Dechert's Hrishikesh N Hari on the implications of the US Supreme Court tariffs judgment on Indian companies

On February 20, 2026, the US Supreme Court delivered a landmark verdict in Learning Resources Inc v. Trump, holding that President Donald Trump cannot impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

For Indian businesses and their lawyers, the more consequential question is what comes next.

Hrishikesh N Hari, co-chair of Dechert's national security practice in Washington, DC, speaks to Bar & Bench on what the decision means for foreign investors, implications for Indian companies navigating Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews, tariff exposure and more.

Bar & Bench: What does the Supreme Court decision on tariffs mean for foreign countries like India?

Hrishikesh N Hari (HH): The decision meaningfully constrains one specific pathway — the use of the IEEPA) to impose tariffs. But it does not end tariff-driven trade policy. I want to be careful here: I am not an appellate litigator and characterising the precise scope of the holding is work best left to those who are. What I can say from a policy vantage point is that the practical consequences are significant. As of February 20, 2026, the US administration issued an executive order directing executive branch agencies to cease collection of IEEPA tariffs, though the full implications of that order continue to develop.

What is equally clear is that the administration is not without options. It has already invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows a temporary 10% tariff on nearly all imported goods for a 150-day period - understood to serve as a bridge while it reassesses its approach. Section 301 of the Trade Act and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 remain available as well. From a national security law perspective, this defeat provides the administration an opportunity to recalibrate the statutory footing of its approach to tariffs. Countries such as India should expect continued use of trade measures; the legal basis may be restructured, but the underlying policy direction remains.

B&B: Is CFIUS scrutiny a "China-only" phenomenon, or should buyers from countries such as India be wary?

HH: CFIUS is not China-specific as a matter of statute, but it is country-sensitive as a matter of policy. And this is an area I can speak to more directly. CFIUS reviews foreign investments in US businesses and real estate transactions for potential national security risks. As the administration identified in its America First Investment Policy (AFIP), not all foreign investment serves US interests. China has been regularly recognised as a foreign adversary in that framework - most evidently in CFIUS blocking acquisitions of Chinese buyers.

That said, the analysis does not begin and end with nationality. CFIUS jurisdiction applies to any non-US investor whose transaction involves the right combination of governance rights and a sensitive US business - particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure and large-scale data processing. Scrutiny intensifies where there is non-US government ownership or control, technology with potential military or intelligence relevance, or significant personal data exposure.

The AFIP has also reinforced that the United States remains an open investment environment. Investors from allied countries, including India, routinely clear CFIUS review, but the structural reality is that national security review is now embedded in US dealmaking across the board. Any foreign buyer considering an investment in the United States should consult CFIUS counsel to understand their exposure and calibrate their transaction structures to manage the risks that are identified.

B&B: Has the era of US leadership in free trade decisively ended?

HH: We are certainly witnessing a significant shift in the United States’ position as a leading proponent of free trade, though it is also part of a larger global shift as countries seek to improve supply chain resilience and address trade imbalances, coupling those goals with national security concerns.

My own framing would be this: what has changed is the lens through which trade is analysed. The 1990s model treated liberalisation as an economic good in itself. Today, trade policy is integrated with industrial policy, supply chain resilience and geopolitical competition. Tariffs, sanctions, export controls and inbound and outbound investment review are now linked in the minds of many policymakers. That linkage is bipartisan and likely durable regardless of which administration holds office. I would describe the current environment as security-conditioned trade rather than the end of trade engagement. The United States is not retreating from global commerce; it is redefining the terms on which it participates.

B&B: Does the Supreme Court decision open the way to refunds for firms that paid IEEPA tariffs?

HH: Potentially, but I want to flag upfront that the mechanics here are primarily a customs law question; and I am not a customs lawyer. With that caveat clearly stated, my understanding is that the decision may open a pathway to refunds, but that pathway is not automatic and the mechanism has not yet been established. The Supreme Court has left it to the lower courts to work through. This area is evolving rapidly and I would caution against drawing firm conclusions at this stage.

My broad understanding is that discussions of refunds for duties officially determined by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) will likely have to proceed through the Court of International Trade and that CBP is not expected to issue refunds voluntarily without judicial guidance. A critical threshold question is apparently whether an importer's entries have been "liquidated" - that is, whether CBP has issued a final order establishing the definitive amount of tariff liability. Entries that have not yet been liquidated may have more flexible remedies available. But I would strongly encourage any firm with affected entries to engage specialist customs counsel immediately rather than rely on my characterisation of this.

B&B: What procedural avenues are available to companies seeking relief?

HH: What I can say at a high level is that affected firms are well-advised to preserve records of IEEPA tariff payments, engage counsel promptly to understand the status of their entries and applicable deadlines and not assume that relief will be straightforward or automatic. Statutory deadlines in customs and trade litigation are, from what I understand, unforgiving. And the cost of a procedural misstep can foreclose substantive relief entirely. This is an area where specialist counsel is essential.

B&B: With IEEPA tariffs limited, will the administration pursue other measures such as safety, sanitary, labour or welfare-based restrictions instead?

HH: The Supreme Court's ruling addressed only tariffs imposed under IEEPA. The administration retains its other tariff authorities as I outlined above, and it will also continue to seek new trade agreements with partner countries to advance its economic objectives. More broadly, the full array of executive agency tools - including through the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State and the Treasury - remain available and active.

The broader point worth underscoring: we are in an era where trade policy, national security and regulatory policy are deeply intertwined. If one statutory channel narrows, the policy pressure does not disappear; it redirects into others. Companies with significant US trade exposure, including Indian exporters and investors, should be thinking about the full toolkit of economic statecraft, not just the tariff headline.

B&B: What does the life of a busy national security lawyer at a leading firm look like?

HH: In my practice, it is less about litigating tariff disputes and more about helping clients navigate the convergence of national security and cross-border investment. A typical week may involve advising sophisticated investors on structuring acquisitions with CFIUS risk in mind, analysing outbound investment restrictions that may limit where US capital can flow, counseling on sanctions exposure in multi-jurisdictional transactions and managing other national security risks that could translate into significant headline or reputational consequences for clients. The work sits at the intersection of law, geopolitics and capital flows. And given the pace of regulatory change over the past several years, it has never been more dynamic.