The Supreme Court fortnightly: 15 important judgments - January 15 to 31, 2023

In this series, Bar & Bench will bring you the top 15 judgments/orders delivered by the Supreme Court of India every two weeks.Below are our picks for the last two weeks of January 2023..1. Release on default bail no bar on cancellation of bail on merits after chargesheet presentedCase Title: State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. T Gangi Reddy @ Yerra Gangi ReddyA division bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar held that the release of an accused person on default bail will not act as an absolute bar to consider a plea for cancellation of bail on merits after the presentation of the chargesheet.The bench held that a case for cancellation of default bail can be considered by the court if:- the defects for which default bail was granted is cured; - special and strong reasons are made out from the chargesheet filed subsequent to the enlargement that the accused has committed a non-bailable crime; and - considering the grounds set out in Section 437(5) and Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), bail can be cancelled on merits.The Court further held that the mere filing of a chargesheet cannot be taken as a ground to seek cancellation of default bail.The Court also underscored that when an accused had committed a serious, non-bailable offence, the Court cannot ignore such a factor as it would frustrate the ends of justice. " The Courts have the power to cancel the bail and to examine the merits of the case in a case where the accused is released on default bail and released not on merits earlier. Such an interpretation would be in furtherance to the administration of justice", the Court said. .2. Different pay scale based on difference in educational qualification and experience not violative of Article 14Case Title: Union of India and Others v. Rajib Khan and OthersA division bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar ruled that pay scale or structure of employees may vary based on educational qualification or experience, even though the nature of work may be more or less the same.The Court held that such difference in pay does not violate the right to equality guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution."Nature of work may be more or less the same but the scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. It is further held and observed that inequality of men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them," the Court observed..3. Jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 to interfere in disciplinary decisions limitedCase Title: Ex-Const/DVR Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India and OthersA division bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi held that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited when it comes to interference with punishments awarded in disciplinary proceedings by competent service authorities.The Court said that the High Court can only examine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer and whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with.Referring to various case laws on the subject, the Court said:"Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court or Tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with."Recounting the judgment in Om Kumar and Others v. Union of India (2001), the Court added:"The question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and ... concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with.".4. Child adopted by widow of deceased government servant not entitled to family pensionCase Title: Shri Ram Shridhar Chimurkar v. Union of India and AnotherA division bench of Justices KM Joseph and BV Nagarathna held that a child adopted by the spouse of a deceased government servant after the death of such an employee is not entitled to claim family pension.The Court ruled that such an adopted child cannot be included within the definition of ‘family’ under Rule 54(14)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 for claiming family pension."It is necessary that the scope of the benefit of family pension be restricted only to sons or daughters legally adopted by the government servant, during his/her lifetime ... the word “adoption” in Rule 54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of family pension, must be restricted to an adoption made by a government servant during his/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoption made by a surviving spouse of the government servant after his/her death," the judgment stated.The bench explained that family pension was devised as a means to help the dependents of the deceased government servant tide over the crisis and to give them some succor.The association of such dependents to the government servant must be direct and not remote. Persons who were not even dependents of the government servant at the time of his death cannot be included in the definition of 'family' under the Pension Rules, the Court said.The Court added that a child born to a deceased government servant after his death would be entitled to family pension. The position of such posthumous children is different from children adopted after the death of the government servant, the Court said..5. Chargesheet is not a public documentCase Title: Saurav Das v. Union of India and OthersA division bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar dismissed a plea to publish chargesheets filed by the police, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) in public domain and on government websites.The Court said that a chargesheet is not a 'public document' and cannot, therefore, be published online."Copy of the chargesheet along with the necessary documents cannot be said to be public documents within the definition