The Delhi High Court in Review: November, 2020 [Part I]

Review of Judgments and orders passed by the High Court in November.
Delhi High Court In Review
Delhi High Court In Review

With its vast and varied case-docket, the High Court of Delhi has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief over-view of the important pronouncements of the High Court of Delhi over the period of the relevant month in review.

While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.


In Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. Power Mech Projects Limited, the Court observed that any facet of an order granting interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) which causes prejudice to the counter-party would entitle the aggrieved party to maintain an appeal thereagainst under Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act and Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

In Shon Randhawa v. Ramesh Vangal, the Court observed that alleged wrongful exercise of discretion by the arbitrator while dealing with a claim for specific performance cannot be a ground under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for seeking to set aside an award.

In Cars24 Services Private Limited v. Cyber Approach Workspace LLP, the Court observed that when an arbitration clause confers exclusive jurisdiction upon a particular Court, specifically for the purpose of appointment of an arbitrator, then the said clause could not be said to be limited to the ‘subject matter’ of the disputes and would accordingly not be overridden by a clause prescribing a seat of arbitration in a different jurisdiction.

In ABB India Limited v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, the Court observed that Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is fundamentally different in scope and operation from Section 85(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act and the provisions therefore have to be interpreted while keeping this important distinction in mind.

In Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. GTL Infrastructure Limited, the Court held that it could modify the order and directions passed by an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, while exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

In Pearl Hospitality & Events Private Limited v. OYO Hotels and Homes Private Limited, it was held that, in the appropriate circumstances, the Court hearing a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is entitled to arrive at a prima-facie opinion in relation to the validity of the termination, if the said determination is essential to adjudicate upon the entitlement to interim relief as claimed in the petition.

In Asian Hotels (NORTH) Limited v. Poonam Sood Menon, the Court held that Section 3 of Arbitration Act, 1940 read with Clause 2 of the First Schedule thereof would result in an inherent modification of a clause providing for arbitration by two arbitrators, and a third arbitrator would have to be necessarily appointed as an umpire.

In Brilltech Engineers Private Limited v. Darrameks Hotels Developers Private Limited, the Court held that where only specific claims in accordance with notified procedure are envisaged to be referred to arbitration, claims falling outside the same cannot be so referred.

In Larsen & Toubro Limited v. National Highways Authority of India, the Court observed that when a clause in the agreement specifically provided that the appointment of an arbitrator had to be made within a particular time by a party to the agreement, failing which the right of appointment would shift to a third party, then any appointment made after the expiry of the said period by the party to the agreement would be non-est in law.

In Dholi Spintex Private Limited v. Louis Company India Private Limited, the Court reiterated that inasmuch as an arbitration agreement between the parties is independent of the substantive contract, there is no bar to two Indian parties choosing a foreign law as the law governing the arbitration proceedings. The Court further observed that when there was a clear foreign element in the agreement between the parties, two Indian parties could have validly agreed to an international commercial arbitration governed by the laws of a foreign country.

In Uttam Chandra Rakesh Kumar v. DERCO Foods, the Court while referring parties to arbitration in line with the mandate under Section 45 of the Arbitration Act, observed that it was open to a Court to examine certain undertakings executed between the parties and come to a prima-facie conclusion as to whether they were the product of duress and coercion.

In Goyal MG Gases Private Limited v. Steel Authority of India, the Court reiterated that the mere act of pronouncement of an award at a different place would have no impact on the agreed seat of arbitration.

In KKR India Private Financial Services Limited v. Williamson Magor & Co. Limited, the Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it was open to the Court to invoke the ‘group of companies’ doctrine and accordingly bind even non-signatories and third parties.

In NTPC v. Amar India Limited, the Court held that the action of the arbitrator in charging fees beyond what was provided for in the terms of appointment would be contrary to the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the mandate of the arbitrator would be liable to be terminated on this ground.

In Dhoot Developers Private Limited (JV) Bengali Silver Spring Projects Limited v. Totem Infrastructure Limited, the Court observed that a finding by an arbitrator that there was absolutely no evidence placed on record, by a party making a claim, was demonstrated to be clearly erroneous, then the award would be liable to be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. Primetals Technologies India Private Limited, while reiterating that the scope of Section of 34 of the Arbitration Act is extremely limited, the Court further held that a contention which was never raised before the Ld. Single Judge in the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot be permitted to be raised before the Division Bench in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.


In Kiran Gupta v. State Bank of India, the Court held that merely because insolvency proceedings were pending before the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), against the principal debtor, the same would not be a bar to institution of proceedings against the guarantor under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’).

