCT of Delhi,[69] the Court rejected anticipatory bail inter-alia on the ground that the accused had failed to respond to a notice issued under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C.

In Raju Kumar Gaur v. State,[70] the Court held that objections as to the alleged defects in the manner of proving CCTV footage in terms of Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’) could not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the appellate stage, if the same had not been taken before the trial court.

In Meena Dabas v. State (NCT of Delhi),[71] after having reiterated the broad principles in relation to quashing of an FIR under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court held that the presence of even basic material to connect the accused with the crime would be a fit ground to refuse quashing.

In Sh. Virender Kumar Mutreja v. State(NCT of Delhi),[72] while explaining the scope and ambit of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., the Court held that when an order passed by the Magistrate is sought to be assailed thereunder, though both the Sessions Court and the High Court have concurrent jurisdiction, it is appropriate and proper that the former forum be approached, except in rare and special circumstances.

In State of NCT of Delhi v. Dharambir & Ors.,[73] the Court issued a note of caution against the courts trying criminal offences passing seething adverse remarks against police officials purely on the basis of ipse-dixit and in response to subjectively perceived slights.

In Vinod Kumar v. State,[74] the Court brushed aside the non-mentioning of the fact of alleged sexual assault in a moving bus in the initial complaint made to the police helpline, inasmuch as the Court noted that in the background of the overall commotion caused in the bus as a result of the incident and the accused having been apprehended by the other passengers, the primary concern of the victim would naturally have been to secure the arrest of the accused and not to mention the incident in detail.

In Islam v. State,[75] the Court noted that the absence of public witnesses, though not fatal to the prosecution case, requires the Court to subject the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to greater scrutiny. The Court noted, while acquitting the accused on the ground of various material inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, that even the occupants of the PCR van which was stated to be present at the site were not examined. In Prashant Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi),[76] the Court upheld a conviction even though the prosecution failed to examine any public witnesses, despite the incident having occurred in a public place in broad daylight, inasmuch as the Court noted other overwhelming evidence available on the record establishing the guilt of the accused.

In Nardev v. The State & Anr.,[77] the Court noted that while the Court is bound by the hierarchy of the documents as mentioned in Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Rules, 2007 (‘the Rules’), in determining the age of the allegedly juvenile accused, it is an implicit requirement of the Rules that the documents sought to be produced should be of reliable quality and origin.

In Rohit Gupta v. State,[78] the Court held that a conviction for cruelty under Section 498-A (a) of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (‘IPC’) could be sustained independently even if the trial court disbelieved the allegation of demand of dowry inasmuch as the offence was not limited to one that was only in connection with a demand for dowry . The Court further noted that once the commission of offence of cruelty under Section 498-A had been established and if the deceased wife had passed away within seven years of marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the IPC would be applicable.

In Anurag Walia v. State (NCT of Delhi),[79] the Court reiterated that it is permissible to quash proceedings for offences punishable Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 when it was evident from the record that there was only a single cartridge recovered from the accused person, without an accompanying firearm, and there was no allegation that the same posed any threat to any person at the place of recovery.

In DK Sivakumar v. Directorate of Enforcement,[80] the Court reiterated the triple test of flight risk, possibility of tampering the evidence and the possibility of influencing the witnesses while deciding an application for bail filed in relation to offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’).

In Edwin Murmu v. The State & Anr.,[81]the Court upheld an order rejecting an application for condonation of delay for filing an appeal under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘DV’) which was sought to be assailed on the ground that the Petitioner was unaware of the developments of the case inasmuch as the Court found that the petitioner was simultaneously appearing before and defending other connected criminal proceedings initiated against him before another forum.

In Haseeb v. State,[82] the Court while acquitting an accused of the offences under Sections 342, 376 and 506 of the IPC held that though the testimony of the prosecutrix alone can provide sufficient basis for securing a conviction, however, when grave inconsistencies and fallacies are demonstrated in the testimony then the same cannot be accepted as the absolute truth and the prosecution’s over-arching onus to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt cannot be permitted to be diluted.

