Can private property be termed as material resources of community? Nine-judge Supreme Court Bench reserves verdict

A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Wednesday reserved its judgment on whether private properties can be considered "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) of the Constitution and thus taken over by state authorities to subserve the "common good"..The Bench comprised Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices Hrishikesh Roy, BV Nagarathna, Sudhanshu Dhulia, JB Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih.The reference arose in the context of the two conflicting views taken by the top court in 1978, in cases which dealt with the nationalisation of road transport services..The nine-judge Bench will also settle the position on Article 31C of the Indian Constitution, which protects laws enacted to secure the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) laid down in Part IV of the Constitution. The last iteration of Article 31C stated:"Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy:Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent."By way of background, Article 31C was enacted by the 25th Amendment to the Constitution in 1971. It served to secure the DPSPs specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. The 25th Amendment was challenged in the famous Kesavananda Bharati case, in which a thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution has a basic structure that cannot be altered by way of a constitutional amendment. The Court also struck down the last part of the provision - "...and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy."Article 31C was later amended by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, enacted during the Emergency, to give precedence to all DPSPs and not just those under Article 39(b) and (c).In 1980, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had in Minerva Mills v. Union of India struck down clauses of the 42nd Amendment that gave effect to the change to Article 31C..In the wake of this judgment, the question posed to the present Bench was whether the Court in Minerva Mills restored the post-Kesavananda Bharati position or struck down Article 31C as a whole. During the hearings, the Bench stated that the question of whether Article 31C still lives following the Minerva Mills decision has to be decided to avoid “constitutional uncertainty”.Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Central government, argued that the doctrine of revival must apply in this case, and the post-Kesavananda Bharati position on Article 31C must be restored.Senior Advocate Zal Andhyarujina, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the original version of Article 31C was ‘substituted’ with the expanded version provided in the 42nd Amendment. This, he argued, meant that the former version of the provision ceased to exist once the 42nd Amendment came into being. .The lead petition in the case was filed by the Mumbai-based Property Owners' Association (POA) in 1992.POA opposed Chapter VIII-A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) Act. Inserted in 1986, the Chapter empowers state authorities to acquire cessed buildings and the land on which those are built, if 70% of the occupants make such a request for restoration purposes.The MHADA Act was enacted in pursuance of Article 39(b) of the Constitution, which makes it obligatory for the state to ensure "that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good"..SG Mehta argued that the MHADA Act provisions are protected by Article 31C of the Constitution, which was inserted with an intention to protect laws giving effect to certain DPSPs.However, the Bench while reserving the judgment observed that deciding the question of law in the affirmative would be "far-fetched".“Suppose you tell a Taiwan-based manufacturer of semiconductor chips to manufacture semiconductor chips in India because India needs semiconductor chips, but add on that the material resource of the community will be taken away. They will say sorry, I don’t want to invest in your country if this is the level of protection,” CJI Chandrachud had observed while closing the case for judgment. .Senior Advocate Gopal Sankarnarayanan argued that previous Constitution Bench judgments have held "material resources" to include private property and private resources. He stated that a businessman may decide to set up a vaccine manufacturing facility, which may be a purely private resource at that time, but after a pandemic like COVID-19, it becomes something essential for the entire community and state has to come into the picture..Justice Nagarathna remarked that if a person invests and starts production tomorrow, it cannot be said that it is going to be taken away for the purpose of distribution to the workers..[Read Order]

Can private property be termed as material resources of community? Nine-judge Supreme Court Bench reserves verdict

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