Why Supreme Court refused to halt inquiry against Justice Yashwant Varma

The Supreme Court today declined to interfere with the inquiry proceedings initiated against Justice Yashwant Varma, ruling that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha was legally entitled to constitute the Judges Inquiry Committee.

The Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma ruled that the statutory process under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 had not been breached and that the petitioner had failed to show any present violation of fundamental rights.

Here's a quick explainer on what the Court held and why.

Justice Varma challenged the Speaker’s decision to constitute a Judges Inquiry Committee after admitting a motion in the Lok Sabha. His argument was that since notices seeking his removal were given in both Houses on the same day, the law required a joint committee to be formed by the Speaker and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. Since the Rajya Sabha motion was not admitted, he argued that the Lok Sabha could not proceed alone.

The Court held that the first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act applies only when motions given on the same day are admitted in both Houses. The proviso does not apply where a motion is admitted in one House but not in the other.

In such a situation, the Speaker or Chairman of the House that has admitted the motion can proceed independently. The Court said,

“The first proviso caters to only one situation, that is, when notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day and were admitted by both Houses (irrespective of their admission on the same or different dates). Therefore, in a case where notices of motion were given in both Houses on the same day, the fact that a notice is not admitted in one House will not necessitate constitution of a Joint Committee and the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, can independently proceed to constitute a Committee.”

No. The Court rejected the argument that non-admission of a motion in one House automatically nullifies proceedings in the other House.

It held that the Judges (Inquiry) Act contains no such disabling consequence.

“There is nothing in the Inquiry Act to suggest that rejection of a motion in one House would render the other House incompetent to proceed in accordance with law. The argument, therefore, lacks any legal foundation. The interpretation advanced by the petitioner of rejection of a notice in one House resulting in the notice automatically failing in the other House would entail consequences of a most serious nature.”

Yes. The Supreme Court held that once the office of the Chairman fell vacant, the Constitution required the Deputy Chairman to step in and perform the Chairman’s duties.

The Court treated this as a constitutional arrangement meant to prevent the House from becoming dysfunctional because of a vacancy. It rejected the petitioner’s argument that the word “Chairman” in the Judges (Inquiry) Act must be read narrowly to exclude the Deputy Chairman. The Court said a statute cannot be read in disregard of what the Constitution provides, and that Article 91 cannot be kept aside while interpreting the Inquiry Act.

It further rejected the petitioner’s apprehension that the Deputy Chairman could be biased if he were a signatory to the motion, calling it hypothetical. It added that even if such a situation arises, recusal or the doctrine of necessity could address it. The Court said that it would be incoherent to interpret the term “Chairman” in a way that creates a constitutional vacuum and makes the Inquiry Act unworkable during a vacancy.

"We see no reason why Article 91 of the Constitution should be kept aside when a court is tasked to make a meaningful interpretation of any provision of the Inquiry Act or, for that matter, any other enactment. After all, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and all laws validly enacted owe their origin to the Constitution. To proceed in disregard of what the Constitution ordains would be an act of gross impropriety on our part," reads the judgment.

No. The Court held that the Speaker constituted the committee only after receiving official communication that the Rajya Sabha motion had not been admitted. At that point, there was no admitted motion pending in the Rajya Sabha and the statutory condition for a joint committee was not met.

"...even if the refusal by the Deputy Chairman (performing the duties of the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha) were to be ignored as legally unsustainable, the factual as well as legal position would still remain as it is: that, as on the date when the Speaker acted, there was no admitted motion pending in the Rajya Sabha. In the absence of an admitted motion in one House, the statutory sine qua non for the applicability of the proviso stood unfulfilled," the top court held.

The Court held that constitution of the inquiry committee does not by itself result in removal or any immediate civil consequence. The statute provides several safeguards at later stages, including a full inquiry and voting by both Houses, with a special majority.

“At this nascent stage, no civil consequences follow; the motion itself remains pending and can succeed only if both Houses ultimately adopt it by the constitutionally mandated special majority," the Court stated.

The Court held that Article 32 is meant to enforce fundamental rights, not to supervise or correct statutory processes of parliament where no present violation is shown.

Since no vested or accrued right of the petitioner was infringed, the petition was not maintainable.

“The extraordinary remedy under Article 32 is confined to enforcement of Fundamental Rights and does not extend to issuing advisory or corrective directions in relation to internal statutory mechanisms of the Parliament, where no present or inevitable infraction of any Fundamental Right is evinced."

The Supreme Court said its observations on the role of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat were only for future guidance and did not affect the outcome of the case, since the Deputy Chairman’s decision refusing to admit the motion was not under challenge.

The Court noted that the Secretary-General appeared to have gone beyond a purely administrative role by examining the contents of the notice, questioning factual accuracy and treating the notice as “not in order”. It clarified that the Secretariat’s function at that stage was limited to "administrative scrutiny" and placing the notice before the competent authority, and not to "a quasi-adjudicatory function."

[Read Judgment]