The slippery terrain of caste verification in elections

The intertwined threads of caste, politics and elections recently resurfaced in A Raja v. D Kumar, reshaping the very landscape of election petitions challenging the caste of the returned candidate in India.

This landmark judgment did not merely revisit the settled principles; it recalibrated the delicate balance between constitutional identity and electoral eligibility, pre and post-qualifications, and abridged the rationales between a caste certificate issued by the authorised officer, the enquiry conducted by the anthropology department, the scrutiny committee, and fact-finding given by the High Court. By probing the limits of caste entitlement within reserved constituencies, it rekindled a long-dormant debate on how deeply judicial scrutiny may embrace the socio-political fabric of representation.

As the Election Tribunal, the Kerala High Court examined the validity of the returned candidate’s election from the Devikulam Legislative Assembly constituency - a seat reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes. The pivotal question was whether Raja could lawfully claim Scheduled Caste status in Kerala, in view of the admitted fact that his grandparents had migrated to the erstwhile Princely State of Travancore-Cochin from the Presidency of the State of Madras before the 1950 Scheduled Caste Presidential Order. The burden of proof rested squarely on Mr A. Raja to demonstrate that he had acquired a valid Scheduled Caste identity within Kerala pursuant to the 1950 Scheduled Caste Presidential Notification and guidelines given by the Supreme Court in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth GS Medical College.

Drawing upon the Constitution Bench ruling in Marri Chandra the Court reaffirmed that while members of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes are free to migrate between states, they cannot carry with them their special privileges of backwardness in the geographical area. Such rights are territorially bound to their specific geographical area specified in the Presidential Orders. In the absence of any evidence of migration prior to the 1950 Order, the High Court held that his claim was untenable and that he remained governed by the caste status applicable in Tamil Nadu (erstwhile Madras Presidency).

The Court also found compelling evidence of religious conversion. Alterations in family records, baptismal certificates and the complete absence of Hindu rituals at every stage - including birth, naming, marriage and funeral ceremonies - revealed that Raja had embraced Christianity before filing his nomination. Consequently, the Court declared his election void, reaffirming that caste-based entitlements are territorially confined and cannot be transposed across state or religious boundaries.

The judgment underscored that the benefits of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe status are inseparably linked to the State for which they are notified. Migration - whether voluntary or ancestral - does not confer portability of such privileges and religious conversion extinguishes any continuing claim to caste-based reservation under the constitutional scheme.

However, the tide shifted in the Supreme Court of India. Though the Supreme Court functioned as the first court of appeal, it gave limited appreciation to the evidence.  As long as a valid caste certificate was issued by a competent authority and no challenge was made to such a certificate, and the authority issuing the certificate was not examined, irrespective of the fact that Raja professed Christianity, such  a valid caste certificate cannot be held to be forged or invalid. The Court thus dismissed the election petition, reinstating Raja with full consequential benefits.

This pronouncement fundamentally altered the terrain of election petitions. The Supreme Court held that the principle in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi has no application where the candidate possesses a valid caste certificate issued after due legal process and statutory enquiry. This pronouncement, in effect, equated the acquisition of citizenship with the determination of a candidate’s caste status - two constructs founded on entirely contrasting parameters. For while citizenship may be acquired, caste is an immutable status by birth.

A glance at the statutory framework reveals the magnitude of this transformation.

Under Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), every election petition is triable by the High Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, unless expressly excluded. The jurisdiction to try such petitions vests exclusively in the High Court. The grounds for declaring an election void must strictly conform to Section 100 and the operative portion of any order must align with Sections 98 and 99. While the vires of a law may be examined during such proceedings, the High Court’s competence is limited only by Article 329(a) of the Constitution, which bars challenges to the delimitation of constituencies or allocation of seats framed under Articles 327 and 328.

 Judicial precedents have consistently reaffirmed this plenary jurisdiction. In Bhagwati Prasad Dixit Ghorewala v. Rajeev Gandhi, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, while trying an election petition, exercises full judicial power and does not act in derogation of its constitutional status. Similarly, in T Deen Dayal v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that the High Court remains a constitutional court, even when acting under the RPA. The same principle was reaffirmed in Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh, confirming that the High Court’s inherent powers remain intact while adjudicating election disputes.

Crucially, when trying an election petition, the High Court does not merely conduct a procedural review; it undertakes a full-fledged trial. It is empowered to examine facts, weigh evidence, assess credibility and reach conclusions on both factual and legal issues, including caste claims when they affect the validity of an election.

At the heart of this process lies the clarity of pleadings. Under Section 83(1)(a) of the RPA, an election petition must contain a concise statement of material facts, distinct from the particulars required under Section 83(1)(b). This distinction is structural, not semantic: material facts form the foundation of the cause of action, while particulars supply detail.

