The Delhi High Court in Review: December, 2020 [Part I]

Review of Judgments and orders passed by the High Court in December.
Delhi High Court In Review
Delhi High Court In Review

With its vast and varied case-docket, the High Court of Delhi has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief over-view of the important pronouncements of the High Court of Delhi over the period of the relevant month in review.

While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.


In Alok Kumar Lodha v. Asian Hotels (North) Limited, the Court held that a party to an arbitration agreement must necessarily apply in writing for referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) to the Court before which a suit has been brought in a matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, and a verbal prayer in this regard is not sufficient. It was further held that once the Court finds that the matter is liable to be referred for arbitration, no prima-facie findings on the merits of the case should then be rendered inasmuch as once the parties are referred to arbitration, the Court is rendered functus-officio.

In Dr. Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi, while reiterating the maintainability of an anti-arbitration injunction suit under limited parameters, the Court observed that disputes in relation to matters that are covered under the Trust Act, 1882 are not arbitrable, and an injunction against an arbitration proceeding would be justified when the disputes themselves are not capable of being submitted for arbitration.

In Future Retail Ltd. v. NV Investment Holdings LLC & Ors., the Court refused to grant any interim relief to the plaintiff so as to restrain the defendant from writing to statutory authorities protesting that an asset sale was in contravention of an emergency arbitral award. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the contention that the provision of emergency arbitration was contrary to the provisions of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, and noted that there is nothing in the Arbitration Act that prohibits the contracting parties from obtaining emergency relief from an emergency arbitrator.

In AST Enterprises Inc. v. Mewa Mishri Enterprises Private Limited, the Court observed that in exceptional circumstances, interim protection by way of securing the amount qua a disputed claim could also be granted at a pre-arbitral stage in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, particularly when it could be demonstrated that the actions of the respondent were patently unconscionable.

In Brace Iron and Steel Private Limited v. Tata Steel BSL Limited, the Court reiterated that the power under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act could be exercised to direct a party to pay admitted arrears of lease-rent pending final determination through arbitration.

In Lt. Col. H. S. Bedi Retd. v. STCI Finance Limited, the Court held that an Order of the arbitral tribunal rejecting an application for amendment would amount to an interim award which would be amenable to challenge through a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In SKS Power Generation (Chhattisgarh) Limited v. Aquatech Systems (Asia) Limited, the Court observed that once the claim of a particular aggrieved party stood rejected by the arbitral tribunal, then the execution proceedings initiated by the counter-party of the arbitral award in its favour could not be permitted to be blocked merely because a petition filed by the aggrieved party under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was pending adjudication, in the absence of any stay of the arbitral award in question.

In Clix Capital Services Private Limited v. Future Capital Investment Private Limited, the Court observed that at the ad-interim stage in a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, a Court is entitled to take a more liberal view in relation to the considerations of prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss as compared to the stage of final hearing of the petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.

In Dilip Buildcon Limited Varaha Infra Limited v. National Highways Authority of India, through its Chairman, the Court observed that the presence of individuals connected to a party on a committee would not render the president of the said committee, who is otherwise unconnected to the parties and acting in an individual capacity albeit ex officio, as being ineligible to appoint an arbitrator under Section 12(5) read with the VIIth Schedule of the Arbitration Act.

In Emaar India Limited, formerly known as Emaar MGF Land Limited v. Hicon Hera Buildtech Private Limited, the Court observed that unless a petitioner is able to demonstrate that the relief sought for under Section 9 is so emergent that it cannot await the formal procedure of appointment of an arbitrator, then it would be apposite to relegate the petitioner to exercise remedies under the Section 17 of the Arbitration Act before the arbitrator so appointed by the Court.

In Joraver Singh v. Black Pepper Hospitality Andevents Private Limited, the Court reiterated that an arbitration clause providing for the unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator by a party could not be enforced in view of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act read with the VIIth Schedule thereto and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects BPC v. HSCC (India) Limited [2019 SCC OnLine SC 1517] and Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. [(2019) 5 SCC 755].

In Iworld Business Solutions Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, the Court observed that a broad-based panel containing the names of impartial and independent persons could not be said to be contrary to the mandate of the Supreme Court in the decision in Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation [(2017) 4 SCC 665], and the appropriate course for the petitioner would be to choose one amongst the said individuals as the arbitrator.

