When wills are no substitute for equality: The unfair burden on Hindu women
Imagine yourself as a woman whose every step forward has been carried on the shoulders of loving parents and family, a woman whose dreams took flight through education, hard work and unyielding resolve. You built your life, piece by piece, acquiring assets and property as tangible echoes of your labour and ambition. You married, bound by love and hope, only to have fate cruelly steal both you and your husband, leaving behind no will, no testament.
In those quiet moments of loss and absence, it would seem only natural that your parents would inherit at least a portion of the fruits of your sacrifice. But the law tells a different story altogether. Instead of returning home, your legacy goes to your husband‛s family. Within this grim outcome lies a deeper truth about how the law fails to honour your life, your agency and the bonds that truly matter.
This scenario may sound unfair, but it flows directly from Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which prioritises the husband‛s heirs over the woman‛s natal family when she dies intestate, even where the asset is entirely self-acquired.
This is precisely why the petitioners in Snidha Mehra v. Union of India approached the Supreme Court through a public interest litigation (PIL) challenging the constitutional validity of the provision. The matter came up for arguments before the Court on November 19, 2025.
The Court recognised the “heartburn” this causes to a woman‛s maternal family and openly acknowledged that today, Hindu women often own substantial self-acquired property through education, employment and entrepreneurship. Yet, instead of striking down or re-reading Section 15, the Bench chose a pragmatic, almost defensive route, urging women, “irrespective of age,” to immediately execute wills to protect their intentions and avoid litigation.
In not delivering a verdict, the Court instead delivered a sobering message to Hindu women: if you want to secure your legacy, you cannot rely on outdated laws that presume your dependence and frailty.
The Court‛s advice to Hindu women to make wills is not inherently flawed. Succession laws, especially when complicated by personal laws like those governing Hindus, are notoriously complex and confusing. For any individual who wishes their property to pass as per their wishes, a will is the clearest path. However, what cannot be overlooked is the troubling abdication of responsibility by both the State and the Court. By shifting the burden entirely on individual women, the Court fails in its duty and effectively steps back from protecting married Hindu women, the ones most likely to fall through the cracks of a deeply flawed legal structure.
At the heart of this problem lies Section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It mandates that in the absence of children, a Hindu woman‛s property first goes to her husband‛s heirs, and only then to her natal family. This applies to all property, including self-acquired assets. Further complicating this is Section 15(2), which makes a distinction based on the source of the property, implying the unsettling notion that a woman‛s property is not truly hers but borrowed from others.
Section 15 sets a three-tier order of succession for Hindu women dying intestate: first, property inherited from her parents; second, property inherited from her husband or father-in-law; and finally, all other property. It is pertinent to note that no such hierarchy exists for Hindu men under Section 8. Fitting, perhaps, considering Hindu men never needed a special provision to affirm that property owned by them is actually theirs, absolute and unquestioned. Meanwhile, Hindu women had to wait for Section 14 to officially declare what should have been obvious: that their property is truly their own and not just held in trust or on sufferance.
Section 15(2)(a) tries to bridge the gap and makes a critical distinction between property inherited by a Hindu woman from her parents from other property, providing that such property will first devolve to her father's heirs. However, this distinction still leaves significant gaps because it effectively excludes the heirs of the mother from inheriting property inherited from her, thereby sidelining maternal lineage entirely. Therefore, property inherited by a Hindu woman from her mother is still ultimately destined to be revert to a husband‛s heirs, albeit a generation later.
This pattern of legal bias underscores how the law perpetuates gendered inequalities by reinforcing patriarchal norms that elevate paternal lineage and treat maternal lineage as secondary or negligible. Moreover, this exception fails to account for the broader spectrum of a woman‛s natal family members beyond just her father or mother, from whom she may have inherited property - such as an aunt or uncle or even a sibling.
An equally problematic issue is the interpretation of the term “inherit”. Courts have constricted “inherit” to mean only property acquired by intestate succession, excluding other devices of acquisition such as gifts, wills or settlements. This narrow definition means that even if a woman receives property from her father, mother or other family members via a will, it may still be subject to the stringent intestate succession rules set out in the first part of Section 15, resulting in that property eventually passing to her husband‛s heirs if she dies without a will herself. The legislature‛s failure to account for the diverse means by which women acquire property beyond intestate succession is a significant blind spot.
