In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court today held that a High Court has powers under Article 235 of the Constitution to take action against judicial officers accused of sexual harassment.
The existence of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 does not preclude the High Court from initiating disciplinary inquiry against such judges and placing them under suspension on being satisfied that sufficient material existed, the Court held.
The judgment was rendered by a Bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan and Navin Sinha in a writ petition filed by an Additional District Judge, PS Malik seeking quashing of various actions initiated by the Delhi High Court against him on a sexual harassment complaint.
Facts
The petitioner has been working as Additional District Judge at Dwarka, New Delhi. A written complaint was addressed to the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court by a lady Junior Judicial Assistant, who was working as Ahlmad in the court of the petitioner.
The Complaint submitted by the employee came for consideration before the Full Court of the High Court on July 13, 2016, which resolved that the Judicial Officer be placed under suspension with immediate effect pending disciplinary proceeding contemplated against him. The Full Court also resolved that the Registrar General will forward the complaint to SHO of the concerned Police Station for appropriate action in accordance with law.
On July 19, the Full Court resolved to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee consisting of five members to inquire into the allegation of sexual harassment made against the petitioner. The Committee interacted with both the parties separately. On November 5, 2016 the Committee submitted a Preliminary Report to the Full Court. In its report, the Committee opined that a disciplinary inquiry be held against the petitioner.
The Full Court then resolved for constituting a Committee in terms of Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (2013 Act) chaired by Justice Hima Kohli, who was appointed as the Inquiring Authority. 2.4 The inquiry before the Inquiring Committee proceeded and Report a was submitted by the Internal Complaints Committee.
The Inquiry Report submitted by the Committee was placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on April 25, 2018 which resolved to forward the Inquiry Report to the petitioner and to ask him to submit his written submissions. Full Court also resolved to supply certified copies of Full Court Meeting Minutes dated July 13., 2016, July 19, 2016 and November 16, 2016 to the petitioner. High Court also resolved that since the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated November 05, 2016 had not been relied upon, the same be not supplied to the petitioner. After receipt of the Inquiry Report, the petitioner filed this writ petition.
Arguments
Counsel for the petitioner, Varinder Kumar Sharma contended that the Full Court of the High Court on receiving the complaint did not follow the procedure given in 2013 Act. It was submitted that Full Court ought to have handed over the complaint to the Internal Complaints Committee for inquiry. Full Court erred in issuing three punitive directions on July 13, 2016 against the petitioner. The order of July 13, 2016 was premature being before an inquiry or opportunity to the petitioner of being heard.
Further, they were passed by an authority, which had no legal competence to pass those directions under the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and the All India Services Rules. There has been a blatant violation of the 2013 Act in the petitioner’s case thereby vitiating the entire procedure. The Committee after conducting the inquiry has submitted a Report dated 05.11.2016, which report was required to be given to the petitioner as per Act, 2013 but was denied to the petitioner. Without the Committee finding the allegation against the petitioner to be proved, the Full Court ought not to have proceeded to impose penalty against the petitioner, it was argued.
Senior Counsel PS Narasimha appearing for the respondents submitted that High Court having control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution, it did not lack jurisdiction in placing the petitioner under suspension and directing for a regular disciplinary inquiry. Internal Complaints Committee after holding a full-fledged inquiry and giving full opportunity to the petitioner submitted a Report dated March 9, 2018. The same was served on the petitioner. The Report dated November 5, 2016 was a Preliminary Report submitted by the Committee giving an opinion that the disciplinary inquiry should be held. The said report being a Preliminary Inquiry Report, it was not necessary to serve such report to the petitioner.
Issues
At very outset, the Court indicated that since the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are still underway, most of the issues, which are sought to be raised by the petitioner in this writ petition can be canvassed and pressed before in the disciplinary proceedings.
It, therefore, proceeded to decide on the following issues alone:
(i) Whether the High Court is a disciplinary authority of the petitioner, competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and suspend him as per Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969?
(ii) Whether the decision of the Full Court on March 13, 2016 initiating inquiry against the petitioner and placing him under suspension was beyond jurisdiction?
(iii) Whether the Preliminary Inquiry Report submitted by Internal Complaints Committee dated November 5, 2016 ought to have been supplied to the petitioner and non-supply of such Preliminary Inquiry Report vitiate the entire proceedings?
Judgment
The first two issues were considered together by the Court.
The Court noted the two Articles of the Constitution that govern the field with respect to the two issues – Articles 233 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Article 233 is the power of appointment, posting and promotion of District Judges while Article 235 deals with the power of control over Judicial Officers of the State.
The word “control” occurring in Article 235 means not only the general superintendence of the working of the Courts but includes the disciplinary control of the judicial officers, i.e., the district judges and judges subordinate to him, the Court held.
It adverted to various judgments in this regard. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal and Another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi [AIR 1966 SC 447] was cited. In that case, the Court had held that under Article 235 of the Constitution, High Court can hold inquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal.
The submission, which has been pressed by the petitioner is that in view of 2013 Act there being an Inquiry Report by Internal Complaints Committee as envisaged by Sections 11 and 13, the High Court could not have taken a decision to initiate the inquiry or to suspend the petitioner.
The 2013 Act provides protection against sexual harassment of women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints of sexual harassment. Chapter II of the Act deals with the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee. Chapter IV deals with complaint. In Chapter IV, one of the sections is Section 11, which deals with inquiry into complaint. The provisions of the Act, complaint mechanism and mechanism for the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee, mechanism to inquire the complaint are all for protection of dignity and welfare of women at workplace.
Thus, the Court held that the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Act in no manner affect the control of the High Court under Article 235, which it has with respect to judicial officers. Therefore, the Full Court of the High court is in no manner precluded from initiating disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner and placing the petitioner under suspension on being satisfied that sufficient material existed.
Hence, the Court concluded that there is no error in the decision of the Full Court dated July 13, 2016 to suspend the petitioner and initiate the inquiry proceedings against him.
On issue no. (iii), the Court observed that that Preliminary Inquiry Report dated November 5, 2016 did not contain any findings on allegations made against the petitioner. It only opined that inquiry should be held. The Inquiry Report, which has been referred to in Section 13 is an Inquiry Report, which has been submitted by the Internal Complaints Committee after completion of the inquiry. In the present case, the Inquiry Report by the Internal Complaints Committee is dated March 09, 2018, which has been admittedly supplied to the petitioner.
Thus, the Court ruled that no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner by non-supply of Report of November 05, 2016.
The Court, therefore, dismissed the petition.
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