In Atlanta Limited v. Government of Rajasthan, the Court held that when the arbitral award in question clearly identified two distinct parties which were liable to make good the amounts awarded thereunder, then the executing Court could not undertake an examination of any inter-se agreement between the said two parties as regards ultimate liability to pay the amount inasmuch as this would amount to going behind the decree which is impermissible in law.

In Deepak Beri v. Atul Beri, the Court held that though an executing Court has extremely limited jurisdiction to ensure that the arbitral award in question is enforced as it exists, however, when the award itself is based inter-alia on a family-settlement, then the Court would have to undertake an examination of the terms of the said settlement in detail in order to effectuate the true intent set out therein.


In Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v. State Bank of India, Overseas Branch, the Court held that an Order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (‘DRT’) in complete violation of principles of natural justice, with non-existent and cryptic reasoning and with the Order itself having been pronounced after a huge delay after reserving of judgment in the matter, then it was a fit case for interference by the High Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India despite the existence of an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal to the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (‘DRAT’).

In Prudent Arc Limited v. Sidha Neelkanth Paper Industries, the Court held that if interest is allowed to accumulate on account of any delay on the part of the secured creditor in taking further steps under Section 13(4) Security and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’), and then the said component is permitted to be added to the amount liable to be deposited by a borrower for an appeal to be entertained under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, it would render the right of an appeal completely illusory, for the reason that the condition of making the pre-deposit would become too onerous to discharge.

Therefore, the Court held that the meaning of the word, ‘debt’ as used in Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 cannot be imported to the SARFAESI Act, as the context therein would require a different connotation. The Court further held that the net amount of pre-deposit required to be made under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, ought to be treated as 50% of the amount claimed by the secured creditor to be due in its notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act.

Even if the interest is claimed in the Section 13(2) notice, it would not be a relevant consideration for purposes of determining the amount of pre-deposit to be made for the purpose of entertaining an appeal under the second proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The Court further held that the secured creditor could not insist that for making a pre-deposit with the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (‘DRAT’), the amounts recovered from the sale of a secured asset of the borrower should be excluded.

It was observed that a borrower was entitled to the benefit of the amount recovered from the sale of the secured asset while computing the amount of debt due for the purposes of entertaining the appeal. The Court, however, clarified that just because more than 50% of the amount mentioned in the notice under Section 13(2) has been recovered by sale of the secured asset, then it would not mean that there was no necessity to deposit any amount, as required under the second proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

In Jindal Steel & Power Limited v. Reserve Bank of India, the Court observed that the power vested with the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) under Regulation 9 of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004, could not be delegated to other statutory agencies like the Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) or the Enforcement Directorate (‘ED’), and neither could such external agencies dictate the exercise of discretion under the said provision.

In ICICI Bank v. Amit Kuril & ICICI Bank v. Jain Logistics, the Court reiterated that in the case of a loan transaction where there is a default, an application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) by a financial institution seeking permission to sell the hypothecated vehicle in its custody should be expeditiously disposed of and sale should be carried out through a receiver appointed by the Court at the earliest.

In ISGEC Heavy Engineering Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the Court observed that even though the burden to be discharged by a petitioner seeking interim relief against encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee is an onerous one, the scope of extraordinary special equities had been expanded over the years through various judicial pronouncements, and each case was to be examined as per its own facts and circumstances, and there was no universally applicable straitjacket formula.

In CRSC Research and Design Institute Group Co. Limited v. Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited, the Court held that a party which has obtained an Order of injunction restraining encashment of the bank guarantee should be burdened with interest for the period it succeeds in stalling such encashment, if the ultimate verdict were to go against it.

In Reena Ghambir v. Central Bank of India, the Court held that once persons claiming to be bona-fide purchasers had failed to perfect the title to the property before the concerned Bank had taken steps under the SARFAESI Act and symbolic possession had been taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, then the Bank could not be faulted for taking further steps to auction the property given by the petitioner as a security.

In Union of India v. DMC Infrastructure Private Limited, the Court held that when the understanding was only that a party had agreed to purchase a property for a certain sum and that on failure to pay the said amount, the Bank would be entitled to take possession of the property and sell the same in accordance with law, then in the absence of any express provision in this regard, it could not be construed that failure to pay the entire amount would entail forfeiture of the instalments towards part-payment advanced by the said party to the Bank.

