Equality under the UGC’s 2026 Regulations: A problem of regulatory design

The persistence of caste-based discrimination within Indian higher education is not a contested proposition. It is a structural reality, documented across institutions and regions, and repeatedly acknowledged in constitutional jurisprudence and public discourse.

Any regulatory framework governing universities must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that caste discrimination requires active, institutional redress. To question that premise would be to disregard India’s unfortunate social experience.

The University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 are evidently framed with this concern in mind. Their preamble records the Commission’s determination to eradicate discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth and disability. Their stated objective is to promote equity and inclusion in higher education, with particular attention to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, socially and educationally backward classes, economically weaker sections and persons with disabilities. At the level of intent, therefore, the Regulations seek to advance a familiar and constitutionally endorsed agenda.

The difficulty lies not in this intention, but in how it is operationalised through the structure and drafting of the Regulations. A close reading suggests that the 2026 framework adopts a narrow and internally inconsistent conception of equality - one that sits uneasily with its stated objectives and with established approaches to discrimination in education.

The conceptual core of the Regulations lies in the definition of “discrimination” under Regulation 3(e). Discrimination is defined as any unfair, differential or biased treatment against a stakeholder, whether explicit or implicit, “on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, disability, or any of them”. The definition then states that it includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference that has the purpose or effect of impairing equality of treatment in education, particularly where such treatment is incompatible with human dignity.

Two aspects of this formulation warrant attention. First, the use of the phrase “on the grounds only of” signals an enumerated and closed list of protected categories. On its face, the definition confines legally cognisable discrimination to the specified grounds. This is significant because several forms of disadvantage that are recognised elsewhere in the Regulations do not find place in this list. Economic vulnerability, despite the express reference to economically weaker sections in the objectives, is excluded from the definition. Language and ethnicity - both of which have historically operated and continue to operate as axes of exclusion within educational institutions - are similarly absent. Discrimination against students from the North-Eastern States illustrates the difficulty this creates. Such exclusion frequently operates on the basis of ethnic identity, appearance, language and regional origin.

Indian equality jurisprudence has not developed a settled understanding of “race” that clearly subsumes these forms of discrimination; the Regulations do not expressly recognise ethnicity or language as protected grounds. In this context, reliance on race to capture such harms renders protection uncertain. Similar concerns arise in relation to discrimination against non-Hindi-speaking students studying in institutions in North India and vice versa. In this backdrop, the definition would, at least prima facie, exclude from its protective scope forms of discrimination that are well documented and far from hypothetical.

Secondly, while the latter part of the definition hints towards an effects-based understanding of discrimination, its relationship with the opening portion is unclear. It is possible to argue that the reference to distinctions or exclusions that impair equality of treatment could encompass a wider range of discriminatory practices. However, the preceding insistence on discrimination being “on the grounds only of” the listed categories makes such an expansive interpretation uncertain. If the legislative intent is to adopt a broader conception of discrimination, that intention ought to be expressed with clarity, particularly when addressing a subject as sensitive and consequential as discrimination in higher education.

This narrow definition becomes more problematic when read alongside other provisions of the Regulations. Regulation 4, which sets out the duties of higher education institutions, requires every institution to eradicate discrimination, promote equity among stakeholders and take protective and preventive measures to safeguard interests “without any prejudice to their caste, creed, religion, language, ethnicity, gender, or disability”. Regulation 4(2) further provides that no institution shall permit or condone any form of discrimination.

Similarly, Regulation 7 mandates that students, faculty and staff furnish undertakings to promote equity and refrain from indulging in any form of discrimination. These provisions adopt an expansive formulation, both in terms of the grounds referenced and the breadth of the duties imposed.

The difficulty is that these broad institutional obligations are tethered to a definition of discrimination that is considerably narrower. Language and ethnicity, explicitly mentioned in Regulation 4, are excluded from the definition in Regulation 3(e). Economic vulnerability, highlighted in the objectives, is similarly absent. The result is a regulatory disjunction: institutions are required to eradicate “any form of discrimination”, but the framework offers a limited account of what discrimination legally entails. This raises questions about coherence, enforceability and the scope of remedial protection available under the Regulations.

The narrowing of the equality framework becomes more apparent when the 2026 Regulations are compared with the regime they supersede. The University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2012 adopted a broader conception of discrimination. Discrimination was defined as any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference that impaired equality of treatment in education, including deprivation of access or the imposition of conditions incompatible with human dignity, on grounds that expressly included caste, creed, religion, language, ethnicity, gender and disability. The 2012 Regulations also specifically highlighted segregation and separate educational arrangements as forms of discrimination, alongside many other clear examples.

The earlier framework thus emphasised effects, dignity and structural exclusion, rather than confining protection to a closed set of categories.

It has been suggested that the Regulations permit caste-based segregation in hostels or classrooms. Regulation 7(d), however, requires that any selection, segregation or allocation for academic or residential purposes be transparent, fair and non-discriminatory. The provision appears directed at regulating existing administrative practices, rather than authorising segregation on prohibited grounds.

Similarly, the omission of an express reference to ragging has been read as a dilution of protections. While ragging is not specifically mentioned in the 2026 Regulations, it continues to be governed by separate UGC anti-ragging regulations. The absence of an explicit reference may raise concerns of coherence, but it does not, by itself, eliminate regulatory oversight of ragging.

The central concern raised by the 2026 Regulations is not their recognition of caste-based discrimination, but the manner in which equality is conceptualised and operationalised. If the objective is to promote equity in a substantive sense, regulatory design must reflect that ambition. This requires coherence between objectives, definitions and duties, as well as a conception of discrimination that is attentive to effects, dignity and lived experience.

Swapnil Tripathi leads Charkha, the Constitutional Law Centre at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.

Views are personal.