In Ram Lakhan Sharma v. State of NCT & Anr.,[83] the High Court of Delhi waived the requirement for deposit of certain percentage of the cheque amount as a pre-condition to the quashing of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H.,[84] keeping in mind the poor financial position of the accused.

In Uma Kant Umesh v. State NCT of Delhi & Anr.,[85] the Court reiterated that the limitation prescribed under Section 468(2)(C) of the Cr.P.C., would not be applicable in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.

In Rajinder Narang v. The State of Delhi,[86] the Court rejected an application for anticipatory bail in proceedings related to charges under Sections 420, 406 and 120-B of the IPC inasmuch as it was clear from the record that the accused had participated in inducing persons to buy properties owned by his family members by misrepresenting the properties as being free from any lien, even though the said properties were admittedly mortgaged with financial institutions.

In Abhishek Kumar v. The State of Delhi,[87] the Court rejected an application for anticipatory bail in proceedings related to the charges under Sections 376, 328, 313, 506 of the IPC while observing that the argument of the accused that he had not extended any false promise of marriage pursuant to which physical relations were established between him and the complainant was a matter of trial and when it was prima-facie evident that the physical relationships between the parties was not consensual in nature, no indulgence could be shown in this regard.

In Raman Sharma v. Director, Enforcement of Directorate & Anr.,[88] the Court observed that with the PMLA being a complete code in itself, and in the absence of a provision therein similar to Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it was not permissible for a Special Court set up under the PMLA to entertain a petition seeking a direction to the Enforcement Directorate to register an FIR. The Court further held that in light of Sections 44 and 45 of the PMLA, the Special Court cannot entertain a complaint filed by a private complaint.

In Prem Kumar Aggrawal v. Senior Fraud Investigating Officer,[89] while rejecting an application for anticipatory bail, the Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should not be granted in a routine manner, particularly, in matters relating to economic cases.

In Sachin alias Chajja v. State,[90] the Court held that a site plan prepared by the investigating officer at the instance of the constable who was present at the place of the occurrence of the offence would be admissible in evidence, and the same would not be barred by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.

In Lalit alias Lucky v. State,[91] the Court observed that when the death of the deceased had been occasioned on account of a single knife blow as a result of a sudden quarrel which had developed over a minor dispute, and no overt cruelty had been displayed by the accused and the entire incident had transpired in a very short period of time, then the accused would be entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and would therefore be convicted under Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC.

In Sandeep @ Sunny @ Rohit & Anr. v. State,[92] the Court held that when the accused had conclusively demonstrated that they were not present at the house when the death of the deceased occurred, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act could not be said to apply and the consequential conviction of the accused on this ground could not be sustained.

In State v. Mayank Kardam,[93] the Court held that though the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) would apply against the accused when the prosecutrix was established to have been a minor on the date of the incident, however, this would not mean that the accused would be convicted on this ground alone especially when the testimony of the prosecutrix, which was the sole basis of the prosecution’s case, was riddled with material discrepancies and inconsistencies.

In State v. Sandeep @ Ganja @ Sombar Roy,[94] in yet another case involving the POCSO Act, the Court while holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged incident noted inter-alia that the alleged proof demonstrating the age of the prosecutrix as obtained from the school was exhibited by the investigating officer and not by a witness hailing from the concerned school.

In Rosi alias Rosy v. State and Anr.,[95] the Court reiterated that in order to sustain a conviction under Sections 376(2)(n), 313 and 506 of the IPC, it should be established that the false promise of marriage had a direct nexus to the prosecutrix’s decision to engage in sexual relations with the accused.

In Sandeep v. State,[96] the Court upheld a conviction under Sections 201, 302, 342 and 120B of the IPC in a case involving honor killing, inter-alia, on account of the clear, consistent & credible testimony of the wife of the deceased who was an eye-witness to the incident. 

In State v. Amjad Kahan,[97] the Court noted that when there are fatal flaws in the prosecution case such as a failure to recover the alleged weapon of offence coupled with failure to examine relevant witnesses like the doctor and the link witnesses, then the accused were rightly acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC.