While construing the terms of a Debt Servicing Reserve Account Guarantee Agreement, the Court in Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited v. Indusind Bank Limited, reiterated that the recitals would not control the operative part of an instrument and where the latter was clear in its purport and scope, the same would prevail over any contrary intention seemingly postulated by the recitals.


While reiterating the bar against revision petition being filed against orders passed by a Family Court, the Court in Pankaj Khanna v. Shalini Gupta further held that there is no complete bar on the production of a document along with a replication, and the leave of the Court can always be sought in this regard.

In Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) v. Hindustan Trading Company, the Court reiterated that an Order granting an injunction in the exercise of jurisdiction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC should contain specific reasons as to how the Court has arrived at a prima-facie case in favor of the plaintiff.

In Jaikishan Aggarwal (Blind) v. Jitender Kumar, the Court reiterated that when adjudicating upon the impleadment of a party to a proceeding, the aspect as to whether the party would be able to contribute to the adjudication of the suit is not the only criterion and the aspect of the impact that the grant of the relief prayed for in the suit would have on the rights of the party seeking to be impleaded would also be a relevant factor.

In Nirmal Devi v. Rakesh Kumar Jain, the Court reiterated that in the absence of any material that the additional documents sought to be produced at the appellate stage could not be produced at the relevant time despite due diligence or that the requisite evidence was not within the knowledge of the party concerned, then no case for grant of permission to lead additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(aa) of the CPC could be said to be made out.

In Nissan Motor India Private Limited v. Fervent Communications Private Limited, the Court held that when there was a specific averment in the suit as regards privity of contract between the plaintiff and one of the defendants, then an application by the said defendant for deletion from the memo of parties under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC was rightly rejected on account of the existence of disputed questions of facts which could only be resolved at the stage of the trial.

In Sudesh Kumar v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, the Court observed that when the order of demolition of property in question was passed by an officer of the Municipal Corporation when the hearing was granted by an entirely different officer, there would be a clear violation of the principles of natural justice and render the order unsustainable.

In Raj Kumar v. Latafat, the Court granted conditional leave to defend to the defendant upon finding that the payment of the alleged amounts in question by the plaintiff to the defendant was admittedly in cash and without any acknowledgement, and that the document sought to be relied upon had not even been duly registered.

In Munish Kumar v. H. D. Bhalla (Deceased) through LR’s, the Court deprecated the practice of filing repeated applications in a suit with the motive of ensuring that the trial of the suit does not proceed.

In Surender Kumar v. Manoj Kumar, the Court expounded on the meaning of the term ‘liquidated demand’ as occurring within Order XXXVII Rule 1 of the CPC and held that any sum which could be ascertained from the documents on record would constitute a liquidated demand.

In Sita Ram Surekha (HUF) v. Basant Kumar Satish Kumar Biyani (HUF), the Court reiterated that even though an admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC could be deduced from any statement made by a party in the pleadings or any other document, however, the said admission would have to be categorical in nature for a decree to be passed as a result of the same.

In Vateena Begum v. Shamim Zafar, the Court reiterated the settled legal position that an executing Court only needs to call for evidence and frame issues if complex facts are put up and if it finds upon a perusal of the documents relied upon that evidence is required for effective adjudication of the issues before it. The Court further held that as per Order XXI Rule 101 of the CPC, any dispute which arises in respect of the right, title or interest in a property between the decree-holder and the objector could be adjudicated upon by the executing Court itself and the same need not be decided by a separate suit so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

In H. C. Ram Naresh v. Union of India, the Court observed that a filing of a fresh petition effectively attempting to find fault with an earlier judgment on the same issue and between the same parties by a coordinate Bench of the Court would amount to re-litigation and would amount to gross abuse of the process of the Court.

In Sunaina Dlamia v. Government of NCT of Delhi, the Court held that the review proceedings cannot be extended to become an appeal in disguise and must be strictly confined within the scope of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC.

In Delhi Transport Corporation v. Jai Kumar Jain, the Court reiterated that a review petitioner could not seek to re-argue and re-agitate grounds denied by the judgment of which review is being sought.


In Amanpreet Singh Kohli v. Pankaj Dayal, it was held that even in the case of an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, if the Court finds that the legal question is not otherwise required to be answered, then it is not compelled to, as an academic exercise, entertain the appeal and answer the legal question, when the effect of the answer to the legal question would not vary the outcome of the appeal in any manner.