of Public Documents as per Section 74 of the Evidence Act. As per Section 75 of the Evidence Act all other documents other than the documents mentioned in Section 74 of the Evidence Act are all private documents ... reliance placed upon Sections 74 & 76 of the Evidence Act is absolutely misplaced."The Court further ruled that putting chargesheets filed in criminal cases by investigating agencies, would be contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)." ... on conjoint reading of Section 173 Cr.P.C. and Section 207 Cr.P.C. the Investigating Agency is required to furnish the copies of the report along with the relevant documents to be relied upon by the prosecution to the accused and to none others. Therefore, if the relief as prayed in the present petition is allowed ... it may as such violate the rights of the accused as well as the victim and/or even the investigating agency. Putting the FIR on the website cannot be equated with putting the chargesheets along with the relevant documents on the public domain and on the websites of the State Governments", the judgment stated. On the petitioner's argument that under the Section 4 of Right to Information Act, public authorities are supposed to provide information suo motu, the bench said the same was misplaced as well."Copies of the chargesheet and the relevant documents along with the charge-sheet do not fall within Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act. Under the circumstances also the reliance placed upon Section 4(1)(2) of the RTI Act is also misconceived and misplaced", the Court added. .6. Conviction cannot be based solely on 'last seen' circumstanceCase Title: Jabir and Others v. State of UttarakhandA division bench of Justices S Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha, while acquitting three persons convicted for the murder of a 7-year-old boy, ruled that an accused cannot be convicted solely on the basis of 'last seen' circumstance.The Court was of the view that the 'last seen' doctrine has very limited application, if the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused and the time of murder, is narrow."It has been repeatedly emphasized by this court, that the “last seen” doctrine has limited application, where the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused, and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on the basis of the 'last seen' circumstance," the judgment said.The Court proceeded to acquit the appellants who had been convicted by the trial court for murder and kidnapping, after noting that there was no evidence against them except for the "last seen" theory. "Importantly, the time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused on 09-10-1999 and the probable time of his death ... is not narrow," the Court observed..7. Lapse of time between injuries and death does not diminish liability in murder casesCase Title: Prasad Pradhan and Another v. State of ChhattisgarhA division bench of Justices Krishna Murari and S Ravindra Bhat ruled that the liability of a murder accused will not be diminished merely because the death of the victim occurred after a considerable lapse of time from when he suffered injuries due to the acts of the accused.The Court opined that there can be no stereotypical assumption or formula to conclude that it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder only because the death occurred after a lapse of some time after incurring injuries."Every case has its unique fact situation. However, what is important is the nature of injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course to lead to death," the Court added.The Court stated that there are several judgments which "emphasize that a lapse of time, would not per se constitute a determinative factor as to diminish the offender’s liability from the offence of murder to that of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.""In Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, the death occurred 13 days after the attack; the accused was convicted of murder. Similarly, in Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, the death occurred a fortnight after the attack, and in Sudershan Kumar (supra), the death occurred 12 days after the attack", the bench recounted..8. Not necessary that every breach of promise to marry is false promiseCase Title: Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi)A division bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi held that it would be incorrect to treat each and every breach of promise to marry as a false promise and thereby prosecute a person for the offence of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).The Court was of the view that in a case of a breach of promise to marry, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry the prosecutrix, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise.The Court, therefore, acquitted a person convicted by the courts below for rape under such circumstances.The Court stated that in order for a case of false promise to be made out, the accused should not have had any intention to marry the victim right from the beginning and should have cheated or deceived the victim by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust.In case of breach of promise, the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry the victim, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances which prevented him to fulfill his promise, the Court explained. .9. Children estopped from claiming share in grandfather's self-acquired property if father has already relinquished his rightsCase Title: Elumalai @ Venkatesan and Another v. M Kamala and OthersA division bench of Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy held that children are estopped from claiming a share in the self-acquired property of their grandfather, if