Procedure v. Fairness in Determining Internal Committee's Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) has held that an Internal Committee (“IC”) set up by the aggrieved woman’s employer is competent to inquire into allegations of sexual harassment against a respondent employed in a different department or organisation, reinforcing the POSH Act as a social welfare legislation.

In Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024 dated December 10, 2025, the Court was called upon to address a recurring jurisdictional objection under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”). The appellant (who was originally the respondent in the inquiry proceedings under the POSH Act), an IRS officer, challenged the jurisdiction of the IC constituted in the complainant’s department, contending that only the IC of his own department could initiate and conduct proceedings under Section 11 of the POSH Act. This argument was premised on a literal interpretation of the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” under Section 11(1) of the POSH Act.

The Court unequivocally rejected this restrictive interpretation. It held that “… in case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’, the ICC is obligated to apply the service rules applicable to him, but the use of the phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ does not mean that the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman cannot exercise jurisdiction. As such, the construction of Section 11 is in the nature of a procedural section rather than one that lays down jurisdictional restraints.” The Court was of the view that to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose and undermine the object of the POSH Act as a social welfare legislation.

The Court’s reasoning also lies in the expansive definition of ‘workplace’ under Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, particularly clause (v), which includes any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment. The Court also noted that the word ‘respondent’ has been defined in Section 2(m) of the POSH Act as a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a complaint under Section 9. The Court noted that it “does not require the ‘respondent’ to be someone working at the same workplace as the aggrieved woman, rather the exact words used are ‘a person’ which can be any person against whom complaint has been made”. In such a context, confining jurisdiction exclusively to the respondent’s IC would impose significant and often prohibitive burdens on the aggrieved woman, compelling her to pursue remedies in unfamiliar or protracted institutional settings.

Importantly, the Court also clarified the functional distinction between inquiry and enforcement under the POSH Act. While the IC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace is fully empowered to conduct a factual inquiry under Section 11 and render its findings, this IC does not have the authority to impose disciplinary action against the respondent directly. Pursuant to Section 13(1) of the POSH Act, the IC’s report and recommendations are to be forwarded to the employer of the respondent, who is then statutorily obligated to act upon them within the prescribed timeline, including initiation of disciplinary proceedings in accordance with applicable service rules. This delineation preserves both procedural fairness for the respondent and the enforceability of the IC’s findings.

Further, the Court underscored the statutory duty of employers under Section 19(f) of the POSH act to cooperate with IC proceedings, including those initiated by an employee of another department or organisation.

From a governance and compliance perspective, the ruling is significant. It removes ambiguity around complaints involving respondents from a different organisation and strengthens the accessibility of the POSH Act to an aggrieved woman. Organisations, particularly, large MNCs, GCCs and multi-entity structures must note and revise their internal policies to the effect that IC proceedings are not limited to complaints involving their own employees but may extend to any individual their employees interact with in the course of employment, irrespective of whether such persons are employed by the organisation. Equally, employers must be prepared to act on IC findings originating from external organisations.

In essence, the judgment aligns statutory interpretation with legislative intent to provide an effective and accessible redressal mechanism for workplace sexual harassment, unimpeded by technical jurisdictional barriers.

About the authors: Siddhartha George and Anjali Menon are Partners, and Vibhuti Tyagi is a Senior Associate at Poovayya & Co.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s). The opinions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of Bar & Bench.

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