This article is the first in a three-part series on judicial transformation based on the experience of PUCAR (Public Collective for Avoidance and Resolution of Disputes) as a Knowledge Partner to the Kerala High Court for India's first 24x7 online court, 24x7 ON Court Kollam.

Those of us invested in judicial reform have been animated by a single question: how do we move cases faster? The answers we reach for are naturally process oriented - e-filing, automated scrutiny, AI-assisted listing. While these are important, they treat the courtroom as a conveyor belt to be optimised, without asking what is actually on it.

A litigant-centric approach demands that we look at who is inside these cases and why.

Why does one accused party settle within weeks while another stalls for years? Why does a complainant with airtight evidence still struggle to close a case?

The answers are rarely in the legal domain. They are  human - shaped by financial pressure, fear, pride and, in some cases, deliberate manipulation of the process itself.

At the centre of every dispute is a human being with a specific motivation: to delay, to settle fast, to harass, or simply to disappear. Until we understand why people behave the way they do, we will keep optimising the raft while ignoring the current that actually moves it.

Cheque dishonour disputes are about as simple as court cases get. A cheque bounced; money is owed. And yet, even here, a year of close observation surprised us: there is not one kind of litigant, but four; each with different motivations, each needing a different response from the system.

1. The delayer

This litigant is not evading obligation; they’re managing constraints. Facing financial hardship, their goal is to buy time to arrange money or negotiate waivers or discounts. Limited resources, fear of penalties and concerns about loss of dignity shape their behaviour. Most of them would rather settle informally than face legal consequences. 

Reflecting this trend, approximately 84% of the cheque dishonour cases filed through the 24x7 online court platform ON Court are resolved through mutual settlements. A small number proceed to trial and settle just before a judgment is delivered. In mediation, the best outcome for an accused usually involves repaying the discounted principal within three months, often with waived interest. 

For a complainant, recovering sooner even at a discount is often a priority. Court processes should, therefore, incentivise earlier settlement - creating legitimate, transparent mechanisms from the moment the magistrate takes cognizance. For instance, allowing complainants to signal openness to pre-packaged settlements at filing could offer the accused an extended repayment window (5–6 months). This could come with an assurance to the complainant that non-payment triggers swift escalation (warrant issuance and/or higher bail amounts).

The delayer also responds to clarity. Knowing that voluntary early appearance means lower bail and fewer hearings - and that continued delay escalates predictably - can shift the calculus. Certainty of consequence often matters more than severity.

2. The honest closer

For this litigant, the dispute shouldn’t exist at all. Armed with proof of repayment - receipt, a bank transfer, a cleared transaction - they want one thing: swift closure without even entering a courtroom. 

They want to communicate directly with the complainant and resolve the dispute. The problem is access. 70% of cheque dishonour cases filed through ON Court are by banks or institutional lenders. The honest closer has usually only dealt with agents or sales  representatives. If they want to reach out to the bank to show payment was made or clarify, there is no straightforward way to do so. They visit the branch, where no one has authority to act. Sometimes, even lawyers do not pass on the message. The case stays alive in court, not because there is a real dispute, but because the right people never spoke to each other.

A simple fix: enable the honest closer to connect directly to the appropriate person as early as possible to resolve the dispute. This could mean sending an SMS to the honest closer when the case is registered with the phone number or email of the complainant (not just their lawyer). It can also be included in the summons. Direct contact empowers swift resolution, eases the court’s workload and ensures verified cases are not held up by process friction.

3. The coercive claimant

This litigant weaponises litigation. They exploit legal actions to harass. They can be  informal lenders who fill in blank cheques for amounts exceeding what is owed, or parties in soured personal relationships who misrepresent facts to wear down the accused. They will not settle; prolonged proceedings are the point.

Distinguishing legitimate claims from malicious ones presents a significant challenge for the judicial system. Implementing case screening or robust early-stage evaluations of evidence could inadvertently burden bona fide claims. Allowing early communication from the accused can enable this understanding. Where claims are proven frivolous, the court should impose costs or penalties. This deters abuse and gives victims a defence against the experience of “the process is the punishment.”

4. The evasive debtor

Faced with a debt they cannot repay and a system they do not trust, the evasive debtor makes a rational and often self-defeating choice to disappear. They ignore summonses, evade warrants, switch SIM cards, relocate. Some attempt to bribe police officers to avoid detection. The court expends enormous time and resources pursuing them, usually without success.

The system currently offers the evasive debtor exactly two options: appear and face a judgment they cannot meet, or disappear and eventually face an arrest. These options equally do not work for a complainant who simply wants their money back and for a court that has better things to do than chase people across districts.

What is missing is a third pathway. A voluntary appearance window early in proceedings without immediate punitive consequence could reach those paralysed by fear. For those who genuinely cannot repay, access to financial counselling or a structured repayment conversation at first appearance transforms showing up from a moment of judgment into a moment of possibility. In some cases, in-kind contribution or community service as a partial resolution pathway offers a face-saving, practical alternative for someone with no liquidity.

People are more likely to engage with a system that acknowledges their constraints than one that simply escalates against them. 

Each archetype demands a different response. A delayer needs a legitimate off-ramp. An honest closer needs a direct line. A coercive claimant needs early scrutiny. An evasive debtor needs a reason to show up. None of this requires new legislation or grand technology. The interventions described here - an SMS with a phone number, a voluntary appearance window, a cost imposed on a frivolous claim - are changes any court could make tomorrow.

Most judges and lawyers already know these people; they walk through the door every day. Looking for solutions through the lens of archetypes can help us make changes designed for the person, not the case. These small, precise changes designed around the litigant can have a disproportionate impact on how justice is actually experienced.

Supriya Sankaran is the co-founder of Agami and PUCAR.

Siddarth Raman is Senior Research Lead at XKDR Forum.