The Indian civil justice system’s execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) have transformed into a second adversarial contest that often proves more arduous than the original trial itself.
The Supreme Court characterised this situation in October 2025 in Periyammal v. Rajamani as a travesty of justice when it noted that 8.82 lakh execution petitions remain pending despite a mandatory six-month disposal timeline established in earlier directions.
This staggering backlog represents nearly a million litigants who possess judicial mandates but remain deprived of actual relief due to a combination of legislative gaps and procedural abuse.
The transformation of execution into a second trial occurs primarily through the misuse of Section 47 of the CPC, which was designed to ensure that all questions relating to execution are determined by the executing court rather than through separate suits. Despite the legislative mandate to curb the multiplicity of proceedings by centralising post-decree disputes, judgment debtors frequently exploit Section 47 to obstruct execution by challenging the decree on grounds of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt Ltd in 2025 had to specifically clarify that objection petitions under Section 47 should not be treated as the commencement of a new trial.
The problem deepens through the mechanism of third-party objections under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 of the CPC. Rule 97 allows a decree holder to complain of resistance while Rule 99 permits a third party who claims to be dispossessed to file objections. Rule 101 effectively transforms the execution proceeding into a substantive title suit by mandating the adjudication of complex rights claims, thereby forcing the decree-holder to excruciatingly re-prove their ownership against third-party claimants often acting as mere fronts for the judgment debtor. This creates a Russian Doll, effect where a suit exists within a suit and the summary nature of execution is completely lost.
The Supreme Court's order in Periyammal v. Rajamani revealed that despite disposing of 3.38 lakh execution petitions between March and October 2025, the total pending cases remained at 8.82 lakh due to continuous new filings and the reopening of dormant files. Data from the National Judicial Data Grid also shows that the unavailability of counsel accounts for 38.9 per cent of delays. Lawyers don't prioritise execution hearings, viewing them as post-judgment administrative work with lower fees.
Interim stay orders granted by appellate courts contribute to 17 per cent of the paralysis, causing cases to languish for years. Administrative delays in obtaining records and warrants from the nazir's office account for another 12 per cent of the backlog.
The Commercial Courts Act of 2015 modernises the adjudicatory phase through Section 16 and its Schedule by introducing strict timelines for written statements under Order VIII Rule 1 and mandatory case management hearings under Order XV-A. It also introduced summary judgment procedures under Order XIII-A that allow courts to decide claims without recording oral evidence when there is no real prospect of defence. These reforms accelerated the first trial and the specified value threshold of ₹3 lakh brought a vast number of disputes into this fast-track system.
However, a critical examination of the Schedule reveals that Order XXI governing execution was completely omitted from the amendments. Since Section 16 applies only the amended CPC provisions listed in the Schedule, commercial decrees are executed using the same 1908 procedures as regular civil decrees. The Kerala High Court in Karthik Exports v. Krishna Kumar Agarwal noted this gap and observed that Section 16 does not touch Order XXI at all. This means a commercial litigant may obtain a summary judgment within six months, but then enters the 8.82 lakh backlog queue for execution, given the antiquated procedures.
The institutional machinery for execution remains fundamentally weak and overburdened. Unlike police officers, the nazir and bailiffs under his supervision are unarmed and often face physical resistance during execution attempts. The low hierarchical status and lack of oversight make the system prone to corruption, with reports of bailiffs colluding with judgment debtors to file false reports of non-service. The same office handles routine summons service and complex asset attachments without any specialised financial training to trace digital assets or manage commercial insolvencies. The sheriff system in metropolitan courts like Mumbai and Kolkata fares no better, as the office has become largely ceremonial with actual execution work delegated to deputy sheriffs who suffer from the same bureaucratic lethargy.
There is a sharp contrast between enforcement systems in India and those in other common law jurisdictions where execution officers possess real coercive authority. The United Kingdom reformed its execution system through the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007 by replacing sheriff's officers with High Court Enforcement Officers, who are private companies authorised by the Lord Chancellor. These officers are paid by results through fees added to the debt recovered, which creates a powerful economic incentive to execute writs of control quickly. They possess extensive powers of entry into commercial premises and can seize goods immediately while operating round the clock using modern tracking technology.
Similarly, Singapore maintains a state-run system but optimises it through tight integration with case management, where bailiffs are empowered to enter premises forcefully if needed to seize assets. The system enforces strict timelines and the courts rigorously apply the abuse of process doctrine to dismiss frivolous objections. If execution fails, the transition to bankruptcy or winding up proceedings is seamless. These examples demonstrate that effective execution requires either privatised incentive structures or highly efficient state machinery with real enforcement powers.
The Supreme Court's observation in 1872 in General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Singh that the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree remains accurate more than 150 years later. In 2013, the Supreme Court in Satyawati v. Rajinder Singh noted that the position has not improved since 1872 when it dealt with a decree for possession obtained in 1996 that remained unexecuted in 2013 due to frivolous objections. In 2021, the Court in Rahul S Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi issued 14 mandatory directions including asset disclosure before passing decrees and a 6-month timeline for execution disposal, but these judicial directions have proven insufficient without legislative and infrastructure support.
The path to meaningful reform requires multiple structural interventions. Specialised execution cells must be established as distinct administrative units, headed by recovery officers with judicial or quasi-judicial rank who are separate from trial judges. This separation recognises that adjudication requires a hearing mindset while execution requires an enforcement mindset. The Commercial Courts Act must be amended to include Order XXI in its Schedule and introduce summary execution procedures for commercial decrees. Section 47 should be amended for commercial disputes to require a mandatory deposit of 75 per cent of the decretal amount before any objection is entertained.
Additionally, High Courts must exercise their supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution through proactive monthly audits of execution pendency with administrative consequences for chronic delays by specific judges or nazirs. India should also explore allowing registered and regulated private enforcement agencies to execute civil decrees for possession and asset seizure following a hybrid model inspired from other common law jurisdictions.
The civil justice system must reaffirm that the decree is the culmination and not the beginning of justice. The execution court must represent closure rather than continuity of litigation. Justice delayed in execution is justice erased in effect and this erosion should alarm everyone committed to the rule of law.
Himal Akhtar is an advocate and former Vice-Chairman, Bar Council of Delhi.
Mohammad Asif is an advocate practicing before the Delhi High Court.