In APECO Infrastructure India Private Limited v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), the Court observed that if the liability under a bank guarantee was made expressly conditional upon non-performance under the main contract, then it would be open to the concerned party to urge that there was no non-performance and therefore the bank guarantee in question could not be sought to be invoked.


In Indu Singh v. Surender Kamboj, the Court held that disputed questions of fact, such as whether properties were purchased out of joint family funds or not, would ordinarily not be considered in an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (‘CPC’) and the matter would have to be finally decided during the course of trial.

In Ashok Arora v. Supreme Court Bar Association (Regd.), while upholding the rejection of an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC, the Court observed that once a person has become a member of an association, he/she is bound by the rules and bye-laws of the association and cannot claim any rights beyond the same. The Court, accordingly, noted that the actions of the association which prima-facie were in exercise of such powers could not be said to be amenable to interference at an interim stage.

In Janak Datwani v. Jamna Datwani, after an exhaustive review of the applicable precedent on the issue, the Court summarized the principles which would apply to the consolidation of cases as under:

“1. Consolidation is a process by which two or more causes or matters by order of the Court are combined or united and treated as one cause or matter.

2. The consolidation can be ordered where there are two or more matters or causes pending in the Court and it appears to the Court that some common question(s) of law or fact arises in both or all the suits or that the rights to relief claimed in the suits are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transaction.

3. The order of consolidation of suits is discretionary, in
exercise of power under Section 151 CPC, to secure the
ends of Justice and abuse of process of law and to save the parties from delay and multiplicity of proceedings.

4. By consolidation the parties can be relieved of the need to adduce same or similar oral or documentary evidence multiple times.”

In Solace Biotech Limited v. Rapross Pharmaceuticals Limited, the Court observed that in view of the amendment to Order IX Rule 32 of the CPC, an ex-parte judgment could not be sought to be set-aside on a bald statement that the aggrieved party was not aware of the proceedings in the matter.

In ICICI Bank v. Ashok Kumar, the Court directed the early consideration of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 6 of the CPC for the sale of a repossessed vehicle while noting that the long delay in this regard would depreciate the value of the repossessed vehicle and cause grave prejudice to the financial institution.

In Darshan Arora v. Vijay Kumar, while upholding the passing of a judgment on admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC against a tenant, the Court observed that there was a clear admission on the essential aspects such as existence of a tenancy agreement, non-payment of rent etc.

In Uma Shankar v. Charanjeet Singh, the Court observed that once names of certain private individuals were mentioned in the list of witnesses filed by the defendants, it was obligatory on their part to file the requisite affidavits of evidence of the witnesses, and having failed to do so at the relevant time, further opportunity cannot be granted to either produce them or summon them as witnesses.

In Zaffar Ahmed v. Sartaj Praveen, the Court observed that when a decree had been passed for specific performance, or in the alternative for payment of monetary sums, and the said decree had attained finality then there was nothing illegal in directing payment of monetary compensation instead of specific performance by the executing Court.

In Vishnu Infra and Energy Solutions Private Limited v. Rohit Singhal, the Court observed that when adjudication of liability of the parties is inbuilt in the prayer for recovery, then a specific declaratory relief as regards the extent of liability is stricto-sensu not required.

In Zas Tele Solutions Private Limited v. The Assistant Provident Funds Commissioner, the Court held that in a scenario where an appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI Rule 11(2) of the CPC or for non-compliance of a pre-condition to entertain the appeal, an application seeking review of the judgment under appeal can still be heard on merits by the Court which originally rendered the said judgment.

In Sandeep v. Darshan Enterprises, the Court upheld the rejection of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC inter-alia on the ground that such an application could not have been considered at the stage of final arguments in the matter.


In Venus Recruiters Private Limited v. Union of India, the Court held that the role of the Resolution Professional (‘RP’) in proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) does not extend beyond the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process period of the Corporate Debtor. Thus, after the approval of a Resolution Plan, the former RP cannot seek to file an avoidance application under Section 43 of the IBC in relation to alleged preferential transactions at a future date. The Court further observed that once a Resolution Plan has been approved and the new management takes over accordingly, it is for the new management to decide whether to continue with a particular transaction or agreement or not.


In Brijlal Kumar v. Union of India, the Court held that though the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not extend to the Armed Forces Tribunal, but the power of the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution continues to operate. The Court, therefore, observed that the Armed Forces Tribuanl was duty-bound to follow the law as laid down by the High Court, and failure to do so would lead to complete chaos.

