Can fugitive economic offenders claim access to justice?

The recent proceedings involving Sanjay Bhandari before the Delhi High Court have brought renewed attention to a constitutional question: can a person who deliberately avoids the jurisdiction of Indian courts continue to invoke the protection of those very courts?

The issue assumes particular significance in the context of Section 14 of the Fugitive Economic Offenders (FEO) Act, 2018, which empowers courts and tribunals to disentitle a declared fugitive economic offender from pursuing or defending civil claims in India.

The issue presents a difficult constitutional conflict. On one hand, access to justice is recognised as an integral part of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the legal system also expects individuals to respect and submit to the judicial process. The FEO Act seeks to address this tension by balancing the right to legal remedies with the need to preserve the authority and effectiveness of courts.

Access to justice has been recognised as a part of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, as was held by the Supreme Court in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan. Justice VR Krishna Iyer in his article titled Appointments and Disappointments, published in the Hindu on 10 October 2003, aptly captured this principle when he wrote that “access to justice is basic to human rights” and that constitutional promises remain illusory unless people possess an effective means to approach courts and secure the benefits of law and justice.

Indian jurisprudence has consistently sought to expand the reach of justice through principles such as the presumption of innocence in criminal law and ubi jus ibi remedium in civil law, ensuring that every legal right is accompanied by an enforceable remedy. Procedural safeguards, legal aid, right to fair hearing and representation for indigent persons collectively reflect the commitment to ensure that no person is denied access to justice on account of disadvantage or incapacity.

Yet, constitutional rights do not operate in isolation from constitutional responsibilities. A legal system cannot function effectively if litigants selectively invoke judicial remedies while simultaneously refusing to submit to judicial process.

This tension becomes particularly visible in cases involving economic offences. Unlike ordinary accused persons, fugitive economic offenders often possess the financial capacity to restructure commercial interests, relocate assets across jurisdictions and prolong proceedings through transnational litigation. Delay in such matters may frustrate investigations, weaken asset recovery mechanisms and undermine public confidence in institutions responsible for financial regulation and criminal enforcement.

It is to address such contingencies that parliament enacted the FEO Act in 2018. The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that the legislature was conscious of the fact that in several instances, economic offenders flee the jurisdiction of the Indian courts anticipating the commencement of criminal proceedings or some times during the pendency such proceedings. Therefore, the Act was enacted as it was felt that the existing provisions of civil and criminal law are not adequate to deal with the severity of a problem. [Sanjay Bhandari v. Enforcement Directorate (2024)]

Under the said statute, a person may be declared a fugitive economic offender upon satisfaction of certain conditions, including that a warrant of arrest has been issued in respect of a scheduled offence, the value involved exceeds ₹100 crore and the individual has refused to return to India to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts. [See Section 2(1)(a), 2(1)(m) and 4, FEO Act.]  Upon such declaration, the statute contemplates serious consequences, including the disentitlement of the individual from pursuing civil remedies. [See Section 14, FEO Act.] The statute has already been invoked against several high-profile economic offenders. As noted in the annual report of the ED, over the past seven years, a total of 21 individuals have been declared fugitive economic offenders including Nirav Modi, Vijay Mallya, Sanjay Bhandari and Hajra Iqbal Memon, the spouse of the late Iqbal Mirchi.

It is in this backdrop that the order dated April 24, 2026 passed by the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Bhandari v. Directorate of Enforcement. The matter arose from an appeal challenging a 2023 order dated passed by the PMLA Appellate Tribunal.

In the order under reference, the Delhi High Court, for the first time, declined to entertain an appeal by placing reliance on Section 14(a) of the said Act, which empowers any court or tribunal in India to disallow a fugitive economic offender from putting forward or defending any civil claim. The significance of the proceedings becomes more apparent when viewed alongside the judgement dated April 9, 2026 passed by the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Bhandari vs Directorate of Enforcement. The High Court dismissed a statutory appeal filed u/s 17 of the said Act challenging the judgment of July 2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (CBI) whereby the appellant was declared a fugitive economic offender. The proceedings raised an important question concerning the scope and operation of Section 14 of the FEO Act and its effect on the right of a declared fugitive economic offender to pursue legal remedies before Indian courts.

The issue is not free from constitutional complexity. Critics may argue that disentitlement provisions risk creating a form of procedural exclusion inconsistent with the broad guarantee of access to justice under Article 21. However, it can be stated that Section 14 of the Act embodies a strong legislative intent to prevent abuse of the civil adjudicatory process by individuals who have been declared fugitive economic offenders. The underlying principle appears to be that the administration of justice cannot function effectively unless litigants are willing to submit themselves to the authority of the legal process.

These concerns raise an important question of proportionality. While preventing absconding economic offenders from frustrating investigations is undoubtedly a legitimate State objective and disentitlement bears a rational nexus to securing compliance with judicial authority, the broader issue is whether a complete bar on civil remedies may, in certain cases, operate disproportionately.

Comparative jurisprudence also indicates that restrictions on access to judicial remedies by absconders are not unique to India. In the United States, courts have developed the “Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine”, under which fugitives who deliberately evade criminal proceedings may, in certain circumstances, be denied the benefit of appellate or civil remedies. The Supreme Court of the United States in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States has explained the doctrine on both enforceability and deterrence-based considerations: 1) when a person is a fugitive, there is no assurance that a court’s judgment will be enforceable, and 2) dismissal of an appeal after the defendant has fled the court’s jurisdiction “serves an important deterrent function and advances an interest in efficient, dignified appellant practice.”

The position under Section 14 of the Indian statute is comparatively broader and more categorical. Unlike the discretionary American model, the Indian law statutorily empowers courts to deny civil remedies once a person is declared as a fugitive economic offender. This reflects a stricter institutional response to economic fugitivity, particularly in view of the increasing complexity of cross-border financial crimes.

At the same time, the broader constitutional philosophy underlying such restrictions is not unfamiliar to Indian law. Indian courts have consistently refused equitable relief to litigants who abuse judicial process, suppress material facts, or seek to approbate and reprobate simultaneously. In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India strongly deprecated attempts by litigants to pollute the stream of justice through dishonest conduct. The principle that the process of law cannot be invoked by those who consciously evade it has long remained embedded within Indian jurisprudence.

Section 14 carries this principle into the specialised context of economic offences. The provision proceeds on the premise that disentitlement is regulatory rather than punitive in nature. Its object is not to extinguish legal rights altogether, but to preserve the authority, efficacy and sanctity of judicial institutions against persons who deliberately evade their jurisdiction.

Viewed from this perspective, the recent approach adopted by the Delhi High Court represents more than a procedural development under a special statute. It reflects a broader view that constitutional rights cannot be used to defeat the very system of constitutional governance. While access to justice remains a core principle of Indian democracy, its legitimacy depends equally on respect for the authority of law.

The majesty of law, therefore, lies not only in recognising rights, but also in ensuring that such rights are exercised within the discipline of the legal process.

Mayank Makhija is an Assistant Legal Advisor & Special Public Prosecutor for the Directorate of Enforcement.

Naman Sharma is a student at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur.

Views are personal.