Disability Law and Mental Health

In G. Hema Gowri v. Union of India & Ors.,[98] the Court while directing the Union of India to consider constituting a committee to formulate a policy for imparting skill learning and vocational training to children with special needs, however, held that no mandatory direction could be given to the Government to ratify the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983, and this was purely a matter of discretion of the authorities concerned.


In Dr. Shidore Shital Mhatrdeo v. National Board of Examination (NBE),[99] the Court after a detailed analysis of the applicable precedent in relation to the cut-off date for providing proof of eligibility criteria, held that while essential eligibility criteria is sacrosanct, there is an inherent difference between the fact of possessing the required eligibility on or before the cut-off date as opposed to the proof of such a fact. The Court conclusively held that a mere failure to establish the latter through the production of an original degree or certificate is not fatal in itself as long as there is some material available on the record, demonstrating the acquisition of the essential minimum eligibility qualification. In Dr. Shivam Chugh v. national board of examinations & Ors.,[100] the Court reiterated the aforesaid proposition and further held that when admission was wrongly refused on the aforesaid basis, admission can be directed to be made even though a significant period may have passed since the commencement of the course.

In Bhumika Choudhary v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences,[101] the Court held that when there seemed to be an evident dichotomy between two clauses of a prospectus, then the provision which would further the interest of a candidate should be given preference.

In Dr. Deepika Veerwal v. Union of India & Ors.[102], the Court first observed that the directions of the Supreme Court in the judgment in Dar-Us-Slam Educational Trust & Ors. v. MCI & Ors.,[103] as regards candidates having been allotted a seat in round two of the counselling not being eligible to participate in further rounds, would apply only to under-graduate courses and not post-graduate courses. The Court further noted that while the general principle proscribing further participation after allotment of a seat might have a sound basis, it can only be operationalized through a concrete legal framework, and would also have to balance the inherent right of a candidate to better his/her prospects.

In Mihir Sattavan v. University of Delhi & Anr.,[104] the Court rejected a belated argument by the university that the student concerned should not have been permitted to sit for the exam in question, inasmuch as there was no detention order passed against the student and his representation pointing out the valid reasons for missing the first semester exams had been accepted and a duly signed admit card had also been issued to him.

In Dr. Rajani Sinha v. Union of India & Ors.,[105] in a case involving the National Board of Examination, the Court held that when a particular institute affiliated to the NBE had been vested with the jurisdiction to over-see training of the student concerned, then the said institute’s interpretation of the availability of leave and the guidance given to the student in this regard should be given due weightage.

In Hakeem Abdul Hameed Unani Medical College v. Union of India & Anr.,[106] the Court held that when the inspection report of the institution in question demonstrated several clear deficiencies, it could not be said that the institution was entitled to an ad-interim stay of the rejection of its application for admitting students for the forthcoming academic session inasmuch as the prerequisites of prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss could not be said to have been made out.

In Yaman Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. University of Delhi & Ors.,[107] the Court noted that when a university was unable to explain as to the gross delay that occasioned in declaration of results of students, then an adverse inference must be drawn against the university and it would not be allowed to insist on a cut-off date for completion of certain formalities, and which was breached solely on account of the delay in the declaration of results by the university itself.

In Tanya Mann v. Registrar GGSIPU & Ors.,[108] the Court reiterated that allotment of a seat to a candidate should always be based on merit alone, and merely because a provisional admission was directed to be granted to a particular candidate by the Court without being made aware of a more meritorious candidate having been overlooked in the process, would not vest the provisionally-admitted candidate with any special equities to continue on the seat on the basis of the said order.

In Vidhanshi Kamalia & Anr. v. University of Delhi & Ors.,[109] the Court held that the admission process cannot be said to have been concluded merely on the publication of the first merit list and the process, in fact, continues till the publication of the last merit list. The Court further observed that it is permissible to shift meritorious reserved category candidates to the list of unreserved category candidates while publishing a second merit list inasmuch as at the said stage, the overall marks for unreserved category candidates would have come down.