In Sergeant Ajith Kumar Shukla v. Union of India, the Court observed the Air Force personnel are distinct from civilians and form a class by themselves, however, it is not open to an Air Force personnel to enjoy the privileges not available to civilians but at the same time reject corresponding obligations which are not applicable to ordinary citizens.

In Nautilus metal Craft Private Limited v. Joint Director General of Foreign Trade, the Court reiterated that the the availability of an alternative remedy cannot operate as a bar to the maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution especially when there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court further observed that even an administrative decision, having civil consequences, must state reasons especially where the decision concerned is appealable.

In Dr. Ashutosh Mishra v. Indian Institute of Mass Communication through its Chairman, the Court reiterated that a petitioner filing a writ of quo warranto is required to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a person without any legal authority.

In Sara Khan v. Union of India, the Court observed that it would not exercise writ jurisdiction in relation to impugned actions pertaining to the administration of a school situated in a foreign country. The Court observed that the mere fact that the Indian Ambassador was the patron-in-chief would not vest territorial jurisdiction in the Court for the exercise of writ jurisdiction when the structure of the management of the school would reveal that it was controlled by other entities and did not function under the sole authority of the Indian Ambassador.


In Janak Datwani v. Kishin Datwani, the Court reiterated that an intra-court appeal would lie only against the order of the Single Bench, punishing for contempt and an order declining to initiate contempt proceedings or exonerating the alleged contemnor would not be amenable to an intra-court appeal to the Division Bench.


In Royal Orchid Associated Hotels Private Limited v. Kesho Lal Goyal, the Court held that Section 202 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘Contract Act’) would apply only in a case where an agency has been created for the purpose of providing security for an existing interest and not in a case where the alleged interest of the agent arises after the creation of the agency. It was further observed that an agent cannot exercise any lien under Section 221 of the Contract Act, if such lien interferes with the principal’s business.


In Mumbai International Airport Limited v. Airports Authority of India, the Court observed that once the existence of a force-majeure event was admitted as also the corresponding requirement to defer the performance of obligations by the counter party, such deferral would have to continue till the level of the activity under the contract as existed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic had been achieved.

In Vikas WSP Limited v. Directorate Enforcement, while considering the question as to the effect of the lockdown declared by the Central Government due to the COVID-19 outbreak on the period of the provisional attachment orders passed under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Court observed that the period of lockdown could not have said to have extended the period of validity of 180 days prescribed for attachment orders, to be reckoned from the date of the Provisional Attachment Order as provided for under the provisions of the Act.

In South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. MEP Infrastructure Developers Limited the Court reiterated that there was no need to give an express notice of force-majeure in government contracts where the situation was otherwise covered on account of the relevant office memorandums issued by the Central Government.

In P. V. Rao v. Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate General of GST Intelligence, the Court observed that in proceedings concerning alleged tax evasion under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the mere apprehension or fear of contracting COVID-19 would not entitle the petitioner to a right to appear through video-conference mode before the investigating authority when the previous conduct of the petitioner in relation to the investigation was evasive.

In V. M. Singh v. Madan Lal Mangotra, the Court observed that in view of the advisories issued by the High Court, the party could not be forced to appear physically before the District Courts, however if there was non-appearance even through virtual mode then the District Courts were free to proceed in accordance with law.

In North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Rajeev Sehgal, the Court reiterated that the credit given for the period of lockdown, can only extend the original period of limitation and not the period up to which delay can be condoned.


In Binay Kumar Chauhan v. The State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that in the absence of any allegation that casteist remarks were made in public view, the provisions of Section 3(1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 would not apply as an embargo to the grant of anticipatory bail.

In Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Raja, the Court held that Section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘Cr. P.C’) does not contemplate placing on record all proceedings, including formation of an opinion and other internal aspects such as analysis of the judgment, notes, drafts etc., which have culminated into a decision to file an appeal. The Court further held that though consultation with the High Court is required for appointment of a Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor under Section 24(1) of the Cr.P.C., however, there is no such requirement for consultation in the case of appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor under Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C.

In Mohit Mehta v. Nayanika Thakur, the Court observed that it is women alone who can claim relief under Sections 18 to 21 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘PWDV Act’).

In Paraminder Singh Kalra v. The Commissioner, Income Tax, while reiterating the parameters for consolidation under Section 220 of the Cr.P.C, the Court observed that when the substratum of the series of acts is common and the other offences, though distinct and separate, have been committed for facilitating the commission of the main offence, then it would be appropriate to order consolidation into a single trial.

In Amit Dhiman v. Boski Dhiman, the Court reiterated that merely because the wife was capable of earning would not be a sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded to her.