their father has already relinquished his rights in the said property for valuable consideration.The Court was of the view that the effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel.In this case, the appellant-children were claiming rights on their grandfather's self-acquired property. However, their father had already executed a release deed relinquishing all his rights from the said property.While analysing the affect of the release deed executed by the father, the Court looked into Sections 6 and 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and observed that a person who may become the heir and entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up.The Court noted that while the grandfather was alive, the father, who was a son from the grandfather's first marriage, would be at best be a spes successonis i.e., there was mere possibility of the appellants' father succeeding in the property.It was also noted by the Court that, unlike a co-parcener who acquires right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of the Hindu, there exists no such right. Therefore, the release deed may not by itself have the effect of a transfer of the rights.The Court noted that words in the release deed that 'hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation' appeared signify that the intention of the appellants' grandfather was to deny any claim to his son (the appellants' father) with respect to the property.It was also clarified by the Court that even if the appellants' father had survived his father, the conduct of executing the release deed accompanied by the receipt of consideration would have estopped him from acquiring any rights in the said property..10. Court strikes down Assam Rural Health Regulatory Authority Act which allowed diploma holders to treat certain diseasesCase Title: Baharul Islam v. Indian Medical AssociationA division bench of Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna struck down the Assam Rural Health Regulatory Authority Act of 2004 which had allowed diploma holders to treat certain diseases.The Court ruled that areas such as the prescription of minimum standards for higher education, authorities to recognise or de-recognise an institution etc. are areas over which the exclusive legislative competence to make law lies with the Parliament under Entry 66 List 1 of the Constitution, and not the State legislature.The State legislatures, on the other hand, under Entry 25 of List 3 of the Constitution, possess legislative competence to legislate with respect to all other aspects of education except the determination of minimum standards and coordination, the Court said.Hence, State legislature lacked the competence to prescribe minimum standards for medical education, the Court found."The Assam Act which seeks to regulate such aspects of medical education is therefore liable to be set aside on the ground that the State legislature lacks competence to legislate wrt the aspects enumerated above," the Court said.The Court also held that the the Assam Act was in conflict with the Central law, the Indian Medical Council Act."Hence, when there is a direct conflict between a State law and Union law, in a matter of coordination and determination of standards in higher education, State law cannot have any validity," the Court ruled..11. Temporary land acquisition cannot last for 20 years; violative of right to property under Article 300ACase Title: Manubhai Sendabhai Bharwad and Another v. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation and OthersA division bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar held that land owners can question temporary land acquisition processes if it has been pending for a long period.The Court said that such temporary acquisition cannot go on for 20 or 25 years since the value of the land would also have increased manifold since."If the land is continued to be under temporary acquisition for number of years, meaning and purpose of temporary acquisition would lose its significance. Temporary acquisition cannot be continued for approximately 20 to 25 years. It cannot be disputed that once the land is under temporary acquisition and the same is being used by the ONGC for oil exploration, it may not be possible for the landowners to use the land; to cultivate the same and/or to deal with the same in any manner," the Court observed.The bench stated that such acquisition would be arbitrary and violative of the right to property as guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution."Even to continue with the temporary acquisition for a longer period can be said to be unreasonable, infringing the rights of the landowners to deal with and/or use the land," the Court said..12. Courts, tribunals should not rely on WikipediaCase Title: HP India Sales Pvt Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (Import) Nhava ShevaA division bench of Justices Surya Kant and Vikram Nath cautioned courts and adjudicating authorities against reliance on online sources like Wikipedia.The Court also called upon courts to impress upon their counsel to depend on sources that are more authentic and reliable than Wikipedia since the online encyclopedia is a crowd-sourced one with user-generated edits.The Court made the observation after noting that in the case before it, the Commissioner of Customs (Appeal) and the Mumbai Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) had relied on the Wikipedia to support their findings."While we expressly acknowledge the utility of these platforms which provide free access to knowledge across the globe, but we must also sound a note of caution against using such sources for legal dispute resolution. We say so for the reason that these sources, despite being a treasure trove of knowledge, are based on a crowdsourced and user generated editing model that