The Court in Abdul Lateef Nomani v. University of Delhi & Ors.[110] held that the Council of Boards of School Education in India (‘COBSE’) is merely an association of the various School Education Boards and is not vested with the power to grant recognition to any school or education board in the country. As a sequitur, the Court noted that a university cannot insist upon a School Board being recognized by the COBSE as a pre-requisite for recognizing the certificates issued by the concerned Board.

In Sir Chhotu Ram Jat College of Education v. National Council for Teacher Education & Anr.[111], the Court held that applications for recognition of courses filed by education instructions with the concerned regional committees of the National Council for Teacher Education prior to a ban being imposed by various State Governments for establishing new institutions and commencement of courses, would be liable to considered uninfluenced by the said ban.

In Naincy Sagar v. Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies & Anr.[112], the Court deprecated the practice of passing a common detention order on account of a shortage of attendance qua several students, without application of mind to the circumstances obtaining in each individual case. Yet further, the Court observed that there was a palpable difference between students who had obtained the minimum academic credits in the given year while falling short of minimum attendance, and those students who had neither attended the minimum academic credits nor the minimum attendance.

In Prateek Singhal vs. National Testing Agency & Anr.,[113] the Court held that the Joint Seat Allocation Authority (‘JOSA’) established by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, is not proscribed from setting a higher qualifying criteria in the examination conducted for joint seat allocation for the Bachelor of Architecture course across various institutions, as compared to the general requirement prescribed by the Council of Architecture for the said course. 


In Radico Khaita Limited v. J.D. Wines & Ors.,[114] while examining Section 34 of the Evidence Act, the Court observed that books of accounts including those maintained in an electronic form can be proved by corroborative oral and documentary evidence relating to the entries in the books of accounts, even though the provision itself does not lay down any specific method of proving the same.

Insurance and Motor Vehicles Act 

In Iti Goyal & Ors. v. Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.,[115] the Court held that when the deceased had passed away in the middle of the assessment year, then in usual circumstances it may not be appropriate to rely on the Income Tax Return (‘ITR’) of the said year. In a connected appeal[116] by the insurance company, the Court rejected the argument that inasmuch as the business being carried on by the deceased was continued by the father of the deceased, there could be no loss of income or dependency. The Court observed that the father stepping in to run the business after the death of the son was a purely temporary arrangement and could never be a substitute for the place of the deceased in the eyes of his widow and children.

In The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Chanan Singh (Deceased) through LRs,[117] the Court held that if the insurer had exercised its inherent right to seek the production of a valid driving license from the owner of the driver of the insured vehicle involved in the accident, and which information was thereafter not provided by the owner, then it was open to the insurance company to presume that there was no valid driving license and that there was a breach of the policy thereby entitling the insurance company to a right of recovery. In The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rinku Devi & Ors.,[118] the Court, however, observed that once the owner of the vehicle had conducted some basic due diligence i.e. he had seen the license of the driver which appeared to be genuine and also tested the driving skills of the driver before offering employment, then the owner would be protected from liability even if it was found after the accident that the driving license was in fact forged.

In Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mona & Ors.,[119] the Court noted that taking the income as reflected in the ITR for calculation of loss of dependency was perfectly in order, especially when no documents were available on record to demonstrate a clear bifurcation of the income earned by the deceased from purportedly different sources.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sandeep & Ors.,[120] the Court observed that visual disability was amongst the most severe disabilities and even the loss of vision in one eye would have an exaggerated and disproportionate impact on a person’s ability to function.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lalita Sharma & Ors.,[121] the Court noted that it was not permissible to deduct ration money allowance and transport allowance inasmuch as these allowances could also be utilized by the family and were not exclusive to the workplace. The Court further noted that when the deceased was 55 years of age on the date of death, then the applicable multiplier would be ‘11’ in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi,[122] and the lesser multiplier of ‘9’ would only be applicable if the deceased had attained 56 years of age on the date of death.