In Chesons Enterprises v. Cadiz Pharmaceuticals Private Limited, the Court reiterated that the aspect as to whether certain cheques were given towards security and not towards a debt or liability is a triable issue under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’). The Court further observed that if a signed blank cheque has been voluntarily handed over, then filling up of the amount and other particulars by the payee would not ipso-facto invalidate the cheque and the onus to prove that the cheque was not intended to be handed over in discharge of liability would remain on the accused.

In Rahim v. The State (NCT of Delhi), the Court while maintaining the conviction for physical assault, set aside the conviction for sexual assault inasmuch as the concerned Medico-Legal Certificate clearly demonstrated the complete lack of any history of sexual assault or trauma.

In Sara Carrierre Dubey v. Ashish Dubey, the Court held that when the estranged wife was admittedly the joint owner of the property, then she has a very strong entitlement to an order under Section 19(1)(b) of the PWDV Act especially when there was some prima-facie material to establish infidelity on the part of the husband.

In Ramesh Boghabhai Bhut v. State, the Court held that Sections 178 and 179 of Cr.P.C only represent exceptions to the general rule enshrined under Section 177 and that former Sections could not be expanded to the point of completely defeating the latter, and that ordinarily a criminal case should be filed before the Court within whose local limits the offence was committed. The Court further held that only the ‘primary consequence’ can be taken into consideration in determining jurisdiction and a ‘secondary consequence’ will not make Sections 178 and 179 applicable.

In Principle Director, Income Tax (Investigation-2) v. Rajiv Yaduvanshi, the Court observed that the subordinate judiciary does not enjoy inherent powers, unlike the High Court, and, therefore, in the absence of any provision in the Cr. P. C. in this regard, the action of calling for a status report or an action-taken report from the investigation wing of the Income Tax Department when no such complaint or case was pending before the Court concerned was plainly unsustainable.

In State v. Faisal Farooq, the Court observed that it was improper for the Trial Court to have granted the bail to the accused in a case of rioting when it was evident that the large scale and detailed preparation in the form of installing a large iron catapult on the premises of the accused could not have been done at the spur of the moment and would demonstrate some acquiescence on the part of the accused, and enlarging the accused on bail would compromise the interests of society at large.

In Mohmmad Arbaz v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Court held that if the conditions as prescribed under 167(2) of the Cr.P.C have been met when the application is made then the accused is entitled to be granted bail, forthwith. The Court further held that a report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C would not be incomplete merely because it was not accompanied by a Chemical Examiner’s report in proceedings under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act)

In Sabhajeet Maurya v. State NCT of Delhi, the Court held that commission of rape by a HIV-positive person would not attract the offence for attempt to murder punishable under Section 307 of the Indian penal Code,1860 (‘IPC’) though the same could be termed as a negligent act liable to punishment under Section 270 of the IPC, particularly in the absence of any medical evidence as regards the appellant’s viral load or propensity to transmit the disease.

In Gulam Jilani v. Government of NCT, the Court held that even if it was accepted that the procedure under Section 267 of the Cr. P. C. was wrongly invoked to produce the accused before the Metropolitan Magistrate for the purpose of arrest, if the accused had failed to establish that he/she was unfairly prejudiced by this procedure then in light of Section 465 of the Cr. P.C., the order of conviction could not be sought to be called into question on this count.

In Jagadish v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that if an accused or his/her Counsel had chosen not to cross-examine certain witnesses despite ample opportunity having been given for the said purpose, then the absence of cross-examination in these circumstances would not vitiate the trail.

In Ishwar Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), the Court upheld a conviction under the NDPS Act and held that testimonies of official witnesses cannot be ignored merely on the ground that they are official witnesses, particularly when the accused did not indicate any reason in a statement under Section 313 of Cr. P. C. as to why he would have been falsely implicated in the matter.

In Subash Bahadur @ Upender v. The State (NCT of Delhi), while reiterating that there is no inherent power in a Court to remand an accused to custody and that any such exercise must be supported by an express provision of law, the Court held that proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. does not envisage the making of a formal application in this regard and the accused would be entitled to be released on bail if the conditions as set out in the proviso are demonstrated to have been met.

In Seema Kukreja v. State of NCT, the Court held that mere existence of civil proceedings between the parties does not proscribe the initiation of criminal proceedings if the commission of a cognizable offence can be said to be disclosed. The Court, however, observed that contrary pleadings made by a complainant in the civil proceedings are relevant to determine if the criminal complaint made subsequently is vexatious or mala-fide.