is not completely dependable in terms of academic veracity and can promote misleading information as has been noted by this court on previous occasions also," the Court said. .13. Presumption under Section 139 NI Act cannot be rebutted unless cogent evidence is led by accusedCase Title: Rajaram s/o Sriramulu Naidu (since deceased) through LRs v. Maruthachalam (since deceased) through LRsA division bench of Justices BR Gavai and MM Sundresh held that unless cogent evidence is led by the accused in defense of his case, the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 (NI Act) cannot be rebutted.The Court was of the view that the standard proof to rebut the presumption under section 139 NI Act is that of preponderance of probabilities.The Supreme Court also placed reliance on its decision in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) to observe that:"This Court has held that once the execution of cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the N.I. Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. It has however been held that the presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.".14. Court acquits two in 1985 murder case, says trial court and High Court failed to consider vital factorsCase Title: Munna Lal v. State of Uttar PradeshA division bench of Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta acquitted two men convicted decades ago in a 1985 murder case, finding that that they were and are entitled to the benefit of doubt.The Court found that there were lapses in the police investigation and that the trial court and High Court had failed to consider vital factors that hinted that the accused may have been falsely implicated.There were vital factors that unfortunately did not engage the attention of the courts below, the Supreme Court noted.The top court further highlighted that it was not giving weightage to the perfunctory police investigation alone in concluding that the accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt. Mere defects in the investigative process by itself cannot constitute grounds for acquittal, the Court acknowledged. Therefore, the Court examined the evidence on record in the case, in detail, to ascertain if the prosecution's allegations against the accused would stand.On such examination, the top court found that "there is a fair degree of uncertainty in the prosecution story" and that the courts below appeared to have been influenced primarily by the oral testimony of two witnesses, without considering the effect of other surrounding circumstances.Having considered such earlier ignored circumstances, the top court was of the view that the charge of murder against the accused-appellants was not proved beyond reasonable doubt..15. Court asks courts, tribunals to frame guidelines to ensure amounts deposited with them by litigants are kept only at banksCase Title: KL Suneja and Another v. Dr Manjeet Kaur MongaA division bench of Justices MR Shah and S Ravindra Bhat called for courts and tribunals across the country to frame guidelines to ensure that amounts deposited with them during the pendency of litigation are mandatorily kept in banks or other financial institutions.The Court observed that this was needed to avoid any possible loss."All courts and judicial forums should frame guidelines in cases where amounts are deposited with the office / registry of the court / tribunal, that such amounts should mandatorily be deposited in a bank or some financial institution, to ensure that no loss is caused in the future. Such guidelines should also cover situations where the concerned litigant merely files the instrument (Pay Order, Demand Draft, Banker’s Cheque, etc.) without seeking any order, so as to avoid situations like the present case," the Court said.Such guidelines should be in the form of appropriate rules or regulations of any forum exercising adjudicatory power, the bench added..1. Court denies interim relief to Google against CCI order imposing ₹1,337 crore penalty for abuse of dominanceCase Title: Google LLC and Another v. Competition Commission of India and OthersA three-judge bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices PS Narasimha and JB Pardiwala refused to grant interim relief to Google in its plea against a Competition Commission of India (CCI) order imposing a ₹1,337 crore penalty on it for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets in the Android mobile device ecosystem."We resist from entering into merits, since matter is pending in appeal by NCLAT. Findings arrived by CCI cannot be held to be without jurisdiction or manifest error at interlocutory stage. While we are not interfering with order of NCLAT, we request the tribunal to dispose off the appeal by March 31, 2023...We affirm the order of NCLAT declining interim relief," the Court ordered.The Court directed the parties to approach the NCLAT with a certified copy of its order with three days. Google was given an additional week's time to comply with the CCI order..2. Premature release of convict is function of governmentCase Title: Hitesh v. State of GujaratA three-judge bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice PS Narasimha and Justice JB Pardiwala observed that granting remission/premature release of a convict is the function of the government and not courts.The Court, therefore, directed the Gujarat State's competent authority to consider a request for premature release of the petitioner as per its 1992 policy."We are of the considered view that in respect of circumstances mete out, it should be reconsidered by state. Since grant of premature release is an executive action, the matter is fit to be reconsidered by the State government. We direct the competent authority of State government to consider the request for premature release including the ones noted above and the