Historically, competition law and white-collar crime inhabited parallel but separate spheres. Competition law aimed at preserving market efficiency and consumer welfare, while white-collar crime tackled deceit, fraud and economic malfeasance.

Corporate misconduct today defies those neat separations. A cartel is as much a secret conspiracy as an antitrust violation. Bid-rigging in procurement defrauds the public and distorts markets. Dominance in a digital platform may involve data misuse or misleading disclosures.

In India, the Competition Act, 2002 sets out a predominantly administrative regime. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) can impose civil penalties, but there is no criminal sanction in the Act. In the United States, the Sherman Act criminalises cartel conduct, exposing executives to imprisonment. The European Union regime is administrative, but its fines are so severe that they approximate criminal punishments.

As India aspires to be both a growth engine and a rule-bound economy, the overlap between competition law and white-collar crime is no longer peripheral. It is central. This article traces doctrine, highlights illustrative cases including recent digital market cases and offers policy, advocacy and judicial reform suggestions.

Cartels as criminal conspiracies

Under Section 3 of the Competition Act, cartel conduct is a civil infringement. Yet cartelisation is inherently conspiratorial. In Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI (2017), the Supreme Court affirmed CCI’s penalty for bid-rigging in a tender for aluminium phosphide tablets, reinforcing that certain forms of coordination are per se illegal. While this was civil enforcement, the same facts could underpin criminal conspiracy charges under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

In the United States, cartel participants are prosecuted criminally. In United States v. Andreas, executives of Archer Daniels Midland were convicted for a lysine price-fixing conspiracy, reflecting the American view that cartels are both economic and moral wrongs.

Abuse of dominance and fraud

Section 4 of the Competition Act prohibits enterprises from abusing a dominant position. In DLF Ltd. v. CCI, (2018), the Supreme Court upheld the CCI’s finding that DLF abused its dominance in the real estate sector through unfair, one-sided clauses in builder-buyer contracts. This conduct could also meet the definition of cheating under Section 420 IPC or an unfair trade practice under consumer protection law.

The overlap is especially visible in digital markets. In November 2024, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹213.14 crore on Meta (via WhatsApp) for abusing its dominance through the 2021 Privacy Policy, which forced users to accept data-sharing terms in a “take-it-or-leave-it” fashion. The CCI held that the coercive policy violated Section 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the Act. This order illustrates how dominance abuse in digital ecosystems often involves misrepresentation, concealment and informational asymmetry, which are hallmarks of fraud.

Mergers and misrepresentation

Mergers under Sections 5 and 6 are assessed for competitive harm. When parties supply false or misleading disclosures to the CCI or conceal material facts, the conduct overlaps with corporate fraud. For example, in Europe, the GE-Alstom merger was cleared only after regulators scrutinised the accuracy of disclosures. In many jurisdictions, false statements in merger filings may attract criminal liability or securities law penalties.

Bid-rigging and procurement fraud

Section 3(3)(d) identifies bid-rigging in public procurement as cartel conduct. In Rajasthan Cylinders & Containers Ltd v. Union of India, the Supreme Court examined allegations of bid-rigging in LPG cylinder tenders. The Court held that parallel bidding or oligopsony, without proof of concerted action, was insufficient to establish cartelisation.

Bid-rigging, however, is also a form of procurement fraud under criminal law. Treating it solely as a civil violation risks under-deterrence and leaves gaps in accountability.

The United States

The US Department of Justice (DoJ) prosecutes cartel behaviour as a felony under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Executives may be imprisoned and corporations may bear steep fines. The DoJ’s Corporate Leniency Policy incentivises self-reporting in exchange for immunity or reduced sentences.

A prominent case is United States v. AU Optronics Corp (2013), where a court upheld convictions of Taiwanese executives and the corporation for involvement in an LCD panel price-fixing cartel. The case illustrates the global reach of US antitrust enforcement and the DoJ’s commitment to personal criminal liability.

The European Union

The European Commission levies administrative fines at punitive levels. In the EU Truck Cartel case, fines exceeded €2.9 billion. The EU framework increasingly addresses platforms, data and digital abuses as competition concerns.

India

India’s enforcement remains administrative. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 introduced settlement and commitment mechanisms, but no criminal sanctions. The CCI continues to impose penalties in sectors such as cement, auto parts and technology, but prolonged appeals weaken deterrence.

Recent cases in digital markets, such as the Meta/WhatsApp order (2024) and the Google Play Store dispute (where NCLAT partially upheld abuse findings in 2025 and the Supreme Court has admitted cross-appeals), show that enforcement is adapting to platform power, data leverage and ecosystem control.

1. Under-deterrence in India: Without criminal penalties, cartelists may treat civil penalties as a cost of doing business.

2. Enforcement silos: Overlaps among CCI, SEBI, ED and SFIO remain poorly coordinated.

3. Evidentiary tensions: Competition law depends on economic models, while criminal cases demand proof of intent. Bridging the two is complex.

4. Global cartels, local limits: India’s capacity to tackle cross-border cartels is limited by weak cooperation frameworks.

5. Digital market complexity: Dominance in data and platforms creates new forms of abuse that conventional antitrust paradigms struggle to address. Recent orders suggest doctrine is still evolving.

For policymakers

• Introduce criminal liability for hardcore cartels and repeat dominance abuses.

• Create joint task forces combining CCI, SEBI, ED, SFIO and cybercrime agencies.

• Strengthen international cooperation and data-sharing treaties.

• Extend whistleblower incentives and leniency programs across competition and anti-fraud enforcement.

For the Bar

• Cultivate expertise in competition economics, digital regulation and criminal law.

• Promote integrated corporate compliance frameworks covering antitrust, data, fraud and ethics.

• Prepare for multi-jurisdictional proceedings with harmonised strategies.

For the Bench

• Accept economic evidence as circumstantial proof of intent in hybrid cases.

• Blend sanctions such as fines, disgorgement, behavioural orders and compliance oversight.

• Encourage judicial training in data economics, platform governance and forensic accounting.

The convergence of competition law and white-collar crime is a pressing reality in India’s digital economy. While Indian jurisprudence has historically treated competition law in isolation, recent orders show that regulators and courts are experimenting with principles fit for platform markets and data-driven dominance.

India now needs a hybrid enforcement paradigm that preserves administrative flexibility while introducing criminal sanctions for egregious misconduct. Lawyers must evolve into multi-domain strategists and judges must interpret doctrine in light of changing markets.

The credibility of India’s regulatory architecture and its attractiveness to global investors depends on this evolution. A fragmented approach risks leaving misconduct unchecked. A harmonised one can strengthen both accountability and economic resilience.

Nidhi Malhotra is Legal Manager - Governance, Risk and Compliance at Cyterico.