Delhi High Court judgment in Sushant Rohilla case: Worrisome or welcome?

The judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Re: Suicide Committed (sic) by Sushant Rohilla, Law Student of I.P. University pertaining to mandatory attendance norms for legal education in India has been the focus of attention in law schools over the past four months. The dominant interpretation of the judgment has been that the High Court of Delhi has done away with the mandatory attendance requirement in legal education institutions, whereas it is not so.

Over the years, operationalisation of the prescribed attendance requirement solely by barring students from appearing in the end semester examination is likely to have contributed to this dominant interpretation. The result has been to equate attendance requirement with the consequence of debarment from appearing in the exam. The Court in its judgment has outlawed the sole mandatory consequence for shortfall of attendance rather than the requirement of attendance itself.

The dominant interpretation has received mixed responses from students, academics and administrators. Students have variedly found it reassuring while navigating the thick and thin of life as well as generally relieving them of the compulsion of attending classes. The administrators found it alarming as it strikes at attendance and engagement between co-learners, which is integral to any form of education. Apparently, institutions have witnessed dwindling attendance since the pronouncement of the judgment. However, misinterpretation of the judgment, both by institutions and students, seems responsible for the same, rather than the judgment itself.

This article delineates the binding directions of the Court regarding attendance and demonstrates that its decision is welcome for all stakeholders, including students, rather than being worrisome.

The case arose out of the unfortunate incident that resulted in death of a student named Sushant Rohilla by suicide on August 10, 2016. He was pursuing a B.A. LL.B. degree from one of the private colleges affiliated to the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi. On August 20, 2016, a friend of Rohilla approached the Supreme Court through a letter in this regard. On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the High Court of Delhi. In the said letter, the friend alleged that “detention of the deceased student due to lack of attendance forced him to take this extreme step.”

In a number of interim orders, the Court not only issued directions to the concerned university but also to University Grants Commission (UGC) and the Ministry of Education, one of them being constitution of ‘Grievance Redressal Committees’ by all undergraduate and postgraduate level educational institutions. The Court pronounced its judgment in this matter on November 3, 2025.

While considering the requirement of mandatory attendance in institutions imparting legal education, the Court identified the following dimensions of the study of law: knowledge of the law (including jurisprudence), practical application of the law and implementation of the law. The Court maintained that holistic legal education necessitates “appreciation of all these three dimensions of the study of law.” Therefore, rules regulating legal education must take into consideration all these dimensions. The Court thus considered Rule 12 of the Legal Education Rules, 2008, laid down by the Bar Council of India (BCI).

The Court held that “the language of Rule 12 of Legal Education Rules, 2008 is extremely strict in nature and leaves no room for relaxation...there are no ameliorative measures for making up the attendance.” This conclusion of the Court is based on two grounds. Firstly, the Court regarded that the Legal Education Rules do not give “adequate flexibility and accommodation to activities like moot courts, seminars, practical training” etc despite their recognition as an essential component of legal education. This observation was made despite the fact that Rule 12 includes “moot court exercises, tutorials and practical training” in the calculation of attendance. Giving effect to the scope of the terms used in the Rule could have encouraged the Court to desist from this conclusion. On a broader reading, one finds multiple ways in which Rule 12 of the Legal Education Rules aligns with the UGC Regulations which the Court found flexible and encouraged BCI to consider.

The second ground relied on by the Court for holding Rule 12 as rigid is, however, stronger. It held that prescription of non-appearance in examination (detention as the first and the only consequence of lack of attendance) is rigid and reveals an “extremely non-pragmatic approach towards the study of law.” This led the Court to direct the BCI to “undertake a re-evaluation of the mandatory attendance norms.” It directed BCI to “incorporate modification of attendance norms,” “contemplate flexibility in attendance requirements” and consider “ameliorative measures” in its only direction to BCI. Modification, flexibility and amelioration pre-suppose the existence of some mandatory requirement. In the absence of the mandatory attendance requirement, these would be redundant. This direction of the Court clearly demonstrates its nuanced approach whereby it struck at the rigidity of the BCI Rule, rather than the requirement of mandatory attendance itself.

Pending the re-evaluation of attendance norms by the BCI, the Court barred preventing students from taking examinations on the ground of lack of minimum attendance, thereby outlawing the BCI prescribed mandatory consequence of non-fulfillment of attendance requirement.