In Bhupal Singh Bisht v. Rajesh Kumar Yadav & Ors. (National Insurance Co. Ltd.),[123] the Court refused to grant a claim of loss of income allegedly suffered by an employee during the period he was undergoing treatment inasmuch as it was found that no actual proof of any loss or deduction of salary during the said period was produced.

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti & Ors.,[124]the Court noted that the ultimate onus to prove that a driving license was fake, was on the insurance company if it was seeking the right of recover from the owner of the offending insured vehicle.

In Suresh Saini v. Manjeet Singh & Ors. (M/s L and T General Insurance Co. Ltd.) [125], the Court observed that while assessing the incapacitation suffered by the injured, the age of the injured would be a very relevant factor.

In Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vernita Garg & Ors.[126], the Court held that once it was established that the offending vehicle was being driven in an extremely rash and negligent manner, and had resultantly collided with the victim resulting in grievous debilitating injury, then the argument that the injured person was crossing the road at a spot where there was no designated zebra crossing would be of no consequence in so far as liability to pay compensation was concerned.

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kashmir Kaur & Ors.[127], the Court held that the mere fact that a daughter had married, would not ipso-facto mean that her financial dependency on her parents had come to an end and each case would have to be considered on its own facts, including by taking into account the financial difficulties, or the lack thereof, encountered by the daughter post the marriage.

In Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Devi & Ors.[128], the Court observed that when the owner had admitted that he/she had neither sought for nor seen the driver’s license before employing the driver in question, then the insurance company was right in seeking the right to recovery against the owner.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jahida & Ors.[129], the Court observed that a dispute as to alleged non-payment of insurance premium was a matter between the insurance company and the owner of the vehicle, and could not be a defense against payment of compensation to the deceased.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Bai & Ors.[130], the Court held that when a policy covered basic and third party risk, then the mere fact that the vehicle in question was insured for ‘site risk’ and not for ‘transit risk’ would not be a ground to deny compensation, when the vehicle was admittedly involved in an accident on the road while being moved from one site to the other, and which accident caused the death of a third party.

In Suraj Kumar v. Dhananjay Kumar and Ors. (The Tata AIG Insurance Company Ltd)[131] and Zakir Hussain v. Ghanshyam & Ors. (The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.)[132], the Court while directing that a prosthetic limb and motorized wheelchair be provided to the injured, also directed the concerned officials of the insurance company to continue to enquire about, and to ensure basic upkeep of, the same on a bi-annual basis.

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Mr. Amol Acharya, Mr. Bharat Rayadurgam and Mr. Piyo Harold Jaimon, Advocates and Ms. Neha Shajan, Law Intern.

[1] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 37/2017 (DB)

[2] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in FAO(OS) (COMM) 276/2019 (DB)

[3]  Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM) 280/2019

[4]  (1986) All ER 772

[5]  Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 97/2019

[6]  Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Arb. Pet. 535/2019

[7] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 298/2017

[8] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 220/2018

[9] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Arb. Pet. 131/2019

[10]Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in FAO(OS) (COMM) 213/2019 (DB)

[11] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 66/2017 

[12] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 16/2018 (DB)

[13] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 262/2019 (DB)

[14] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in FAO(OS) (COMM) 297/2019 (DB)

[15]  Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in Arb. Pet. 660/2019

[16] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in LPA 341/2019 (DB)

[17] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11461/2019

[18] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 3549/2014 (DB)

[19] (2013) 205 DLT 713

[20] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11283/2015 (DB)

[21] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8506/2018 (DB)

[22] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 479/2016

[23] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 236/2010

[24] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in CM (M) 1467/2019

[25] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in CM (M) 628/2019

[26] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in CM (M) 682/2015

[27] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in CM (M) 1062/2019

[28] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in CM (M) 1417/2019

[29] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 1968/2003

[30] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 541/2014

[31] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in C.S. (COMM) 9/2018

[32] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in C.S. (COMM) 89/2019

[33] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in C.S. (COMM) 1155/2018 (DB)

[34] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 14/2018

[35] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 285/2019 (DB)

[36] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in C.M. 31047/2019 (DB)