At the threshold stage, while considering maintainability, the Court must assume the averments to be true and determine whether they disclose a triable issue. Pleadings must be read as a whole and their imperfection does not negate intelligibility. [Mayar (HK) Ltd v. Vessel MV Fortune Express]

As underscored in Ashraf Kokkur v. KV Abdul Khader, courts must exercise caution before dismissing an election petition at inception; such dismissal should follow only when, even on a plain reading, no cause of action is disclosed. Elections vitiated by corrupt practices or statutory violations under Sections 100 and 123 cannot claim the sanctity of the electorate’s will. Courts, therefore, bear a constitutional duty to examine such allegations within the statutory framework, eschewing hyper-technicality while remaining mindful of electoral realities.

So long as a petition discloses a live cause of action or raises issues worthy of judicial determination, it must proceed to trial. Weakness of merit cannot justify rejection at the threshold. In election law, substance must prevail over form, for justice resides not in the avoidance of trial, but in the pursuit of truth.

It was always understood by the Bar at large that the jurisdiction of the High Court in election disputes is thus not a narrow corridor confined by procedural statutes, but a wide constitutional arena empowered to test even the legitimacy of law when necessary for adjudication. As held and followed in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, even a Constitutional amendment can be challenged in an election petition. Hence, the general principles of law cannot curtail the privilege of the election tribunal and its plenary authority of proceedings under the RPA.

In Indira Nehru Gandhi, the Constitution Bench not only interpreted the law but also subjected the Thirty-Ninth Constitutional Amendment to judicial review. No constitutional amendment can place electoral justice beyond the reach of the courts in  an election petition. The case marked a defining assertion that the High Court, when seized of an election petition, does not function as a mere statutory forum, but as a constitutional sentinel safeguarding the purity of democracy.

This inevitably raises a fundamental question: if inquiries into citizenship - a far more stringent and foundational matter - can be examined within an election petition, why then should scrutiny of caste be restrained?

Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that reference to the Caste Scrutiny Committee is the appropriate course, how can such recourse be reconciled with the rigid 45-day limitation period for filing an election petition under the RPA? Unlike ordinary civil suits, this limitation is inflexible and cannot be extended, as the RPA is a self-contained code that excludes the general provisions of the Limitation Act.

These stringent timelines leave little room for administrative verification, creating an inherent tension between expediency and equity. If caste verification is integral to assessing the validity of an election, yet the statutory timeline precludes thorough inquiry, the system risks producing outcomes that are procedurally sound but substantively unjust. The challenge, therefore, lies in maintaining equilibrium between procedural rigidity and substantive fairness - to ensure both timely disposal and integrity of the electoral process.

What is challenged in an election petition is not the caste certificate per se, but the validity of an election - a process rooted in constitutional sanctity. The issue of the caste certificate, therefore, is not the core cause of action, but an incidental yet determinative component of that broader inquiry. To compartmentalise the two would fragment the very essence of electoral adjudication. An absolute bar on caste scrutiny within election petitions disrupts the delicate balance between statutory mechanisms and judicial oversight. It excludes a relevant, sometimes decisive, fact from judicial consideration, thereby undermining the High Court’s role as the ultimate adjudicator of electoral disputes. More so, if the executive firstly decides the issue of caste certificate in one direction, which the returning officer (RO) approves subsequently, and the election petition cannot wait for a third review by an expert body or/and a quasi-judicial body. The workability of the election petition on a caste challenge will be a challenge. 

A judicious balance must therefore be struck between respecting the role of Caste Scrutiny Committees while preserving the High Court’s plenary jurisdiction under the RPA. The answer lies not in exclusion, but a judicial analysis of the facts. The sanctity of proceedings before the High Court can always be called into question as being contrary to the statue, in this case, the Kerala (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996. It will be inappropriate for a quasi-judicial authority to judge the fact finding given by the High Court, which is a constitutional court.

Any model created through judgments cannot encroach upon the High Court’s statutory and constitutional function as the primary adjudicator of an election dispute. A quasi-judicial body created under statute cannot smuggle into the jurisdiction of a constitutional court. Expert enquiry under the 1996 Kerala Act is presumed to have been done prior to the issuance of the caste certificate. Once the said caste certificate issued by the competent authority is called into question under Section 100 of the RPA,  the validity of the certificate can only be adjudicated in an open trial after giving equal opportunity to the challenger and the returned candidate. It would prevent multiplicity of proceedings, expedite adjudication within statutory limits and uphold both the finality of electoral justice as well as the integrity of the caste verification.

The judicial divergence between the High Court and the Supreme Court thus raises profound questions at the heart of electoral jurisprudence. Is this merely an interpretative difference, or does it signal a deeper recalibration of quasi-judicial review of the constitutional court judgment and fact-finding?

Most crucially, it would have a long term impact on challenges to the electoral justice and the equilibrium between statutory procedure and constitutional principle. The answers to these questions will shape not only the contours of the caste issues in an election litigation, but also the integrity of the democratic mandate.

Aljo K Joseph is an Advocate-on-Record at the Supreme Court of India.

Ramisha Jain is an Advocate practicing before the Supreme Court of India.