Sabarimala case: 10 arguments by Centre before Supreme Court which could shape India’s religious laws

The Union government has filed its written submissions before the 9-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the Sabarimala reference.

The written submissions filed through Solicitor General Tushar Mehta has asked the Supreme Court to set a lasting judicial policy on how constitutional courts approach religious disputes, handle Public Interest Litigations (PILs), and interpret the freedom of religion.

The submissions urge a shift away from recent judicial trends, advocating for a stricter boundary between secular courts and religious customs.

Below are 10 of the most significant arguments canvassed by the Centre before the top court.

1. Barring non-believers from filing religious PILs

The Centre has strongly opposed the trend of activists challenging the religious customs of faiths they do not personally practice.

The government has argued that the liberalization of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) rules in the 1980s was originally meant to help the voiceless and genuinely marginalized, not to arm ideological crusaders.

Allowing outsiders to drag faith-based rules to court clogs the judicial system and creates an industry of vested interests in litigation, it has been contended.

The core argument is one of locus standi - if a person does not belong to the denomination and do not worship the deity, they do not have the legal standing to challenge its internal traditions.

2. Questioning 'Constitutional Morality' through the adultery verdict

In 2018, the top court used the principle of "Constitutional morality" to strike down traditional norms in several cases including the original Sabarimala case. The Centre is now urging the 9-judge bench to stop using this tool, arguing the Constitution uses "morality" simply to mean public or societal morality.

To illustrate why "Constitutional Morality" is a flawed, judicially invented doctrine, the Centre has highlighted the Supreme Court's 2018 judgment decriminalising adultery.

The government claims that by relying on this concept in the adultery verdict, the top court defied Indian societal morality.

The Solicitor General pointed out an alleged judicial blindspot, arguing the Supreme Court mistakenly relied on a dissenting minority view of the US Supreme Court to justify sexual privacy. By citing this, the Centre has argued that the court previously used vague Western concepts to dismantle traditional Indian norms, and is warning that the same standard must not be used to override the country's ancient religious practices.

3. Scrapping the 'Essential Religious Practices' test

Since the Shirur Mutt case in 1954, Indian judges have resolved religious disputes by asking whether a particular practice is an "essential" part of the religion.

The Centre has said that this test should be scrapped in its entirety. The government states that this judge-made doctrine has no textual foundation in the Constitution and was introduced merely as an observation (obiter) in a 1962 ruling.

Secular judges lack the academic and theological scholarship to act as theological censors, the government has said.

Quoting constitutional scholar HM Seervai, the Centre notes that one person's "superstition" is another's fundamental belief, and courts should not be in the business of interpreting holy texts to decide what forms the core of a faith.

4. Rethinking tests that disadvantage Hinduism's plurality

Expanding on its criticism of the Essential Religious Practices test, the Centre has pointed out that the doctrine inadvertently targets Hinduism.

The current legal framework, the government argues, favors rigid, monotheistic religions that possess strict holy books and centralised authorities. In contrast, it puts diverse faiths like Hinduism - which have organically assimilated unwritten, local customs over centuries - at a disadvantage.

The Centre has also contended that existing Supreme Court tests defining a "denomination" are too Eurocentric, as they require a common organisation and distinct name.

This church-style model completely ignores India's deity-centric communities, sampradayas and guru-shishya lineages, the government states.

5. Respecting the deity's unique character

The Centre has mounted a detailed defence of Lord Ayyappa's celibate character at Sabarimala by relying on property and trust law.

Under Indian law, a Hindu deity is recognised as a juristic person, holding a status akin to a perpetual minor. Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala is consecrated specifically as a Naisthika Brahmachari (an eternal celibate).

The Centre contends that just as a court cannot judge a minor's personal choices as irrational, it lacks the competence to subject a deity's unique attributes to tests of secular rationality.

The exclusion, it argues, is grounded entirely in the nature of the deity, not in misogyny or contempt for women - noting that other temples across India similarly restrict men for reasons intrinsic to their specific worship forms.

6. Article 25 guarantees inter-faith, not intra-faith equality

Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees that all persons are "equally entitled" to practice religion.

While petitioners argue this mandates gender equality within a religion, the Centre fundamentally disagrees.

The government states that the Constituent Assembly drafted Article 25 to ensure secularism and non-discrimination between different religions (inter-faith equality). It was not designed to police gender norms or initiate reforms within a specific religion (intra-faith equality).

7. Balancing individual claims against collective faith

The submissions also address what happens when one woman's fundamental right to enter a temple clashes with the fundamental rights of millions of devotees who believe she should not.

The Centre has advanced the "doctrine of optimization."

According to the written arguments, granting unrestricted entry amounts to the total extinction of the collective community's right to worship Lord Ayyappa in his specific celibate form.

A devotee can freely pray at hundreds of other Ayyappa temples, and "total extinction is not balancing." A single individual's claim cannot automatically override the deeply held faith of an entire community, it has been contended.

8. Religious reform is the legislature's job, not the judiciary's

The Centre submits that the power to initiate social welfare and reform in Hindu religious institutions specifically rests with the State legislature under Article 25(2)(b), not the courts.

The government has argued that the Constitution deliberately chose to vest this reforming power in the legislature - a clear signal that courts have no jurisdiction to undertake reform of religion on their own motion.

A judicial dictum, the Centre cautions, cannot substitute for a legislative act in this sensitive sphere.

9. Temple entry laws were aimed at caste, not gender

On the constitutional provision that allows the State to throw open Hindu religious institutions to "all classes and sections of Hindus," the government argues this phrase does not include a mandate for gender equality.

Citing Constituent Assembly debates and historical movements like the Mahad and Guruvayur Satyagrahas, the Centre has submitted that the provision was strictly introduced to eradicate caste-based untouchability.

The constitutional mandate to open temple doors was designed to dismantle the caste system, not to enforce gender parity in specific religious rituals.

10. Adopting the global 'sincerity test'

If the Essential Religious Practices test is scrapped, how should courts decide religious disputes?

The Centre pointed to Europe, Australia, and the United States for an alternative framework, noting that India stands alone globally in requiring litigants to prove theological essentiality.

Borrowing from these jurisdictions, the government has suggested a simpler threshold - courts should only check if a religious belief is "sincerely held" by the community. Once the sincerity of the faith is established, the State and the courts should grant the community a "margin of appreciation" to manage its own affairs, gracefully stepping back from theological debates.