policy which will hold here is the 1992 policy," the Court said..3. Court sets aside NGT order upholding demolition of Goa beach shack CurliesCase Title: Linet Nunes v. Goa Coastal Zone Management AuthorityA division bench of Justices AS Bopanna and Hima Kohli set aside a National Green Tribunal (NGT) order directing the demolition of Curlies, a popular beach shack in Goa's Anjuna, for violation of Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) guidelines.The Court was told that the Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority (GCZMA), which had initially called for the demolition of Curlies, was not present on the day the order was passed by the NGT.Thus, the Court found that it would be appropriate "in the interest of justice" to restore the appeal before the NGT so that both parties can furnish their arguments and fresh orders can be passed."In that circumstance, we feel that the principles of natural justice would require that an appropriate opportunity be granted to both the parties and then, an appropriate decision be taken by the NGT," the order stated..4. Court grants interim bail for 8 weeks to Ashish Mishra in Lakhimpur Kheri caseCase Title: Ashish Mishra @ Monu v. State of Uttar PradeshA division bench of Justices Surya Kant and JK Maheshwari granted interim bail for 8 weeks to Ashish Mishra, son of Union Home Minister of State Ajay Mishra, in the 2021 Lakhimpur Kheri case in which 8 persons protesting against the Farm laws were mowed down by a four-wheeler belonging to Mishra.The Court ordered that Mishra cannot stay in Uttar Pradesh or Delhi after his release, as one of the several conditions issued for his release on bail. .5. Court upholds bail granted to Anil Deshmukh by Bombay High Court in corruption caseCase Title: Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anil DeshmukhA three-judge bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices V Ramasubramanian and JB Pardiwala confirmed the bail granted by Bombay High Court to former Maharashtra Home Minister and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) leader Anil Deskhmukh in connection with a corruption case filed against him.The Court rejected the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) challenging the Bombay High Court order.The top court noted that Deshmukh was granted bail earlier in the case under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) in connection with the same set of transactions."He has been granted bail in the PMLA case as well. SLP dismissed. Same observations as in PMLA case," the Court said..6. Court disapproves Allahabad High Court practice of dismissing several bail applications on same day for defaultCase Title: Rahul Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and AnotherA division bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi took exception to the Allahabad High Court dismissing almost 50 bail applications on the same day citing default or non-prosecution.The Court was hearing an appeal challenging one such Allahabad High Court order dismissing an anticipatory bail application on the ground that the appellant/ bail applicant failed to appear before the Court on the scheduled date of hearing."... we disapprove such practice adopted by the High Court in passing orders for dismissal of bail application in default", the Court said, although it also acknowledged that it was not fair on the part of the bail applicant to not be present in court when his matter was taken up. .7. Decriminalisation of adultery does not affect disciplinary proceedings against armed force personnel: Supreme CourtCase Title: Joseph Shine v. Union of India Secretary A Constitution bench comprising Justices KM Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, and CT Ravikumar clarified that its judgment decriminalizing adultery under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) would not come in the way of the armed forces initiating disciplinary proceedings against personnel indulging in extramarital affairs.The Court made it clear that the Joseph Shine judgment, which decriminalised adultery, had not dealt with Sections 45 and 63 of the Army Act or allied provisions in the Navy and Airforce Acts."It is not as if this Court approved of adultery. It has found that it may be a civil wrong and will continue to be a ground for dissolution of marriage ... This Court was neither called upon nor has pronounced on Sections 45 and 63 of the Army Act and corresponding provisions of the other Acts. We only make this position clear and dispose of the application", the Court said..8. Impermissible for trial courts to record testimony only in English if witness gives evidence in vernacularCase Title: Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi)A division bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi expressed its disapproval of the practice adopted by some trial courts to record depositions of witnesses only in English, as translated by the judge, even when the witness testifies in a different language.The Court was of the view that the evidence of the witness has to be recorded in their language, as may be practicable, after which it should be translated into the language of the court for forming part of the record."... recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible," the Court said.The Court added that the original deposition of the witness, in the language in which it was given, would give better insight into what was said."As such, the text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness. Even otherwise, when a question arises as to what exactly the witness had stated in his/her evidence, it is the original deposition of the witness which has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge," the Court explained..Read the Supreme Court fortnightly - January 1 to 15, 2023 here.