When a farmer in rural Maharashtra used the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI), to expose embezzled wages under the MGNREGA scheme, it showed how an ordinary citizen can hold the powerful accountable.
Over the years, RTI has been the support system of democratic transparency in India. This framework has assisted in unravelling the Commonwealth Games scam, the Adarsh Housing Society scandal and the Vyapam scam, among others. Furthermore, it has enabled the citizens, journalists and activists to question the authorities and demand transparency from them.
However, a single clause in the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) - Section 44(3) - can reverse decades of advancement in the regime of RTI. By amending Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and removing the “public interest exception” for disclosing personal information, the law risks pushing governance back into secrecy. It is crucial to know why this amendment raises big issues and why its repeal is necessary.
The RTI Act was designed to balance both transparency and privacy. Section 8(1)(j) initially created an exception on the disclosure of personal information. It protected data that was not connected with any public activity or interest or whose disclosure would have caused an unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy, unless a larger public interest justified its release. This made data such as the declaration of assets by officials or information on government contracts available when they were held to account. The courts have consistently upheld this balance in many landmark cases.
In Surupsingh Hrya Naik v. State of Maharashtra (2007) and Vijay Prakash v. Union of India (2009), the Bombay High Court and the Delhi High Court, respectively, ruled that privacy is subject to surrender in the face of the common interest when the need arises. Even in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner (2012), the Supreme Court held that personal information is exempt from disclosure unless a larger public interest is established.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975) has already recognised the right to information as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution even before the enactment of RTI Act, 2005. The Court held that the citizens have the right to know how the government functions. Similarly, in SP Gupta v. Union of India (1981), it restated that the right to information is a fundamental aspect of the freedom of speech and expression.
Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act reverses this framework. It has replaced Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act with a sweeping clause: “Information that is related to personal information”. The link to the public activity and the public interest test has disappeared; public information officers have no discretion in complicated cases. The amorphous definition of “personal information” is open to abuse and would promote a risk-averse attitude, leading to inconsistent, arbitrary denials across departments. RTI requests seeking disbursal matters concerning subsidies or tenders could be refused by the public authorities, as such information is considered personal even though it concerns public funds or governance.
Additionally, under Section 4(1)(a) of the RTI Act, public authorities are required to properly maintain and digitise their records. Section 4(1)(b) obligates them to proactively place this information in the public domain. Meanwhile, Section 8 provides a few exceptions from disclosure of information. Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act undermines this structure by giving the authorities the option to withhold the disclosure of information by branding it as such, even when the purpose and accountability of the disclosed information is meant to benefit the populace.
Take an example of a citizen who wants to obtain information about the beneficiaries of a welfare scheme to expose mismanagement. According to the revised law, the authorities have a chance to refuse it under the justification of the data being personal, irrespective of whether it has public significance or not. This change poses a threat of making the DPDP Act a pretext for opacity, which defeats the essence of the RTI Act.
The government has defended Section 44(3) by referring to Section 3(c) of the DPDP Act, which provides an exception to information or data which is publicly available and which must be disclosed under law. This defence is incorrectly positioned and signals a greater shift towards secrecy through regulation. The previous push for transparency has now been superseded by administrative secrecy.
Section 3 of the DPDP Act is not much of a relief when the RTI Act itself has been restricted via amendments that restrict disclosure of information. The outcome is a system that makes it possible to make blanket refusals or denials to citizens, leaving them with fewer instruments of ensuring transparency. While RTI Section 8(2) still allows disclosure in the larger public interest, the absence of a definition of “personal information” now allows authorities to classify almost any record as personal. This makes the safeguard practically ineffective in real-world decision-making.
To aggravate this issue, the RTI Act lacks a definition of what constitutes “personal information”, whereas Section 2(t) of the DPDP Act defines “personal data” as any data relating to an individual who can be identified by or through such data. This broad definition allows any authority to consider almost any record personal - including a list of subsidies, welfare recipients or official contracts - making it easier and more arbitrary to refuse under Section 44(3).
The privacy-transparency conflict is not a zero-sum game. They are both established under Part III of the Constitution as affirmed in KS Puttaswamy (I) v. Union of India (2017), where the Supreme Court ruled that any restriction must meet the tests of legality, necessity and proportionality. This principle was represented in the original Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act that permitted disclosure where the interests of the public overrode privacy. Section 44(3) abandons this balance and establishes an absolute exemption, disregarding context.
Previously, the Central Information Commission has made it clear in S Muthumalai v. CPIO (2020) that Section 8(1)(j) can be invoked only when the information sought is personal information of a third party, has no relationship to any public activity or interest, and its disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Section 44(3) has now negated this jurisprudence and may lead to inconsistency in its application across different departments.
The amendment also fails the proportionality test of the Supreme Court provided in the case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), which necessitates a restriction of fundamental rights to be necessary, proportionate and least restrictive. Section 44(3), which has introduced a blanket exemption of all personal information irrespective of public interest, fails to respond to these standards.
This moves in a direction opposite to the expert guidance available on the issue. The Justice AP Shah Committee (2012) made it clear that a privacy law should not water down the RTI Act and that information which the RTI requires to be disclosed cannot be treated as a breach of privacy. Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act disregards these suggestions and turns the DPDP Act into an instrument of secrecy, reminiscent of the colonial era legislation.
Through this amendment to the RTI framework, people from marginalised and economically weaker backgrounds who rely heavily on welfare schemes, subsidies and essential government services will be disproportionately affected. Ironically, citizen data rights under the DPDP Act are delayed till May 2027, but the RTI dilution is immediate. Moreover, the RTI applications of hundreds of disadvantaged citizens every month could be refused now due to the reasons of personal data. It would be much harder to perform social audits, investigative journalism and anti-corruption activities. Voter lists, land records and other important databases can also be closed to the public, undermining transparency and citizen control. The consequences will be far-reaching.
Besides, the amendment weakens the democratic fabric in India, considering the fact that the RTI Act gives citizens the right to question authority and holds people accountable in a system that is usually tainted with secrecy. Section 44(3) DPDP Act suppresses civic action, which is the foundation of reform, by undermining this right. It is also a disturbing precedent, since it weaponises the notion of privacy to ward off societal questioning.
The RTI Act is not a bureaucratic inconvenience; it’s a constitutional commitment to transparency. To balance between privacy and accountability, it is necessary to restore the original Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. A broader analysis of the DPDP Act is also needed to ascertain that it is in line with democracy.
The repeal of Section 44(3) is not merely a legislative correction; it is a democratic imperative. India needs a system where transparency is not sacrificed at the altar of abstract notions of privacy. The RTI Act has been a source of accountability in the last twenty years, but Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act is extinguishing that light. The only solution is to repeal it in order to secure the right to know.
Now that Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act has been brought into force (operationalised via Gazette Notification on November 13, 2025), and public authorities must apply the DPDP Act’s definition of personal data while deciding RTI requests, the risk of opacity has already materialised. It is imperative to reassess the amendment so that the constitutional promise of transparency is not eroded.
Shivam Jadaun is a Delhi-based lawyer and tech consultant specialising in technology policy.