Judges (Protection) Act does not affect in-house procedure against judges: Supreme Court in Justice Yashwant Varma case

In a significant development, the Supreme Court has for the first time held that the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 does not affect the 1999 in-house procedure for inquiries initiated against sitting High Court judges.

“This decision could be the first of judicial pronouncements by this Court touching Section 3(2) of the Protection Act vis-à-vis the PROCEDURE,” noted the Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih.

"In our considered opinion, the Protection Act does not offend the constitutional scheme present; and, being in addition to the extant provisions, does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take such action, as deemed fit, against a Judge of a High Court who is alleged to have indulged in misconduct in terms of the PROCEDURE."

The Court noted that no previous ruling had directly addressed the interplay between the 1985 legislation and the internal disciplinary mechanism adopted by the higher judiciary.

“We propose to deal with it in some detail while assigning reasons for our firm opinion on applicability of the Protection Act in the instant case,” the Court said while dismissing the plea filed by tainted Allahabad High Court judge, Justice Yashwant Varma.

Justice Varma had challenged the in-house inquiry that followed the discovery of unaccounted cash during a fire at his official residence in Delhi.

After a fact-finding committee submitted its report to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) recommending initiation of removal proceedings, the CJI forwarded the report along with the judge’s written response to the President and Prime Minister.

The judge then moved the Supreme Court seeking to strike down parts of the in-house procedure as unconstitutional.

Court reads "otherwise" in Judges Protection Act to include in-house inquiries

Section 3 of the Act reads:

3. Additional protection to Judges.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge.

The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “or otherwise” in Section 3(2) include in-house inquiries conducted by the Supreme Court under its administrative mechanism.

“The PROCEDURE contemplating a fact-finding inquiry can and does very well fit in the mould of the word ‘otherwise’,” the Court held. It added that this reading aligned with the settled rule of construction that no word in a statute is to be treated as superfluous.

The Court also clarified that the term “judge” under the Protection Act was deliberately worded broadly to include judicial officers of various kinds, including tribunal members and quasi-judicial authorities. This, in the Court's view, justified the inclusion of the Central and state governments and courts among those empowered to initiate permissible action under the Act.

In-house mechanism has legal force under Article 141, not just moral sanction

Rejecting the contention that the in-house procedure was based on ethics alone and lacked legal backing, the Court traced its origin to the judgment in C Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice AM Bhattacharjee.

“Once the dicta in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra) constitutes a precedent, it is law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is judicial legislation that emerged because of the vacuum in the field of disciplining a Judge who shows signs of delinquency.”

The 1999 Full Court resolution, according to the Court, was based on this judgment and thus carried full legal sanction.

CJI is not a mere forwarding channel

The Bench also rejected the argument that the Chief Justice of India merely acted as a conduit when sending the committee’s report to the President and Prime Minister.

“We have no hesitation to say that the CJI is not a mere post office between the COMMITTEE and the President/the Prime Minister...We see no justification to hold that in so forwarding, the CJI may not give his own views.”

The judgment clarified that such communication is confidential and not addressed to either House of Parliament.

In-house procedure not a removal mechanism, but a preliminary inquiry

The Court reiterated that the in-house procedure is a preliminary fact-finding process and not a mechanism for removal. It emphasised that the procedure was created to address gaps in the constitutional scheme that deals only with “proved misbehaviour” but is silent on conduct falling short of that threshold.

“In-house inquiry or its report forming part of the PROCEDURE in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally ordained procedure,” the Court clarified.

Court flags improper public disclosure, but denies relief

Justice Varma had objected to the Supreme Court publishing photographs and video footage of the incident on its website during the inquiry process. While the Court acknowledged that such uploading was not contemplated by the in-house procedure, it found no merit in granting relief since no objection was raised at the relevant time.

“Placing incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided in the PROCEDURE… such uploading may not be considered proper,” the judgment stated.

However, it concluded that no benefit could be claimed by the petitioner at this stage.

Delay in approaching Court sealed Justice Varma's fate

The Court took note of the fact that the judge had participated in the inquiry without protest and did not question the process until the report was submitted and forwarded.

“The conduct of the Petitioner, therefore, does not inspire much confidence for us to entertain the writ petition,” the Bench said.

It added that a challenge to the constitutional validity of the process should have been brought earlier, especially since no objection was raised in the judge’s written response dated May 6, 2025.

Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal and Mukul Rohatgi appeared for Justice Varma.

[Read Judgment]