Judicial decisions, public emotion, and the cost of misplaced outrage

In a constitutional democracy, the judiciary stands as a stabilising institution that quietly ensures that the promise of justice endures beyond the passions of the moment. It exists to preserve legal continuity, protect individual rights, and uphold the rule of law with reason and restraint. This role is sustained by a disciplined method of adjudication. This discipline is not a limitation, but a strength - one that safeguards legitimacy and public trust. When courts remain faithful to record and reason, they reinforce the very foundations of justice.

Courts do not function as courts of impression; they are courts of record. In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, judicial decisions are confined to what is pleaded, proved, and tested through the adversarial process.

When courts are expected to respond to perception, reputation, or public emotion, adjudication is pushed away from law and towards impression. It weakens, rather than strengthens, justice. Institutions endure when they are governed by rules rather than pressure and courts are no exception to it.

In the order rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Kuldeep Singh Sengar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Crl. A. No. 53 of 2020 (order dated December 23, 2025), the approach of the judges exemplifies disciplined appellate adjudication in a matter marked by exceptional public sensitivity. The Bench approached the case with measured restraint, carefully situating its analysis within the statutory framework of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the material placed on record. By consciously resisting extraneous considerations and confining itself to settled legal principles and evidentiary boundaries, the judiciary reaffirmed the judiciary’s constitutional role as an institution governed by reason rather than reaction. The approach adopted by the Bench is consistent with a judicial record marked by clarity, restraint, and fidelity to constitutional process. Over the years, both judges have been recognized for decisions that emphasize procedural discipline, evidentiary rigor, and principled application of law, often in matters involving individual liberty and institutional accountability. In the present case, that judicial temperament is once again evident.

At the heart of this constitutional role lies a set of enduring judicial values: independence, restraint, consistency, and fidelity to process. Courts are designed to be institutions of reason in a system often marked by urgency and emotion. Their authority does not stem from immediacy or popularity, but from adherence to law, precedent, and the discipline of deciding only on what is properly placed before them. This commitment to process is not procedural formalism; it is the means by which courts ensure fairness, equality before law, and protection against arbitrariness. This institutional independence is expressed most clearly in the way courts adjudicate, not by impression or expectation, but by fidelity to the record and the discipline of constitutional process.

What emerges here extends beyond any single order granting suspension of sentence or bail. It brings into focus a core feature of constitutional democracy: the understanding of judicial independence when legal reasoning is viewed through public sentiment rather than constitutional method. The Indian judiciary was never designed to function as a representative institution. Unlike the legislative or executive branches, courts are deliberately insulated from electoral accountability, an insulation that operates as a constitutional safeguard rather than a democratic shortcoming. This structural independence enables judges to decide without regard to approval or disapproval and to uphold rights even when such adjudication is unpopular, a principle the Supreme Court of India has consistently affirmed. The Supreme Court reiterated this constitutional duty in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, observing with rare clarity:

“Liberty across human eras is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. Yet, much too often, liberty is a casualty when one of these components is found wanting.”

This understanding of judicial independence reflects the importance of maintaining institutional confidence in courts as guardians of the constitutional process. A healthy constitutional democracy depends upon a judiciary that is confident in its independence and secure in its institutional role. Courts function best when they are able to decide with fidelity to law, free from apprehension about public reaction.

While reasoned criticism of judicial reasoning is an essential part of democratic engagement and strengthens institutional accountability, it is equally important to preserve the distinction between critique and delegitimization. When courts are trusted to apply law without being viewed through a lens of moral suspicion, they remain effective neutral arbiters, particularly in moments when constitutional rights require careful and principled protection.

Placed in the proper constitutional context, the consequences of heightened public reaction become clearer. When judicial decisions are assessed through the prism of public response rather than legal reasoning, courts may be pressed, subtly but persistently, to look beyond the record and rely on material not tested through cross-examination or judicial scrutiny. Such pressure does not strengthen justice; it distorts the boundaries of adjudication. Courts are not designed to reconcile outrage with investigation. They are bound to decide on the record and in accordance with law, and expectations to the contrary impose a real institutional cost by drawing courts away from their role as neutral arbiters and towards impermissible functions of moral or investigative judgment.

That cost becomes most visible when judicial decisions are criticised not for legal error, but for failing to mirror public emotion. The expectation then advanced is not of stronger justice, but of diminished constitutional restraint. Yielding to such expectations risks recasting courts from institutions of adjudication into arbiters of sentiment, an outcome the Constitution neither envisages nor permits. Courts are entrusted with a narrower, yet more enduring task: to decide according to law, on the record, and without regard to popular reaction. It is this unwavering commitment to reasoned adjudication, especially in moments of heightened public feeling, that preserves judicial independence, protects individual liberty, and sustains the rule of law as a constitutional guarantee rather than a contingent response.

About the authors: Kapil Madan is the Managing Partner of KMA Attorneys. Samit Siddhanta is an Associate at Firm.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. The opinions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of Bar & Bench.

If you would like your Deals, Columns, Press Releases to be published on Bar & Bench, please fill in the form available here.