The Enforcement Paradox: Emergency Arbitration under SIAC Rules 2025 and the Indian legal landscape

The nascent Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules 2025 (“SIAC Rules”), introduced on January 1, 2025, brought about significant advancements in the realm of international arbitration, designed to address the exigencies of such commercial disputes seeking interim relief.

These rules broaden the tools available to parties to seek interim relief particularly through the expeditious provision of ‘Emergency Arbitration’ under Rule 12 of the SIAC Rules without approaching the courts or even prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.

The two significant changes introduced to this procedure of Emergency Arbitration in accordance with Rule 12 of the SIAC Rules include: firstly, the parties may now appoint an emergency arbitrator prior to the filing of a notice of arbitration and secondly, the parties can now approach emergency arbitration without any notice to the counterparties through a Protective Preliminary Order (“PPO”) application [Rule 20, Schedule 1 of SIAC Rules].

These innovations, particularly the introduction of pre-filing emergency applications and ex parte PPOs, create complex enforcement challenges in a country like India. With relief at an interim stage being a fundamental point of consideration whilst discussing arbitration in India, our multi-faceted resolution structure in rendering interim arbitral awards and later enforcements, is envisaged under two brackets: firstly, in the arbitral tribunals seated in or outside India, and secondly, in courts as envisaged under Section 17 and Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) respectively. However, the practical application of these provisions becomes fraught when emergency relief is granted before the arbitration formally begins or without hearing the other side.

The ability to request an emergency arbitrator before filing a notice of arbitration is a departure from traditional procedure as mentioned under the Act, where such notice marks the commencement of arbitral jurisdiction. In the Indian context, this creates a jurisdictional vacuum. Courts are generally reluctant to enforce interim measures unless arbitration has formally commenced, as the very authority of the arbitrator may be seen as contingent on procedural thresholds being met. Pre-filing emergency relief thus risks falling outside the scope of what Indian courts are currently equipped or willing to enforce.

The challenges deepen with PPOs, which allow one party to secure temporary relief without informing the counterparty. While these are designed to prevent pre-emptive sabotage, they clash with India’s due process norms. Indian law emphasizes procedural fairness, with constitutional protections guaranteeing equal treatment and the right to be heard. An interim measure issued without notice, even if reversible, is likely to face resistance in Indian courts on the grounds that it violates fundamental principles of natural justice.

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Amazon NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Limited and Others (“Amazon Case”) was a turning point for emergency arbitration in India. This decision established crucial precedent by clarifying that an “award/ order” issued by an emergency arbitrator could be enforced under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act, as long as the underlying institutional rules grant an emergency arbitrator that power. The Supreme Court stressed that parties are provided with the autonomy to select their procedural framework through institutional rules.

While the Indian law places considerable emphasis on due process, rooted in constitutional principles under Articles 14 (equality before law), Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and also Section 18 of the Act which specifically mandates equal treatment of parties and ensures each party has complete opportunity to present their case - this inherently creates potential conflicts with SIAC’s ex parte PPO mechanism.

Section 18 of the Act explicitly requires equal treatment and opportunity for both parties to present their case. Ex parte orders, by definition, deny the counterparty this opportunity, creating a direct conflict with statutory mandates. Although Rule 31 of SIAC Rules allows the affected party to challenge the order as soon as possible after it is issued, the fact that the relief was granted without hearing them may still raise concerns under Indian due process standards. As a result, Indian courts may hesitate to enforce such orders, viewing them as inconsistent with basic principles of fairness and natural justice.

Hence, Indian courts applying Section 17(2) for enforcement must determine what standard of review applies to emergency arbitrator orders, particularly ex parte PPOs. Unlike conventional arbitral tribunals that operate with full adversarial proceedings, emergency arbitrators making ex parte determinations present novel questions about the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny during enforcement.

Another challenge arising from the interface between SIAC Rules 2025 and the Act is the risk of duplicative proceedings. Parties obtaining emergency relief through SIAC may still be compelled to approach Indian courts under Section 9 for enforcement, effectively re-litigating the same issues in parallel forums. This dual-track approach dilutes the efficiency that emergency arbitration seeks to achieve. The Amazon Case illustrates this complexity, where the award of an emergency arbitrator had to be separately enforced through judicial intervention.

This enforcement uncertainty incentivizes forum shopping and strategic behaviour. Respondents may resist compliance, relying on procedural delays in Indian courts, while applicants may bypass SIAC’s emergency mechanism altogether in favour of direct court relief. These trends undermine both SIAC’s procedural innovation and India’s arbitration-friendly reforms leading to increased costs, delayed outcomes, and erosion of arbitration’s comparative advantage over traditional litigation.

The path forward, then, requires better alignment between institutional rules and domestic enforcement regimes. SIAC Rules is commercially sound but ultimately rests on the assumption that national courts will enforce its procedures without hesitation. In India, that assumption does not always hold. Legislative clarification or judicial recognition will be necessary to address the ambiguity surrounding pre-filing emergency relief and ex parte orders.

At the same time, arbitral institutions must consider the enforceability of their procedures in key jurisdictions where parties are likely to seek relief. Procedural changes such as pre-filing emergency applications and ex parte PPOs may enhance speed but risk ineffectiveness if they fall outside the statutory framework of enforcement states. Therefore, institutions like SIAC must ensure that the emergency measures they offer are not only procedurally efficient but also capable of surviving judicial scrutiny in major enforcement forums.

About the authors: Gagan Narang is a Partner and Shivali Srivastava is an Associate at Triumvir Law.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s). The opinions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of Bar & Bench.

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