While reiterating that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be utilized as a replacement for an appeal, the Court in Vineet Khosla v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited, refused to interfere with an order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, which was otherwise appealable under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) and the limitation period for which appeal had already expired without the petitioner taking any step to challenge the impugned order.

In New Era Projects v. Senbo Engineering Limited, the Court noted that a decree holder was entitled to priority in accordance with law before the Resolution Professional appointed under the provisions of the IBC.

While interpreting the requirements of Clause 8 of the 1st Schedule of the Charted Accountants Act, 1949, in KDP Buildwell Private Limited v. Union of India, the Court observed that there is no requirement for the subsequently appointed auditor to secure a no-objection from the previous auditor and the only requirement is that the subsequently appointed auditor must communicate to the erstwhile auditor about his acceptance of the position.


In Lekhraj Meena v. Union of India, the Court while invoking the background of the discrimination faced by the Scheduled Tribes for generations and which disadvantage extended to all parameters of contemporary life as well, held that the constitutional and legislative reservations/relaxations intended for the community could not be sought to be taken away by invoking technicalities, particularly in the arena of public employment.

In Smartchem Technologies Limited v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that though a Writ Court would not ordinarily enter into disputed questions of fact or contractual disputes, if the material on record did not reveal any disputed question of fact, then the Court could undoubtedly examine whether the action complained of was arbitrary and illegal.

In Union of India v. Samridhi Sushil Sharma, the Court held that a Court sitting in writ appellate jurisdiction against a judgment rendered in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was empowered to pass appropriate Orders putting in place requisite arrangements which might be apposite in the facts and circumstances of the case without entering into a full-blown adjudication of the merits of the controversy.

In Anti-Corruption Council of India Trust through its authorised signatory Mohd. Kamran Khan v. The Directorate of Education, the Court observed that a vague prayer which is incapable of a reasonably precise definition cannot form part of the reliefs claimed in a Public Interest Litigation.


In BDR Builders & Developers Private Limited v. Lalit Modi, the Court observed that merely because the strenuous and concerted efforts of the contemnor to create third-party rights in a property in violation of the Orders of the Court had ultimately been defeated on account of the vigilance exercised by the decree holder, would not in any manner mollify the breach of undertaking given to the Court in this regard, by the judgment debtor and the same would clearly amount to contempt.

In Rajeshwari v. Amit Bajaj, the Court observed that when the Order of which contempt was being alleged had made the undertaking given by the respondent conditional upon certain payments being made by the petitioner, then the respondent could not be held of guilty of contempt if the breach of the undertaking was a result of non-payment of the promised sums by the petitioner.


In Amit Khaneja v IL&FS Financial Services Limited, the Court held that the circulars of the RBI and the guidelines thereunder relating to reliefs to be granted for payment of interest and declaration of accounts as Non-Performing Assets (‘NPAs’) etc. during the COVID-19 pandemic would not come to the rescue of the petitioners where the defaults admittedly occurred prior to the outbreak of the pandemic.


In Manoj v. The State (Govt. of NCT) of Delhi, the Court held that Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POSCO Act’) has limited applicability and must be interpreted keeping in view the limitations of such reverse-onus clauses. The Court cautioned against reading the provision in a manner in which the onus to establish innocence would shift to the accused merely upon being charged of an offense. The Court held that the initial burden for establishing the offence will have to be discharged by the prosecution and it is only when this basic threshold had been established that the legal burden to establish innocence would shift on the accused. Even so, the accused was not required to establish that he/she is innocent beyond any reasonable doubt and the presumption could be rebutted by him/her by meeting the standards of preponderance of probability to demonstrate innocence. While noting that such a burden could never be extended to being an impossible one, the Court held that the accused could seek to discharge the burden in several ways including by eliciting responses in the cross-examination of witnesses, by leading positive evidence of innocence etc.

In a similar vein, the Court in Altaf Ahmed @ Rahul v. State (GNCTD of Delhi) held that for the presumption under Section 29 of the POSCO Act to come into play, the onus is on the prosecution to establish the foundational facts by leading evidence.

While upholding an order of acquittal for an offence punishable under Section 417 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the Court in X v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), observed that it was difficult to accept that continuing with an intimate relationship, along with associated sexual activity, over a long period of time can be construed as involuntary and secured not on account of mutual affection but only by a false promise of marriage.

In Sonu @ Hemaraj v. State, the Court observed that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that persons from a disadvantaged socio-economic background are hesitant to approach the police authorities to make a complaint or report a crime under an apprehension of being overlooked, treated with indifference or harassment, and therefore any delay in this regard would not by itself make the witness an unreliable one.

