By Dr. Shruti Bedi and Navdeep Singh

“In a watershed moment, the Supreme Court has further expanded its existing progressive jurisprudential canvas and has held that the right against disability-based discrimination must be viewed as having the same stature as a fundamental right.”

“Justice is blind,” the old adage goes, signifying impartiality in law. But what happens when the very system that upholds justice refuses to see beyond physical limitations? In a watershed moment earlier this month, that reshapes the contours of judicial inclusivity, the Supreme Court of India, in In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services v The Registrar General, The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, has reaffirmed that merit is not measured by sight, but by intellect, reason and integrity. By striking down discriminatory recruitment barriers, the Court has sent a powerful message—that the judiciary must not only deliver justice but also embody it.

The case originated from a letter-petition dated January 15, 2024, addressed to the then Chief Justice of India by the mother of Alok Singh, a visually impaired judicial aspirant.

The letter questioned the legality of a rule which excluded visually impaired and low-vision candidates from appointment in the judicial service. The letter contended that such exclusion was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of the spirit of the Constitution, particularly the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act).

Taking cognizance of this important proposition, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan undertook a rigorous examination of several fundamental questions that lay at the heart of the case. Central to its deliberation was the contentious issue of whether visually impaired candidates could be deemed inherently ‘unsuitable’ for judicial service—a presumption that risked reinforcing outdated stereotypes rather than assessing merit on objective grounds.

Additionally, the validity of a related rule also came under the lens, as it imposed certain requirements on Persons with Disabilities (PwD), raising concerns about whether these stipulations militated against the equality doctrine and the mandate of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

Further, the Court weighed the permissibility of relaxing selection criteria in instances where an adequate number of PwD candidates were not available within their respective categories, probing whether such an approach aligned with the principles of fairness and affirmative action.

Finally, it considered whether a distinct cut-off should be maintained for visually impaired candidates, ensuring a fair and equitable selection process while upholding the spirit of inclusivity in judicial appointments.

In its judgment ushering a progressive socio-legal shift, the Court emphasized that the RPwD Act, 2016, represents a significant legislative move aimed at expanding the rights of PwD broadening the recognized categories of disabilities. This landmark law ensures equality and non-discrimination, mandates the provision of reasonable accommodations, and works towards eliminating barriers in areas such as community life, education, employment, and access to justice.

The Court further underscored that the RPwD Act has acquired a status akin to a ‘super- statute,’ containing the ingredients of a quasi-constitutional law. Most significantly, the Court held that the right against disability-based discrimination must be viewed as having the same stature as a fundamental right.

In addressing the suitability of visually impaired persons for judicial roles, the Court rejected the notion that visual impairment inherently impedes one's ability to perform judicial functions. The Court highlighted that with appropriate reasonable accommodations, visually impaired individuals are fully capable of discharging judicial duties effectively which aligns with the principles of substantive equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Constitution.

The Court also examined the requirements imposed by the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, which mandated either a three-year practice period or securing an aggregate score of 70% in the first attempt for PwD candidates.

The Court found these stipulations to be discriminatory and violative of the principle of reasonable accommodation. Consequently, it struck down these requirements insofar as they applied to PwD candidates, asserting that such candidates should be assessed based on their qualifications without unjust additional burdens.

The judgment draws upon a robust legal framework and precedents that advocate for the rights of PwD. The RPwD Act, 2016 aligns with international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) to which India is a signatory. These instruments collectively emphasize the need for reasonable accommodation and the elimination of discrimination against PwD.

Progressive rulings in disability jurisprudence are no stranger to our Supreme Court.

The Court in previous rulings has touched the lives of many a disabled, and in various contexts. For instance, in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021), the Court recognized the right to reasonable accommodation as an essential facet of equality and non-discrimination.

Similarly, in Jeeja Ghosh & Another v. Union of India (2016), the Court underscored the importance of dignity and respect for PwD, reinforcing the constitutional mandate for their inclusion and participation in all spheres of life.

In Omkar Ramchandra Gond v Union of India (2024) followed by Anmol v Union of India (2025), the Court emphasized the rights of PwD to study and undertake medical courses.

In Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal and v Union of India (2021), the Court went into great detail in dealing with applicability of disability laws to the armed forces in a case of a member of the Central Reserve Police Force suffering from mental health issues who was unfairly departmentally punished despite his condition.

In State of Kerala v Leesamma Joseph (2021), the Court dealt with reservations for the disabled in promotions. In Jeeja Ghosh, the Court observed that PwD should be approached from the perspective of human rights.

In Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer (2023), the Court dealt with a member of the Indian Air Force who contracted HIV while in service, and went on to caution the defence services by recording: “a corresponding duty is cast upon all state functionaries, including echelons of power within the armed forces to ensure that the highest standards of safety (physical/mental wellbeing, medical fitness as well as wellness) are maintained. This is absolutely the minimum required of the military/air force employer for not only assuring the morale of the forces but also showing the sense of how such personnel matter and their lives count, which reinforces their commitment and confidence.”

The work of the Supreme Court has not just been restricted to jurisprudence. Action beyond the courtroom was evident when the Court, in 2024, issued a Handbook on Persons with Disabilities.

Apart from providing the basics of disability law and judgments, the Court in this handbook cautioned stakeholders in usage of the correct language and terminology for PwD and other facets concerning disability, such as avoidance of terms such as ‘differently- abled’ or ‘specially-abled’, which on the surface appear to be sensitive, but on a deeper and more layered thought are now considered condescending and loaded.

In the same vein and continuing the same line of progressive thought, the judgment In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services signifies a progressive step towards inclusivity in the Indian judiciary.

By striking down discriminatory provisions and affirming the eligibility of visually impaired candidates for judicial service, the Supreme Court has once again reinforced the constitutional values of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination.

This ruling is more than just a legal milestone—it is a reaffirmation of the judiciary’s role in shaping a society where justice is truly accessible to all. By dismantling discriminatory barriers, the Court has not only upheld constitutional values of equality and inclusivity but has also redefined the very notion of merit in judicial service.

This verdict does not merely empower visually impaired individuals; it enriches the judiciary itself, fostering a system that values intellect, reason, and fairness over outdated biases.

Helen Keller profoundly observed, “The only thing worse than being blind is having sight but no vision.” With this judgment, the highest court of the land, once again has demonstrated the kind of vision that justice demands—one that sees beyond physical ability and embraces the limitless potential of every individual.

Dr Shruti Bedi is Professor and Director of University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh and International Fellow, National Institute of Military Justice, Washington DC.

Major Navdeep Singh is a practicing lawyer at the Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, International Fellow, National Institute of Military Justice, Washington DC and was member of the drafting Committee of the Yale Draft and the Stellenbosch Draft (Commonwealth Military Justice Principles).