This legal nuance is more than just a mere academic exercise; it reflects a deeper social challenge: Hindu women have long struggled to assert their rights over parental property, which traditionally favours sons. The reluctance of parents to part with property to daughters is exacerbated by the knowledge that any property a daughter inherits will ultimately flow into her husband‛s family, diminishing the incentive for equal distribution.
While the Supreme Court‛s advice for Hindu women to execute wills may sound practical, it overlooks the stark inequalities in wealth and education that persist in our society. The burden imposed by this law is far from equal. Urban, educated women with access to legal advice may manage to register clear wills. Yet, countless others - women with limited literacy, restricted mobility, or constrained bargaining power within their households - may never have that opportunity. The cruel truth is that those for whom the law is most paternalistic are the least equipped to benefit from the Court‛s call to action.
On one hand, women are encouraged to pursue education, engage in employment and become financially independent. On the other hand, the legal framework remains glaringly inadequate to protect the dignity and agency of women once they acquire property. For a Hindu woman especially, Section 15 creates a special ladder where her husband and his heirs are privileged over the very parents who may have funded her education and given the initial economic push. The legal intricacies and statutory language may seem abstract to some, but at their core lie profound personal consequences. This is not just about property or inheritance; it is about the recognition and respect due to the sacrifices and contributions of women and their families, which the law currently fails to honour.
It is almost ironic that the drafters of Section 15(2), which came to be incorporated on the recommendation of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament, gave the following reasoning for its existence:
“…In the opinion of the Joint Committee such a provision would prevent properties passing into the hands of persons to whom justice demand they should not pass…”
So what, I ask, does Justice demand today? Is anyone willing to answer her call?
In its order, the Court further sought to address the inequality perpetuated by the outdated law by introducing a mandatory pre-litigation mediation requirement for disputes arising under Section 15(1). The Court directed that when parents or their heirs claim property of a Hindu woman who dies intestate and Section 15(2) does not apply, parties must first engage in mediation before initiating any court proceedings. The Court emphasised that any settlement reached during mediation should be treated as a decree of the court, seeking to reduce acrimony and emotional distress.
However, this requirement raises serious concerns. Expecting a woman‛s family - especially those from vulnerable backgrounds - to appeal to the better nature of the husband‛s heirs is inherently problematic and unlikely to yield fair results. Such mediation imposes an unnecessary barrier where there was already a difficult path to justice. Successful mediation depends on bargaining power. Yet, in these cases, the law itself heavily skews power in favour of the husband‛s heirs, leaving the woman‛s family with little leverage. Besides, where is the bargaining power when gender bias, social constraints and economic dependence dominate women‛s lives? For many women and their families, these “mediation” discussions would be nothing more than inaccessible hurdles, further entrenching inequality rather than alleviating it.
The law‛s role should be to break barriers, not impose new ones. Ultimately, stopgap measures like mandatory pre-litigation mediation do not address the root injustice embedded in the law; real reform must come from dismantling the discriminatory provisions themselves.
Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj, representing the Union of India, defended Section 15(1)(b) as having been drafted on a “scientific basis” in 1956, a time when Parliament may not have envisioned women owning self-acquired property. But we do not live in that era anymore. Neither, for that matter, does the Hindu Succession Act. Since its enactment, the Hindu Succession Act has undergone important amendments to keep pace with changing social realities - most notably, the 2005 amendment granting women equal coparcenary rights in ancestral property. After nearly seventy years of operation, it is only logical that the law continues evolving to fully recognise and protect women‛s property rights, particularly self-acquired assets.
The time has come to question whether Section 15(1)(b) still serves justice or if it now stands as an outdated barrier to equality. The Supreme Court should play an active role in upholding the principles of equality as enshrined in our Constitution.
Mallika Kamal is a Senior Associate at Bahuguna Law Associates.