In Mohd Shahabuddin v. State Government of NCT Delhi, the Court held that custody parole was not a matter of right, and even when custody parole is granted the prisoner is not freed from judicial custody but continues to remain in the custody of Court in the conceptual sense, and it is for this reason that the period spent in custody parole is counted towards period spent in prison. It was further held that custody parole was to be granted only after the verified existence of exceptional personal circumstances and upon being satisfied that it would not compromise the prisoner’s judicial custody or his/her own safety or the safety of others and that it would not contribute towards subverting the legal process in any manner.

In Ravi Kumar @ Shooter v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court issued a slew of directions to ensure completeness, accuracy and credibility of State Crime Reports Bureau (‘SCRB’) records. The Court directed that the following steps must be taken by an Investigating Officer or other police official before an SCRB report is presented to any Court:

“1. When searching the criminal involvement/record of any person, the concerned police officer shall accurately enter the full name of the person, the parentage, the alias as also the full address as per an official identification document, such as Driver’s Licence, Passport, PAN Card, Aadhaar Card; or, if no such document is available, then as disclosed by the person, ensuring that the wildcard sign (%) is appropriately used in the search to account for commonly used alternate spellings of any of these particulars;

2. The particulars so entered shall be searched against each of the following databases: (i) Crime Criminal Information System (CCIS) database; (ii) On-line Criminal Dossier database maintained by the police; (iii) Criminal Attributes Database (CADB); (iv) CCTNS Database/Core Application Software (CAS) Database; (v) Register No. IX (Register No. 9) maintained at police stations; and (vi) Interoperable Criminal Justice System (ICJS) database;

3. If any element of information in relation to a person or in relation to a particular FIR is not complete, say the status of a bail application or current stage of a pending trial, the Investigating Officer shall obtain such updated status from the concerned police station, prison or court; and file an additional information sheet separately signed by him indicating such updated status, without making any interpolations in the SCRB report generated from the aforesaid databases;

4. Before an SCRB report is filed in any court, the SHO of the concerned police station shall counter-sign the SCRB report and the additional information sheet, if any, confirming that the procedures set-out above have been followed by the Investigating Officer in preparing such report; and

5. The foregoing procedures shall be incorporated as part of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to be followed by all Investigating Officers in all cases and circulated by the Special Commissioner of Police (Crime), Delhi to all police stations within the NCT of Delhi.”

In Neha v. The State (NCT of Delhi), the Court observed that when repeated attempts have been made by the Investigating Officer to produce the complainant before the Court at the time of hearing of the bail application filed by the accused, in terms of the mandate of the amended Section 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’), and despite the said attempts, there was no appearance on behalf of the complainant, then the Court is empowered to proceed to adjudicate the matter on merits in-spite of the said absence.

While refusing to quash an Order of charge and framing of charge under the proceedings of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’) the Court in Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, held that the immunity against disclosure available under Section 3(1) of the Special Bearer Bonds (Immunities and Exceptions) Act, 1981, would not be applicable to proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and if there is a strong suspicion that the accused has committed the offence, then no indulgence would be shown by a Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

In Natwest Markets PLC formerly the Royal Bank of Scotland NV v. The Special Director (Central Region) Adjudicating Authority Directorate of Enforcement, the Court held that the scheme of Rule 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal) Rules, 2000, would reveal that there was a two-stage scrutiny which was envisaged thereunder and a show-cause notice issued at the first stage is only concerned with formation for an opinion as to whether an inquiry at all should be held or not. It was observed that at this preliminary stage, it would not be apposite for the Court to interfere with the issuance of the show-cause notice.

In Deept Sarup Aggarwal v. Union of India, the Court observed that in the absence of any allegation that an individual is a flight-risk having no roots in India or that there is a likelihood that he/she shall abscond from India, then a mere allegation that the individual is evasive or non-responsive during the course of investigation, cannot be a ground for issuance of a lookout circular which has grave consequences towards personal liberty and free movement. The Court further observed that merely because there was a power available for issuance of a lookout circular for the reason that foreign travel of the person concerned would prejudice the economic interest of the country, would not take away the requirement to provide cogent reasons for exercise of the said power.

