Merely passing wrong orders does not warrant disciplinary action: Gujarat High Court reinstates judge

The Gujarat High Court recently set aside the dismissal of judicial officer M J Indrekar on charges of corruption and dereliction of duty.

A Bench of Justices AS Supehia and RT Vachhani said that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the officer were unfair and unjust. It thus directed his reinstatement as Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC.

Summarising Supreme Court judgments on the issue, the Court held,

"Unless there are clear-cut allegations of “misconduct”, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect, or the judicial officer has been negligent in ignoring any fact. The allegations of extraneous influences, corrupt practice are required to be proved by persuasive evidence, and not on surmises and conjectures."

The judicial officer challenged a notification issued by the State government in 2011 dismissing him from service. The key allegation was that on August 27, 2007, he passed an ex-parte mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in a civil suit, despite being aware that a criminal complaint involving theft was already pending.

It was also alleged that he ignored an application by a third party seeking to be added to the case and instead ordered that oil tankers related to the case be handed over to the plaintiffs - actions which were alleged to be corrupt and amounted to grave misconduct.

The departmental inquiry resulted in the framing of four charges against the petitioner. Charges 1 and 4, which related to the passing of the ex-parte injunction and assisting the plaintiffs in taking possession of the tankers, were found to be proved. Charges 2 and 3, however, were not proved. The inquiry officer held that the judge’s rejection of a party’s application to be impleaded was reasonable and that the complainant had denied signing the complaint on which the charge sheet was based.

Despite these findings, the Gujarat High Court in its administrative capacity disagreed with the inquiry officer’s conclusions on Charges 2 and 3 and issued a show-cause notice to the judicial officer.

After the judge submitted his response, the State government issued the dismissal notification.

Appearing before the High Court, counsel for petitioner argued that the departmental proceedings were fundamentally flawed and based on vague allegations. He pointed out that the complaint dated November 30, 2007, which formed the basis of the inquiry, was allegedly signed by someone who later denied writing or signing it. Therefore, the authenticity of the complaint was questionable undermining the entire inquiry, he added.

He argued that the interim injunction granted on August 27, 2007 was lawful, as the tankers in question were not in police custody but detained by a private party, and the criminal case was still in the preliminary stage.

Counsel emphasised that the decisions were judicial in nature and no higher court had ever challenged or overturned them.

On the other hand, the respondents' counsel argued that the judicial officer committed serious misconduct by granting ex-parte relief without adequate reasoning and by assisting plaintiffs in obtaining possession of the tankers in question despite pending applications.

The Court found that the disciplinary action taken against the judicial officer was unjustified. The allegations of misconduct were based on vague claims and a complaint that was later denied by the supposed complainant, it added.

"There is no evidence on record to suggest that the tankers were in the custody of the police, nor is there any proof to indicate that the petitioner was aware of such custody pursuant to the filing of a criminal complaint," the Court noted.

It held that judicial officers cannot be punished just because their decisions are legally flawed, unless there is strong evidence of corruption or external influence.

"At the most, it may be said that the ex-parte interim relief granted was not in strict conformity with the legal principles, but that by itself cannot be construed as a corrupt practice."

It added,

"There is not even a speck of evidence on record in the entire disciplinary proceedings to suggest that the petitioner has, for extraneous consideration or for any personal benefit, passed the orders."

Advocate Vaibhav A Vyas appeared for the petitioner.

Advocates Shruti R Dhruve appeared for the State

Advocate PR Abichandani represented the Registrar General of the High Court.

[Read Order]