Is every lawyer an advocate? Supreme Court answers

When the Supreme Court held recently that in-house lawyers are not “advocates” under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), it was not merely deciding a procedural point about professional privilege. It was restating a foundational distinction in the Indian legal profession - one that separates legal education from the legal profession, and a law degree from the right to practise law.

The judgment, authored by Justice K Vinod Chandran for a Bench led by Chief Justice BR Gavai, came in a suo motu case on the summoning of lawyers by investigating agencies. While the Court clarified that investigative agencies cannot summon advocates to elicit privileged communication with clients, it also turned its gaze inward, examining who precisely qualifies as an “advocate” under Indian law.

At the centre of that discussion lay a simple but loaded question - is every lawyer an advocate?

The Court’s answer was no.

It said that persons with law degrees who work as salaried employees/legal advisors (termed as in-house counsel in legal circles) would not fall within the ambit of the term 'advocate'. Consequently, attorney-client privilege will not apply to them.

“In-house counsel will not be entitled to the privilege under Section 132 since they are not advocates practising in courts as spoken of in the BSA,” the Bench said.

That line, seemingly technical, revives a statutory divide that has existed since the enactment of the Advocates Act, 1961, but one which has blurred over time with the growth of corporate legal roles and compliance-based advisory work.

Under Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961, an advocate means a person whose name is entered on the rolls of a State Bar Council. Sections 29 and 33 then make it explicit that only advocates are entitled to practise law before courts, tribunals or authorities.

On the other hand, a “lawyer” is a colloquial description and refers to anyone holding a law degree or engaged in legal work.

A lawyer may draft contracts, advise a corporation or even teach law, but unless enrolled with a Bar Council, they do not have the statutory right to appear or practise before a court.

It is this right - the entitlement to “practise law” - that the Supreme Court tied to the meaning of “advocate” under Section 132 of the BSA, which protects communications between a client and an advocate.

“The fact of their regular employment with full salaries takes them away from the definition of an Advocate as defined under the Advocates Act, 1961,” the Court said.

The Court relied on Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules, which prohibits a full-time salaried employee from practising as an advocate.

The logic is straightforward - advocacy is a profession, not employment, and requires independence of judgment and duty to the court, qualities compromised when a lawyer is part of an employer’s hierarchy.

The Court cited the Constitution Bench judgment in Rejanish KV v. K Deepa (2025), which reaffirmed that once a law graduate takes up full-time employment, they must intimate the Bar Council and cease to practise. Even if they remain enrolled, they cannot function as advocates until they resign from employment.

Thus, while an in-house counsel may be a lawyer in every sense - legally trained, qualified and offering legal advice - they are not advocates in the eyes of the law. Their relationship with their employer is that of master and servant, not client and advocate.

The judgment identifies independence as the core attribute distinguishing an advocate from a lawyer. Quoting the European Court of Justice’s decision in Akzo Nobel Ltd. v. European Commission (2010), the Supreme Court approved the reasoning that an in-house lawyer, though qualified and even enrolled with a Bar or Law Society, does not enjoy the “same degree of independence” as an external lawyer.

“An in-house counsel, though engaged in the job of advising his employer on questions of law, would even then be influenced by the commercial and business strategies pursued by his employer and would always be beholden to his employer and obliged to protect their interest."

In other words, independence is the litmus test for advocacy. An advocate owes allegiance first to the law and to the court, while a lawyer in employment owes primary allegiance to their employer.

Section 132 of the BSA, like the old Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, protects from disclosure any communication between an advocate and their client made “in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such advocate.”

The privilege rests on the presumption of professional independence - that the advocate is not part of the client’s organisation and, therefore, acts as an external fiduciary.

An in-house counsel, by contrast, stands on a different footing. The Court held that their communications, while possibly confidential, are not privileged under Section 132. They may, however, claim limited protection under Section 134, which prevents compelled disclosure of confidential communications with a legal adviser.

That subtle distinction - confidentiality versus privilege - is what defines the legal consequence of not being an “advocate.”

The ruling has implications far beyond Section 132. It draws a sharp boundary for corporate legal departments, compliance teams and general counsel by clarifying that their internal communications may not enjoy statutory immunity from disclosure.

It also reiterates that the right to practise law, including the privileges that flow from it, is not conferred by a degree but by enrolment and practice. This principle, while old, is increasingly relevant in an era where legal work extends well beyond courtrooms into boardrooms, startups and multinational compliance units.

In re-affirming this line, the Court has effectively said that a person may be a lawyer by qualification, but only by being enrolled and practising independently do they become an advocate in law. And with that status comes privilege, protection and responsibility.

The judgment does not create a new distinction, but restores clarity to one that had grown indistinct with time.

In the eyes of the law, “lawyer” is a broader social description, but “advocate” remains a legal status defined by practice, independence and enrolment.

As Justice Chandran’s reasoning makes clear, the privilege of advocacy is inseparable from the duty of independence and that is what ultimately divides a lawyer from an advocate.