In Vijay Mann @ Kapil v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court summarized the principles which would be applicable to the grant of sanction for prosecution under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 as under:

“1. That the requirement of more than one charge sheet under Section 2(1)(d) need not be against the individual alone but against the entire syndicate as a whole;

2. That the ingredients of the Section have to be satisfied on the date when the sanction has been granted;

3. That it is sufficient if the alleged crime has been committed prior to the sanction and the procedural requirements of registration of charge sheet are satisfied later.

4. For the purpose of taking cognizance under the Act, the charge sheets need not have been filed in only one State i.e., Delhi but charge sheets in other states can also be taken into consideration.”

In Mahesh Goyal v. State, the Court held that aspects such as whether or not there has been a requisite compliance of the provisions of Section 42 and Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’) could not be looked into at the stage of adjudication of an application for bail, and the same are aspects which can only be determined at the time of trial.

In Rohit v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, the Court reiterated that as per Section 52A(2) of the NDPS Act, only the officer in-charge of a police station or an officer who is empowered under Section 53 of NDPS Act can dispose of drugs under Section 52A of NDPS Act, and a breach of this requirement could not be overlooked.

In Govardhan Vigraham v. Union of India, while reiterating that a person who had acquired property in good-faith and for adequate consideration would not fall under the scope of Section 68A(1) of the NDPS Act and accordingly the said property would not be liable to forfeiture under the provisions of the NDPS Act. The Court further held that any person who was aggrieved by an order of forfeiture of property under Section 68-I, including a purchaser in good-faith, could file an appeal thereagainst under Section 68-O of the NDPS Act.

In V. Hansprakash (through Pairokar) v. State, the Court turned down the grant of regular bail to the business-head and chief business statutory officer of a company inasmuch as it found that he had potentially been involved in the fraudulent activity which had been complained of and which offence was required to be viewed strictly considering the impact on the economy of the country as a whole.

In Anju Khanna v. State of NCT of Delhi, while reiterating that civil proceedings can continue side-by-side with criminal proceedings, the Court observed that if the necessary averments in relation to the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC are present, then a summoning Order could not be set aside merely on the ground that disputes arose out of a commercial transaction for sale-purchase of an immovable property.

In Ranbir Bhardwaj v. Sohan Lal Gupta, the Court reiterated that in the case of a mediated settlement accepted by the Court under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’) if the settlement is not subsequently not complied with under Section 138 of the NI Act, then the magistrate would be empowered to pass an Order under Section 431 read with Section 421 of the Cr.P.C. to recover the amount mentioned in the settlement as also take appropriate action for breach of the undertaking including proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

In Rajesh Kumar v. Mehrotra Impex Pvt. Ltd., the Court observed that in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act which attracts criminal liability, the burden of proof upon the complainant is of proving his/her case beyond reasonable doubt whereas the accused is required to demonstrate a case of preponderance of probabilities.

While reiterating the fundamental parameters for construing and gauging the competency of the testimony of a child witness, the Court in Laxman v. The State (NCT of Delhi), observed that the Trial Court had followed the correct procedure of putting certain relevant questions to the child witness and of having recorded satisfaction as to her overall competence as a witness on the basis of the answers received.

While refuting the vague submission that a doctor could never be arrested in a case of medical negligence, the Court in Dr. Suresh Chandra Gupta v. NCT of Delhi, had observed that the investigating officer had taken the pain to obtain an independent opinion in the matter from the Delhi Medical Council and which had found the petitioner clearly guilty of negligence resulting in the death of the patient.

In Saurabh Jain v. Shilpa Jain, the Court reiterated that the word ‘reside’ in Section 1(b) of Section 126 of Cr.P.C. does not refer to the permanent residence and would also include the place where the wife may be residing on the date of the application.

In Fahim v. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), the Court reiterated that once blood of human origin was found on the weapon of offence, then merely because there was no precise grouping of the blood stains found on the weapon would not accrue to the advantage of the accused if the circumstantial evidence otherwise clearly pointed towards the guilt of the accused.

In Karunakaran Ramchand v. Economic Offences Wing, the Court rejected an application for anticipatory bail inter-alia on the ground that the petitioner was the managing director of the company which was accused of awarding bogus contracts for the purpose of money-laundering and it was not a case of mere lack of supervision over culpable subordinates.

In Sunil Kumar Dahiya v. State, the Court rejected an application for bail while observing that the applicant had indulged in illegally selling properties even when he was incarcerated, and that no equity could be said to rise in his favour.