The illustrative ameliorative measures delineated by the High Court further reinforce the aforementioned interpretation of the direction. These measures are geared towards calculation of attendance on the basis of actual classes held and offering opportunities to students to make up for the shortfall of attendance through conduct of extra classes, home assignments and practical work.

The seventh illustration of ameliorative measures provides that where despite the opportunities for fulfilling attendance requirement if “a student still does not qualify the prescribed attendance norms”, the final result of the student for the semester may entail grade reduction. The Court, therefore, suggested an alternative deterrent consequence in lieu of debarment from examination.

The Court’s approach was well suited to the kind of litigation and the issue before it. The approach adopted by the Court is akin to standpoint epistemology, which privileges the status of the victim and recognises that it gives access to understanding that others cannot have. Like the victim, the Court was keen on “finding out what is wrong.” The approach encourages questioning “accepted interpretation of reality and developing new and less distorted ways of understanding the world.” This approach reverses the priority that is generally attached to a distant “objective standpoint in favour of one of experience and engagement.” While taking note of the specific experience of the victim, the Court, in keeping with the demands raised by the nature of this litigation, considered varied “paradigms of human experiences”, thus casting its net wide while considering the issue.

Additionally, the Court did not adopt an interactional approach while considering the matter. In other words, rather than narrowing its focus on individual actions being responsible for the unfortunate death by suicide, it rather focused on one of the structural factors that contributed to the irreparable loss. The Court’s approach was tender to individuals while being unrelenting with respect to one of the structural aspects of the problem regarding Rule 12 of the Legal Education Rules. It questioned the kinds of possibilities the Rule left the institutions with, while dealing with each students variedly situated within complex realities and personal proclivities. The latter added a desirable another layer to the Court’s inquiry, especially on account of the wider question that the case raised. It allowed the Court to question the one-size fits all approach embedded in Rule 12 of the Legal Education Rules.

Firstly, the Court rightly refrained from doing away with the attendance requirement, thus recognising that classroom learning and engagement is crucial for meaningful study of law. Critical engagement with law, exploration of the frontiers of law, implications of law with respect to varied domains of human existence (social, economic, cultural etc), evaluation of historical development and theoretical assumptions of law undertaken in the classroom - irrespective of whether or not such engagement is demanded for the purpose of enactment, implementation or enforcement of law - makes classroom engagement indispensable. Further, varied contributions of academia in the field of law, both nationally and internationally, whether in the context of law-making, implementation or adjudication are also well known. 

Secondly, while recognising the significance of classroom learning, theCcourt did not lose sight of the context in which this learning takes place. In a country like India, which is marked by diversity, prescribing an extremely serious mandatory consequence for non-fulfillment of categorical attendance requirement is likely to be extremely debilitating and exclusionary. A sole, debilitating and mandatory consequence in the field of education runs counter to its mission.

The judgment of the High Court of Delhi does not only bring respite to students who may be struggling with mental health or suicidality, but is a welcome measure as it facilitates operationalisation of the mandate to ensure reasonable accommodation of students with disability in general. The judgment enables students with severe disability who may not always be able to attend five to six hours of classes scheduled one after the other each day, to pursue legal education, which must be welcomed. Illustrations may be multiplied, but the broader point is that the judgment aligns the rule with empirical realities and enables institutions to apply this flexible rule while being mindful of the heterogeneity within the student community. The Court recognises that institutions, being in direct contact of the students, are best placed to do so. Further, ameliorative measures suggested by the Court are intended to introduce flexibility rather than subversion of attendance requirement which may result if such measures are erroneously read as a comprehensive substitute for attendance. 

Finally, the Court suggested the consequence of deduction of marks as a last resort. However, as these ameliorative measures are only illustrative rather than being exhaustive, institutions may explore putting in place a system of incentives in this regard. The Court indicated the same in its observations dated August 21, 2024.

It is also desirable that a distinction is maintained between intentional absenteeism without any reasonable cause and absence on account of conditions beyond one’s control. While dealing with the former, institutions may envisage a graded response based on the principle of proportionality. It is now upon institutions to skillfully put in place a workable system which integrates endorsement of attendance as integral to imparting legal education and attendance calculation taking into account multiple dimensions of legal education, while ensuring reasonable accommodation of those struggling with conditions or circumstances beyond their control.

Dr. Amita Punj is a Professor at National Law University, Delhi and the Director of Centre for Law, Justice and Development.