Can a party that has lost in arbitration still seek interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? Or does the passing of an arbitral award narrow the scope of “a party”—a term the legislature has consciously left unqualified so as to confine post-award relief only to the award-holder? These questions are far from academic. They go to the core of arbitration jurisprudence, testing the limits of judicial interpretation and whether courts may read restrictions into a statute that the legislature itself has chosen not to impose.
This question crystalised in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi (2026 SCC OnLine SC 670), where the apex court was poised with the question, whether a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) at the post-award stage, preferred by an unsuccessful party with no enforceable award in its favour, is maintainable. The case thus squarely presented a clash between two competing approaches: one that views post-award interim relief as a mechanism solely to preserve the “fruits of the award” for the successful party, and another that recognises the statutory right to seek interim measures as continuing to vest in every party to the arbitration agreement, regardless of the outcome.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention, High Courts across the country had taken sharply divergent views on this issue. The Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd. (2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481), the Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee, Commonwealth Games (2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834) and National Highways Authority of India v. Punjab National Bank (2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810), as well as the Madras High Court in A. Chidambaram v. S. Rajagopal (OA No. 843 of 2024), held that an unsuccessful party in arbitration could not maintain a petition under Section 9. These decisions were premised on the view that, since proceedings under Section 34 ultimately result in either setting aside or upholding the award, post-award interim relief is intended to preserve the fruits of the award pending enforcement and should therefore be confined to the successful party.
In contrast, the Telangana High Court in Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management (2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765), the Gujarat High Court in GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd. (2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836), and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (FAO-CARB-51-2024 (O&M) adopted the opposite view, holding that even an unsuccessful party is entitled to seek interim protection under Section 9.
In order to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court was required to closely examine the text of the statute, the overall scheme of the Act, and the legislative intent underlying it. Before the Supreme Court, the primary argument against the maintainability of the Section 9 petition by the unsuccessful party was rooted in the idea that arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process that culminates in a final and binding award, subject only to limited challenge under Section 34 of the Act. From this perspective, although Section 9 empowers courts to grant interim measures at different stages, it should not be interpreted in a way that weakens or undermines the finality of an arbitral award. This line of reasoning was most clearly articulated by the Bombay High Court in Dirk India (supra), where it held that Section 9 is intended to protect the benefits arising from a successful outcome in arbitration, and therefore, post-award relief should be confined to the award-holder.
The Supreme Court rejected the restrictive approach adopted by several High Courts and held that Section 9 relief remains available to any party to the arbitration agreement, even at the post-award stage. Its reasoning can be distilled into four key points:
1. The meaning of "a party" cannot be contextually modulated
The Court emphasised that statutory interpretation must begin with the text. Section 9 uses the expression “a party,” which is defined under Section 2(h) as any party to the arbitration agreement. The statute draws no distinction between successful and unsuccessful parties. Reading such a limitation into the provision would amount to judicial rewriting, which is impermissible.
The object of incorporating definitions within a statute is to assign a precise and particular meaning to terms in that enactment. To assign a different meaning to "a party" depending on whether interim measures are sought before or after the award would result in an anomaly: before the award, the term would encompass all parties, whereas after the award, it would acquire a narrower connotation referring only to the successful party. The statutory framework prescribes no such qualification.
2. Scope and structure of Section 9
Section 9 allows interim measures at three stages—before arbitration, during proceedings, and after the award but before enforcement. The provision, on its face, does not restrict who may apply at any stage. Notably, Indian law goes beyond the UNCITRAL Model Law by expressly permitting post-award relief, reflecting a conscious legislative expansion without imposing any corresponding limitation on parties.
3. Sections 34 and 36 operate in distinct spheres from Section 9
The availability of remedies under Sections 34 and 36 does not bar recourse to Section 9. These provisions operate in different spheres: while Sections 34 and 36 address the validity and enforceability of the award, Section 9 is concerned with protecting the subject matter of the dispute. Denying such protection could leave a party without an effective remedy.
The Court also envisaged several situations where an unsuccessful party may require interim protection for instance, where an award has been rendered without proper notice to a party, or where a party can prima facie demonstrate that the award was induced or tainted by fraud or corruption. Similarly, where an unsuccessful party had obtained interim protection during arbitral proceedings such as restraining invocation of a bank guarantee, the immediate removal of such protection upon rendition of the award may result in irreversible prejudice pending adjudication under Section 34.
4. Practical and purposive interpretation
The Court recognised that even an unsuccessful party may require interim protection in certain situations—such as where the award is prima facie vitiated by fraud, lack of notice, or where lifting existing interim safeguards could cause irreversible harm pending a Section 34 challenge. In sum, the Hon’ble Court held that “a party” must be understood uniformly across all stages, preserving access to interim relief without tying it to the outcome of the arbitration.
Home Care Retail Marts (supra) is more than a resolution of a long-standing conflict. It is a reaffirmation of the primacy of statutory text, judicial discipline, and party autonomy in arbitration. Its significance extends well beyond the narrow issue, reshaping the broader framework of post-award remedies.
Statutory text as the starting point: At its core, the judgment reinforces a simple yet often overlooked principle: the legislature means what it says. For over a decade, various High Courts had read into Section 9 to mean that “a party” must mean only a successful party at the post-award stage—an assumption that found no basis in the statutory text. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Home Care Retail Marts (supra) restores interpretive discipline, emphasising that in a self-contained code like the Act, the inquiry must begin and end with the language of the statute.
Moving beyond the winner-loser binary: The decision also moves the law beyond the rigid binary of “winner” and “loser.” An unsuccessful party today may yet succeed in proceedings under Section 34. Denying interim protection during this interim phase, when assets may be dissipated or rights irreversibly affected, could render such eventual success meaningless.
Access vs. Entitlement: At the same time, the Court draws a clear line between access and entitlement. While the right to invoke Section 9 remains open to all parties, relief is far from automatic. An unsuccessful party must meet a high threshold: demonstrating compelling circumstances, irreparable harm, and a clear nexus between the relief sought and the preservation of the dispute pending challenge. Section 9, in this sense, operates not as a broad gateway, but as a carefully calibrated safety valve.
From a practical standpoint, the ruling calls for a recalibration of post-award strategy. Award-holders can no longer assume exclusive access to interim protection and must be prepared to resist applications that may undermine the finality of the award. Conversely, unsuccessful parties now have a remedy that was previously unavailable in several jurisdictions but one that must be invoked with precision and restraint.
Ultimately, Home Care Retail Marts (supra) affirms a clear and powerful proposition: Section 9 is not a reward for success in arbitration, but a statutory right flowing from party status under the arbitration agreement. Its purpose is to preserve the integrity of the dispute resolution process until its judicial culmination. In doing so, the Supreme Court has brought statutory text, legislative intent, and judicial interpretation into alignment settling a question that had remained divided for over a decade.
About the authors: Angad Varma is a Partner, Nikhil Mehndiratta is a Principal Associate and Nidhisha Choksi is an Associate at Dua Associates.
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