[37] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in CO.PET. 169/2001

[38] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in CO.PET. 383/2011

[39] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 2079/2018

[40] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 7666/2019

[41] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 540/2019

[42] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11310/2019

[43] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 9337/2018 (DB)

[44] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11014/2018 (DB)

[45] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10324/2017 (DB)

[46] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 2043/2019 (DB)

[47] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10549/2018

[48] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 5265/2019 (DB)

[49] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 2468/2019 (DB)

[50] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 11239/2019 (DB)

[51] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM) 161/2017

[52] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11076/2019 (DB)

[53] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11457/2019 (DB)

[54] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 215/2019

[55] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. A. 9/2019

[56] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 11223/2019 (DB)

[57] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in Crl. A. 733/2017 (DB)

[58] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1106/2018 (DB)

[59] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in Bail Appln.1447/2019

[60] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. M.C.4698/2019

[61] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. Rev. Pet. 727/2016

[62] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1317/2015

[63] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 1006/2019

[64] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in W.P. (Crl). 2864/2019

[65] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (Crl). 2830/2019

[66] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in Bail Appln. No. 887/2019

[67] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 1828/2019

[68] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in Bail Appln.1865/2019

[69] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in Bail Appln.1900/2019

[70] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in Crl. A. 746/2015

[71] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 4451/2019

[72] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in Crl. Rev. Pet. 814/2019

[73] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 4174/2019

[74] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in Crl. Rev. Pet. 887/2019

[75] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. A. 916/2016

[76] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1067/2016

[77] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (Crl.) 1543/2018

[78] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in Crl. A. 616/2016

[79] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 5272/2019

[80] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 2484/2019

[81] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 707/2017

[82] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1200/2016

[83] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 5210/2019

[84] (2010) 5 SCC 663

[85] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. M.C. 1450/2017

[86] Judgment dated 17.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 2346/2019

[87] Judgment dated 11.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 1913/2019

[88] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in Crl. Rev. Pet. 1033/2019

[89] Judgment dated 23.10.2019 in Bail Appln. 2693/2019

[90] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. A. 743/2019 (DB)

[91] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1109/2018 (DB)

[92] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in Crl. A. 606/2018 (DB)

[93] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. L.P. 549/2019

[94] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in Crl. L.P. 443/2019 (DB)

[95] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1117/2019 (DB)

[96] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. A. 1117/2018 (DB)

[97] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in Crl. L. P. 577/2019 (DB)

[98] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 2953/2012 (DB)

[99] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 7255/2019

[100] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 6796/2019

[101] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in W.P.(C) 9480/2019

[102] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 7747/2019

[103] Judgment dated 09.05.2017 in W.P. (C) 267/2017

[104] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 9059/2019

[105] Judgment dated 01.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 12477/2018

[106] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in L.P.A. 679/2019 (DB)

[107] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 9365/2018

[108] Judgment dated 24.10.2019 in L.P.A. 556/2019 (DB)

[109] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in L.P.A. 603/2019 (DB)

[110] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8526/2019

[111] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 8820/2019

[112] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in W.P. (C) 10909/2019

[113] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in L. P. A. 575/2019 (DB)

[114] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in C.S. (OS) 2244/2010 (DB)

[115] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 88/2019

[116] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 1092/2019

[117] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 279/2018

[118] Judgment dated 09.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 815/2019

[119] Judgment dated 15.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 690/2017

[120] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 390/2019

[121] Judgment dated 10.10.2019 in MAC. APP. 979/2015

[122] (2017) 16 SCC 680

[123] Judgment dated 14.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 656/2018

[124] Judgment dated 16.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 564/2018

[125] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 588/2017

[126] Judgment dated 18.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 827/2019

[127] Judgment dated 21.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 932/2017

[128] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 29/2016

[129] Judgment dated 22.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 465/2018

[130] Judgment dated 30.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 1064/2013

[131] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 403/2015

[132] Judgment dated 31.10.2019 in MAC.APP. 915/2018

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place
on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Mr. Amol Acharya and Mr.
Bharat Rayadurgam, Advocates and Ms. Neha Shajan, Law Intern.

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