Judicial clerkships today form the invisible backbone of India’s constitutional courts. Law clerks assist judges with legal research, case preparation, drafting of judgments and managing increasingly complex litigation. Despite performing comparable work across institutions, clerkships in India remain poorly institutionalised, marked by inconsistency in pay, tenure and service conditions.
This fragmented framework raises serious constitutional concerns, particularly in relation to equality and the State’s obligation to act as a model employer. The principle of equal pay for equal work, long recognised as an integral component of Article 14 of the Constitution, is directly implicated.
A comparative examination of existing remuneration structures reveals stark disparities. While law clerks in the Supreme Court of India receive an honorarium of approximately ₹1,00,000 per month, similarly designated law clerks in various High Courts are paid amounts ranging from ₹25,000 to ₹30,000, despite no discernible difference in the nature, complexity or intensity of work performed.
In certain instances, tribunals and statutory commissions offer higher compensation than constitutional courts. These variations cannot be justified on the basis of workload, responsibility or expertise and instead reflect institutional arbitrariness. This is particularly troubling because the judiciary is not merely another employer. Under Articles 146 and 229 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and High Courts enjoy administrative autonomy over service conditions. However, such autonomy cannot operate in isolation from constitutional discipline.
As “State” under Article 12, judicial institutions are equally bound by principles of fairness, equality and non-arbitrariness. An institution that routinely enforces labour rights and condemns exploitative employment practices must not itself fall short of those standards. The absence of institutionalisation also produces exclusionary outcomes. Clerkships with low or uneven remuneration disproportionately disadvantage candidates lacking financial backing, effectively transforming merit-based opportunities into positions accessible primarily to the economically privileged. This undermines the constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 and narrows the diversity of voices within the judicial ecosystem.
Unequal pay has direct costs for courts. First, it makes it harder to attract good candidates. If one court pays ₹80,000 and another pays ₹25,000 for similar work, many people will choose the higher-paying option. The result is uneven hiring, even when the work is similar.
Second, it affects how clerks see their role. When clerks doing similar tasks are paid very different amounts, it creates a quiet hierarchy. It sends a simple message: some clerks are valued more than others. That hurts morale. It also affects confidence, especially when clerks compare their work and pay across courts.
Third, it is bad human resource management. Courts rely on clerks for research and drafting support. But low pay leads to faster exits and constant turnover. Judges lose trained support. New clerks take time to settle in. Work gets repeated. None of this helps a system already dealing with heavy caseloads. And the effects do not stop there. Clerkships shape the next generation of the profession. Unequal pay pushes talent away from some courts and concentrates it in a few.
A clerkship should not depend on scattered rules and judge-to-judge practice. Courts need a basic structure that works across the system. High Courts can keep their administrative autonomy, but there should be clear minimum standards.
Start with pay. If the work is broadly similar, the pay gap should not be extreme. Standardised pay bands linked to cost of living is a fair place to begin. Then focus on training. Courts should run a short orientation at the start and regular in-house sessions through the year. Clerks should be told what is expected, how research and drafting are handled and what basic court processes look like. This makes the work consistent and saves judges’ time. Courts also ignore alumni networks as many High Courts remain silent and do not keep basic alumni records. That weakens mentoring and institutional memory.
Clerkships are a pipeline for leadership. Many former clerks become distinguished advocates, scholars, professors and, later, judges. They carry with them the discipline of careful legal reasoning and public responsibility. Treating clerkships as a serious institution strengthens the Bench and the Bar over time. It is capacity-building for the legal system.
Hence, institutionalising clerkships through a uniform national framework featuring standardised pay is not a matter of administrative convenience; it is a constitutional obligation. In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co Ltd v. Audrey D'Costa (1987), the Supreme Court held that the principle of equal remuneration applies not only to identical work but also to work of equal value. Although the case arose in the context of gender-based pay discrimination, the values it affirmed remains quite pertinent to the issue. If the judiciary is to remain a credible guardian of equality, it must begin by practising it within its own institutions.
Sourabh Roy is a Research Fellow at Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.
Keerthi Reddy is an advocate practicing before the High Court of Karnataka.
The authors were former law clerks at the High Court of Karnataka.