In Rajeev Sharma v. State (NCT) of Delhi, the Court held that the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable only if the offence warranted imprisonment for a period of 10 years or more.

In C. D. Pharma India Private Limited v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Court reiterated that the power to order reinvestigation or transfer of investigation must only be exercised in rare circumstances when the conscience of the Court was shaken by the standard of the investigation. The Court further observed that the power of a magistrate in this regard cannot be sought to be short-circuited by approaching the High Court.

In Mithali Singh v. NCT of Delhi, the Court reiterated that unconscious possession of a live cartridge would not attract the rigors of the Arms Act, 1959.


In N. K. College of Pharamacy v. Pharmacy Council of India, the Court reiterated that grant of interim relief permitting educational institutions to admit students was fraught with risk inasmuch as if the institutions were to ultimately fail in the proceedings, then the students would be left high and dry. The Court observed that even the possibility of migration to other institutions was not an appropriate remedy inasmuch as the same would pose immense logistical difficulties for the students concerned and the quality of education may also be compromised in the process.

In Chintpurni Medical College and Hospital v. Union of India, the Court observed that a party which had been lax in taking steps to seek inspection of its facilities by the Medical Council of India and which inspection was essential to verify as to whether the requisite infrastructure and facilities are available, cannot seek a direction for the undertaking of an inspection at a belated stage after the timelines for the relevant academic year had already been breached.

In Edem Sanketh v. Union of India, the Court observed that in a situation where several thousand applications are being received from candidates from the Other Backward Class (‘OBC’) category, it is not practical to expect the authorities to individually scrutinize each caste certificate and in such a situation the insistence on the filing of a certificate as per the prescribed format in the prospectus cannot be said to be irrational or arbitrary.

In Hrithik Rana v. Delhi University Sports Council, the Court reiterated that the terms and conditions mentioned in an admission brochure, including the manner of providing the requisite certificates, are binding upon a candidate and cannot be sought to be challenged after the candidate has applied under the said admission brochure without any demur.

In a similar vein in Injamam Ul Hossain v. All India Institute of Medical Science, the Court held that a candidate could not seek concessions contrary to the terms of the prospectus after having applied under the same.

While refusing interim relief against an order reducing the sanctioned intake for a particular course, the Court in Parul University v. Council of Architecture noted that there were grave allegations against the University concerned of having orchestrated and condoned organized mass cheating and the inquiry committee report was the culmination of a procedure that was prima-facie fair.

In Snehil Deota v. University of Delhi, the Court observed that permitting candidates to repeatedly make changes in the application form and accompanying certificates would lead to chaos and delay in finalization of the admission process.

In Professor Rajiv Saxena v. Jawaharlal Nehru University, through its Registrar, the Court observed that the action taken by the University to replace the supervisor of a Ph.D. candidate because the erstwhile supervisor was not taking timely action for conducting the final viva-voce could not be said to be arbitrary and were in fact in the interest of the student, in particular, as also the institution, in general.

In Shaswat Kumar Thakur v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha College, the Court reiterated that the students who take admission in all-India quota seats after the second round of counselling undertaken by the medical counselling committee of the Director General of Health Services could not be permitted to vacate the said seats to apply elsewhere.

In Muskaan Aggarwal v. University of Delhi, the Court held that when a corrigendum was issued by the concerned University in compliance with the Order passed by a coordinate Bench of the Court, it would not be appropriate to grant any relief to the petitioner in the teeth of the said corrigendum inasmuch as it would lead to inconsistent findings and the resultant judicial chaos.

In Syed Sadique Raza v. Jamia Milia Islamia, the Court observed that a student cannot seek declaration of results of a semester, though he/she may attend the classes and submit all assignments, when it was an admitted position that the student could not clear the previous semester examinations.

In Vipin v. University of Delhi, the Court held that when the university had admittedly failed to give intimation to a student about the preponement of his last attempt examination, and which resulted in the student being unable to appear in the same, then it would be fair and just to permit the student to appear in the subsequently scheduled examination.

In Yash Yadav v. Central Board of Secondary Education, the Court reiterated that in the absence of adequate medical documentation to attest to the serious illness of the student concerned, then recourse could not be had to an examination by-law which permitted condonation of attendance in exceptional circumstances.

Amit George
Amit George

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi.

The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Advocates Amol Acharya, Bharat Rayadurgam and Piyo Harold Jaimon.

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