Any custom or restriction curtailing the right of a female to alienate a non-ancestral property inherited by her from her husband is inherently discriminatory, the Punjab and Haryana High Court recently held [Mohd. Ashraf and Another v Sadiq (Since Deceased) through his LRs and Others]

Justice Virinder Aggarwal made the observation while setting aside two concurrent verdicts of a trial court and a first appellate court in a land inheritance dispute dating back to 1982. 

The trial court had disinherited a woman, one Rehmani, on the basis of the customary rights prevailing in the Meo ethnic group of the Mewat region. It was stated that a Meo widow is entitled only to a life interest in the property belonging to her father or husband.

However, the High Court ruled that a limitation founded solely upon gender or marital status cannot withstand the scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which mandates equality before law and prohibits arbitrary or unreasonable classifications.

“Consequently, any such fetter on a woman’s right to deal with her independently inherited property must be held to be constitutionally impermissible, legally unsustainable, and devoid of binding effect,” the Court ruled.

At the heart of the dispute was the land measuring 42 kanals and 19 marlas in Haryana’s erstwhile Gurgaon district. It belonged to one Akkala, a Meo Muslim. After his death, his wife Rehmani in 1982 executed a registered sale deed to sell the property.

However, her authority was challenged by Akkala’s nephew who argued that the transaction was null and void. He argued that since Akkala had no children, he was entitled to possession of the land after Rehmani’s death and thus any transaction could not have taken place without his consent. 

A sub-judge 1st Class ruled against Rehmani. The verdict was later upheld by Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, leading to filing of a second appeal before the High Court in 1996.

In the verdict dated January 22, the High Court considered whether a Meo widow has the right to alienate non-ancestral property, in light of Wajib-ul-arz, which is the village record of existing customs regarding rights and liabilities in the estate.

The first appellate court, while relying upon a 1969 precedent, ruled that powers of alienation vested in a widow are inherently restricted, both in respect of ancestral and non-ancestral property.

However, the High Court in the present ruling opined that any reference to “property” in the Wajib-ul-arz is to be construed as reference to ancestral property alone and not to property of a non-ancestral character. 

“Furthermore, this Court has consistently adopted a pragmatic, progressive, and constitutionally aligned approach while examining customary restrictions on the rights of women in matters of alienation of property. It has been unequivocally held that any custom which seeks to curtail, dilute, or abrogate the proprietary rights of a female exclusively on the basis of religion, gender, or sex-based classification is inherently vulnerable to challenge and cannot withstand the constitutional mandate of equality enshrined under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India,” the judge added.

Thus, the High Court ruled that the courts below had failed to appreciate the material evidence in its correct legal perspective. It also noted that Rehmani had sold the property for bonafide use of her granddaughter. 

“Though Janvi was not proved to be the biological daughter of Akkal, the record unmistakably establishes that she was indeed the daughter of Smt. Rehmani. The impugned alienation was, thus, effected not for purposes relatable to the estate of the deceased husband but solely for the bona fide and pressing needs of Smt. Rehmani herself, particularly for meeting the marriage expenses of her granddaughter, the daughter of Janvi a fact duly proved on record,” it held.

The Court added that once the property is held to be non-ancestral, and the sale is shown to be for a legally recognized necessity of the owner, the transaction cannot be declared void merely for want of the consent of the collateral.

Resultantly, the appeal against the trial court decree and the decision of the first appellate court was allowed. 

“The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are set aside, and the suit instituted by the respondent–plaintiff stands dismissed,” the High Court ordered. 

Senior Advocate Ashish Aggarwal with advocate Vishan Pundir appeared for the appellants. 

Senior Advocate ML Sarin with advocate Hemani Sarin appeared for respondents.

[Read Judgment]