In Karan v. State, the Court issued far reaching directions requiring determination and payment of adequate compensation to the victims by the accused who has ultimately been found guilty of the offences complained of and laid down parameters for computation of the compensation on parameters such as impact of the crime on the victim, financial capacity of the accused etc.

In Charan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court reiterated that merely because there was no positive Forensic Science Laboratory (‘FSL’) report, it would not ipso-facto make the testimony of the witness liable to be discarded inasmuch as a FSL report is only corroborative evidence and not conclusive proof.

In Munna Goyal v. Union of India, the Court held that when the detenu had remained untraceable and avoided the service of detention order, the delay in the execution of the detention order could not be raised as a ground to challenge the same. The Court further observed that even if there was some delay in passing the detention order, as long as the said delay was not so inordinate so as to result in snapping of the link between the illegal actions and the detention order, then no ground for interference was made out. The Court also observed that when the detenu had admittedly been provided with voluminous records containing the documents relied upon by the authority, it could not be insisted upon that each and every document referred to by the authority, but not relied upon, was also required to be supplied to the detenu.

In Ved Prakash v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Court observed that considering the adverse effects of penal incarceration, a mechanical invocation of the need for custodial interrogation cannot defeat the entitlement to anticipatory bail.

In Anayo Daniel v. State, the Court rejected an application for regular bail under the NDPS Act inter-alia on the ground that the applicant was a flight risk in as much as he did not have a permanent address in Delhi and had also allegedly travelled to India on a fake passport.

In Swami Ganeshanand v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court rejected a prayer for anticipatory bail in a matter involving the offences inter-alia under the Protection of Children from Sexual Officers Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) inasmuch as it noted that various similar complaints had been made against the applicant by other women in the same neighborhood as also the fact that the applicant had initially absconded from the investigation.


In Anju Mehra v. Canara Bank, the Court observed that in terms of the mandate under the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 read with the relevant office memorandums on the subject, employees with disabilities are to be exempted from routine/rotational transfers.


In Aviral Shankar Pandey v. University of Delhi, the Court held that any change in admission criteria in a particular course is required to be preceded by a detailed procedure and extensive consultations by the University concerned, and the said process cannot be sought to be short-circuited or hurried through a writ petition.

In Waquar Akbar v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that a prayer for cancellation of an exam is very rarely granted inasmuch as it has a deleterious impact on a large number of candidates.

In Aastha Raj v. University of Delhi, the Court observed that a minor accommodation made for a candidate on account of excusing her physical absence on account of travel restrictions on the day of counselling was fair and reasonable, particularly when she had secured a high rank in the merit list.

In Nikumoni v. Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), the Court reiterated that a restrictive approach should not be adopted when only correction in the spelling of the name in the secondary school certificate is sought for.

In Rayaan Chawla v. University of Delhi, the Court observed that the demand of the University for a student to have his name changed in the records of the Central Board of Secondary Education (‘CBSE’) before approaching the University for a change in the University records was fallacious in light of the fact that the student in question had changed his name after having completed his schooling, and thus the change in name in the records of the CBSE could evidently not be done in a retrospective manner.

In Sushma Ambati v. Ministry of Education, the Court held that when the student had admittedly filled up the admission form asking to be treated as general category candidate, then the category could not be sought to be changed at a later juncture.

In Divya Bansal v. University of Delhi through its Registrar, the Court held that a choice made to opt out from the second round of counselling, even if said to have been made inadvertently, could not be sought to be rescinded at a belated stage as it would lead to complete chaos in the process of admission.

In Anubandha Anand v. Union of India, the Court observed that as per the extant policy acceptance of credits or credit transfer is a normal practice in most foreign universities and equivalence can be granted to such foreign degrees where the duration of the degree has been shortened on account of credits accepted by the foreign universities, provided, all other parameters are met.


In Ajay Girdhar v. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India, it was reiterated that a Court should not ordinarily seek to stall the process of formation of a governing body through the electoral process.


In Mustakeem @ Bhura v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), while reiterating that the case of the prosecution must stand on its own legs and cannot succeed purely on the basis of the lacunae in the defense, the Court further observed that when the prosecution had failed to prove that the money found in the possession of the accused was actually the looted amount, then the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act,1872 relating to stolen property would not be attracted.


In Dhiraj Bhushan v. Delhi Development Authority, the Court held that public parks play an important role for people of all age groups, particularly for children, by providing them with outdoor recreational avenues and, therefore, public parks in residential colonies should endeavor to make a specific demarcation for the enjoyment of such facilities.

Amit George
Amit George

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi.

The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Advocates Amol Acharya, Bharat Rayadurgam and Piyo Harold Jaimon.

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